European Journal of Social Psychology
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 347–358 (2007)
Published online 18 August 2006 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.364
Altruism and egoism: Prosocial motivations for helping depend
on relationship context
JON K. MANER* AND MATTHEW T. GAILLIOT
Florida State University, USA
Abstract
Findings from the current study suggest that the link between helping and empathic concern—a
hypothesized motivator of altruistic behavior—may be more pronounced in the context of kinship
relationships than among strangers. Participants expressed their willingness to help a kin-member or
stranger in specific need situations. Putative mediators of helping (empathic concern, general negative
affect, perceptions of oneness) were measured. Empathic concern appeared to partially mediate
effects of relationship context on willingness to help. Moreover, while controlling for egoistic
motivators (negative affect, oneness), empathic concern was linked to participants’ willingness to
help a kin-member but not a stranger. Findings suggest that factors motivating prosocial
action in close relationships may be different from those that motivate helping among strangers.
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Humans possess a tremendous capacity for prosociality. Whether loaning $20 to a sibling or helping a
lost child find her parents, instances abound in which people endeavor to help others (e.g., Burnstein,
Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Krebs, 1991; McGuire,
1994; Pearce & Amato, 1980; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Schaller & Cialdini,
1990). What motives lead people to perform prosocial acts? Do people ever help out of a truly selfless
desire to enhance another person’s welfare? These questions have long been the subject of debate
among scientists and philosophers. When aid is provided to others in a seemingly selfless fashion,
helping can appear to be driven by altruistic motives. However, decades of research (not to mention
centuries of philosophical debate) have left many unanswered questions with respect to whether such
behaviors are truly altruistic, or whether they are driven by more selfish motives.
In the current research, we investigate the possibility that motivations for helping depend upon the
type of relationship that exists between the provider and the recipient of help. Although many previous
studies suggest that different motives can drive affiliative behaviors in different relationship contexts
(e.g., Kenrick et al., 2002; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000), the extent to which altruistic versus
egoistic motives differentially promote helping within different relationship contexts remains relatively
unexplored. In the current study, we focused on the extent to which empathic concern—a
*Correspondence to: J. K. Maner, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1270, USA.
E-mail:
Received 3 August 2005
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 7 March 2006
, 348 Jon K. Maner and Matthew T. Gailliot
psychological state hypothesized to elicit selfless, altruistic behavior—is associated with willingness
to perform prosocial action in different relationship contexts. More specifically, we tested the
hypothesis that whereas empathic concern may promote helping among kin, it is less likely to promote
helping among strangers.
ALTRUISM OR EGOISM: WHICH MOTIVES LEAD PEOPLE TO HELP?
Observing someone in need of help can evoke a sense of empathic concern for that person (see Batson,
1991, for a review). According to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, empathic concern is associated
with an affective focus on the person who is suffering (rather than on oneself), and therefore promotes
truly selfless motivation to provide aid. In a long line of research, Batson and colleagues have amassed
evidence seeming to support the empathy-altruism hypothesis (e.g., Batson, 1998; Batson, O’Quin,
Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983, Batson et al., 1997). Such evidence, therefore, paints a magnanimous
portrait of human nature—that human beings are capable of truly altruistic behavior—of acting on
genuinely selfless motives to enhance another’s welfare.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis, however, has not been without its challenges. The veracity of this
hypothesis has been disputed on several grounds, each focused on the possibility that prosocial actions
seemingly driven by altruistic motives instead may be motivated by more egoistic, self-centered
concerns (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1997; Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991). Indeed,
difficulties in disentangling empathic concern from more egoistic factors have fostered substantial
debate over whether empathic concern genuinely drives prosocial action (e.g., Batson et al., 1997;
Davis, 1994; Neuberg et al., 1997; Piliavin & Charng, 1990).
One difficulty in distinguishing altruistic from egoistic motives for helping reflects the fact that
circumstances leading an observer to feel empathic concern also tend to elicit self-focused emotional
states such as personal sadness. Actions designed to help a person in need, therefore, could be
motivated by a desire to enhance one’s own emotional state rather than a desire to enhance the welfare
of the person in need. For example, studies supporting the arousal/cost-reward model (Dovidio et al.,
1991; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981) and the negative-state relief model (Cialdini et al.,
1987; Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984) suggest that even seemingly altruistic actions may be
motivated instead by a desire to enhance one’s own affective state or to gain self rewards through
helping.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis has been challenged on additional grounds, as well. Researchers
have argued that a sense of shared self can account for actions that are seemingly driven by empathic
concern. People have the capacity for experiencing a sense of ‘oneness’ with another person—a sense
that another person is part of one’s own identity (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis,
Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Several of the same factors that elicit empathic concern have also been
shown to evoke a sense of oneness: kinship (Hamilton, 1964), relationship closeness (Aron, Aron, &
Smollan, 1992; Aron et al., 1991), and shared group identity (Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999).
Moreover, evidence suggests that seemingly altruistic actions may instead be driven by the experience
of oneness, rather than by empathic concern (Cialdini et al., 1997). In turn, researchers have argued that
such actions should be viewed as egoistically, rather than altruistically, motivated (Cialdini et al.,
1997). That is, if one helps another because one experiences a sense of shared self with that person, then
that action should not be viewed as truly selfless, because helping that person would, in an important
psychological sense, also be helping oneself. Therefore, perceptions of oneness must be sufficiently
disentangled from the experience of empathic concern before the motivators of helping can be
adequately specified (e.g., Neuberg et al., 1997).
