PHL232 University of Toronto Test Questions with Answers

PHL232 University of Toronto Test Questions with Answers Reliablist Response to Scepticism - Answer -Relaiblists argue that we do know we're not brains in vats because we have true belifs that we are not brains in vats caused by reliable methods. E.g.: - This is my hand - If this is my hand then I am not a brain in a vat. - Then I am not a brain in a vat. Problems with Reliablism - Answer -- Cannot necessarily distinguish lucky truth (the stopped clock example) - Have to define over what range of situations a method delivers true beliefs. E.g. in a BIV scenario, pretty much no methods would be correct. - Avoiding to the conclusion that repeated AB scenarios means A causes B. - The lottery paradox. You can form the reliable belief that you will not win the lottery, but it will not always be true. Semantic Externalism - Answer -The view that works in our language have meanings that they do in virtue of relations between us and the environment. Semantic Internalism - Answer -The view that words in our language have the meanings they do which are independent of our environment. Externalism About Mental Content - Answer -The view that the contents of our representational mental states are partly determined by relations between us and our environment. Internalism About Mental Content - Answer -The view that the contents of our representational mental states are determined by facts independent of our environment. Putnam's First Argument for Semantic Externalism (from ordinary speaker intuition) - Answer -Churchill and the ant question. It's an explaination for the answer 'no' that the representation requires a causal connection in our language. Putnam's First Argument for Semantic Externalism (Twin Earth) - Answer -Ordinary speaker intuition says our statement would be false. The explaination from semantic externalism says that our uses of words reach past appearance to scientific properties. Semantic Externalist's Response to Scepticism - Answer -Suppose we are brains in vats. - 'tree' in vat -language stands for tree* - 'green' in vat -language stands for green* - 'the tree is green' is true iff this tree* is green*. So, on the BIV: 3. 'I'm a brain in a vat' is true iff I am a brain* in a vat*. 4. But in the vat works, I'm a brain in vat, not a brain* in a vat*. 5. So even in the world where I am a brain in a vat 'I am a brain in a vat' is false. 6. Then I am not a brain in a vat. 7. So I cannot claim to know I am a brain in a vat. Type of Necessity - Answer -epistemically necessary: p is necessarily true given what we know physically necessary: p is necessarily true given the laws of nature metaphysically necessary: p is necessarily true given a right metaphysics logically necessary: p is necessarily true given the laws of logic Objections to Externalist's Response to Scepticism - Answer -There are several cases where the argument may not hold: (i) I became a brain in a vat yesterday. (ii) I have always been a brain in a vat, but I talk to ordinary (embodied) people all the time. My friends don't tell me that I am a brain in a vat because they know that I would be horrified.... (iii) We all became brains in vats five minutes ago. (iv) I am now dreaming. (v) I was created as an already fully thinking and speaking brain in a vat by an intelligent creator who inhabits an ordinary world of tables, chairs, grass, trees, and so on. These make it possible that brains* are oridinary brains and vats* are ordinary vats. Normative Account - Answer -Concerns whether and how the practice meets a standard of correctness. Questions whether a practice is as it ought to be, and what makes it wrong/right. Descriptive Account - Answer -Lays down how people act in accordance with a practice, and tells us how the practice is, not whether it's right or wrong. Naturalism - Answer -Naturalism about a question is the view that the appropriate answer either is or rests on a descriptive, rather than normative, account of our place in the world. Naturalism in epistemology is the view that the right answers to epistemo logical questions are purely normative. Quine's Scientific Naturalism - Answer -According to Quine: - Our words mean what they do because of their connections with our experiences. - An account of how S could be justified in believing p must take the form of how the belief is justified given what the words in p mean. - Therefore if there is justification, it must be a justification which shows how the truth can be derived from S's experiences.