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 347–358 (2007)
Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 347–358 (2007)
Published online 18 August 2006 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com). DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.364
Altruism and egoism: Prosocial motivations for helping depend
on relationship context
JON K. MANER* AND MATTHEW T. GAILLIOT
Florida State University, USA
Abstract
Findings from the current study suggest that the link between helping and empathic concern—a
hypothesized motivator of altruistic behavior—may be more pronounced in the context of kinship
relationships than among strangers. Participants expressed their willingness to help a kin-member or
stranger in specific need situations. Putative mediators of helping (empathic concern, general negative
affect, perceptions of oneness) were measured. Empathic concern appeared to partially mediate
effects of relationship context on willingness to help. Moreover, while controlling for egoistic
motivators (negative affect, oneness), empathic concern was linked to participants’ willingness to
help a kin-member but not a stranger. Findings suggest that factors motivating prosocial
action in close relationships may be different from those that motivate helping among strangers.
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Humans possess a tremendous capacity for prosociality. Whether loaning $20 to a sibling or helping a
lost child find her parents, instances abound in which people endeavor to help others (e.g., Burnstein,
Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Krebs, 1991; McGuire,
1994; Pearce & Amato, 1980; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Schaller & Cialdini,
1990). What motives lead people to perform prosocial acts? Do people ever help out of a truly selfless
desire to enhance another person’s welfare? These questions have long been the subject of debate
among scientists and philosophers. When aid is provided to others in a seemingly selfless fashion,
helping can appear to be driven by altruistic motives. However, decades of research (not to mention
centuries of philosophical debate) have left many unanswered questions with respect to whether such
behaviors are truly altruistic, or whether they are driven by more selfish motives.
In the current research, we investigate the possibility that motivations for helping depend upon the
type of relationship that exists between the provider and the recipient of help. Although many previous
studies suggest that different motives can drive affiliative behaviors in different relationship contexts
(e.g., Kenrick et al., 2002; Reis, Collins, & Berscheid, 2000), the extent to which altruistic versus
egoistic motives differentially promote helping within different relationship contexts remains relatively
unexplored. In the current study, we focused on the extent to which empathic concern—a
*Correspondence to: J. K. Maner, Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1270, USA.
E-mail:
Received 3 August 2005
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 7 March 2006
, 348 Jon K. Maner and Matthew T. Gailliot
psychological state hypothesized to elicit selfless, altruistic behavior—is associated with willingness
to perform prosocial action in different relationship contexts. More specifically, we tested the
hypothesis that whereas empathic concern may promote helping among kin, it is less likely to promote
helping among strangers.
ALTRUISM OR EGOISM: WHICH MOTIVES LEAD PEOPLE TO HELP?
Observing someone in need of help can evoke a sense of empathic concern for that person (see Batson,
1991, for a review). According to the empathy-altruism hypothesis, empathic concern is associated
with an affective focus on the person who is suffering (rather than on oneself), and therefore promotes
truly selfless motivation to provide aid. In a long line of research, Batson and colleagues have amassed
evidence seeming to support the empathy-altruism hypothesis (e.g., Batson, 1998; Batson, O’Quin,
Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983, Batson et al., 1997). Such evidence, therefore, paints a magnanimous
portrait of human nature—that human beings are capable of truly altruistic behavior—of acting on
genuinely selfless motives to enhance another’s welfare.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis, however, has not been without its challenges. The veracity of this
hypothesis has been disputed on several grounds, each focused on the possibility that prosocial actions
seemingly driven by altruistic motives instead may be motivated by more egoistic, self-centered
concerns (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1997; Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991). Indeed,
difficulties in disentangling empathic concern from more egoistic factors have fostered substantial
debate over whether empathic concern genuinely drives prosocial action (e.g., Batson et al., 1997;
Davis, 1994; Neuberg et al., 1997; Piliavin & Charng, 1990).
One difficulty in distinguishing altruistic from egoistic motives for helping reflects the fact that
circumstances leading an observer to feel empathic concern also tend to elicit self-focused emotional
states such as personal sadness. Actions designed to help a person in need, therefore, could be
motivated by a desire to enhance one’s own emotional state rather than a desire to enhance the welfare
of the person in need. For example, studies supporting the arousal/cost-reward model (Dovidio et al.,
1991; Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981) and the negative-state relief model (Cialdini et al.,
1987; Manucia, Baumann, & Cialdini, 1984) suggest that even seemingly altruistic actions may be
motivated instead by a desire to enhance one’s own affective state or to gain self rewards through
helping.
The empathy-altruism hypothesis has been challenged on additional grounds, as well. Researchers
have argued that a sense of shared self can account for actions that are seemingly driven by empathic
concern. People have the capacity for experiencing a sense of ‘oneness’ with another person—a sense
that another person is part of one’s own identity (e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Davis,
Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Several of the same factors that elicit empathic concern have also been
shown to evoke a sense of oneness: kinship (Hamilton, 1964), relationship closeness (Aron, Aron, &
Smollan, 1992; Aron et al., 1991), and shared group identity (Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999).
Moreover, evidence suggests that seemingly altruistic actions may instead be driven by the experience
of oneness, rather than by empathic concern (Cialdini et al., 1997). In turn, researchers have argued that
such actions should be viewed as egoistically, rather than altruistically, motivated (Cialdini et al.,
1997). That is, if one helps another because one experiences a sense of shared self with that person, then
that action should not be viewed as truly selfless, because helping that person would, in an important
psychological sense, also be helping oneself. Therefore, perceptions of oneness must be sufficiently
disentangled from the experience of empathic concern before the motivators of helping can be
adequately specified (e.g., Neuberg et al., 1997).
Copyright # 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 37, 347–358 (2007)
