The superior negotiating skills of the British delegation prevented Sinn Fein from achieving a
republic in the Anglo-Irisih treaty talks of 1921. How far would you agree with this statement
(20) (Modal answer)
Treaty negotiations took place between 11 October and 6 December 1921. It argued that
Superior British negotiating skills prevented Sinn Fein from achieving a republic, but there
were also additional reasons for their failure. This includes the weakness of their Irish
delegation, division within Sinn Fein, and, most importantly, the fact that it was never a
realistic prospect.
The superior negotiating skills of the British delegation were by no means significant.
This is due to the strength of the British team.
- The team leader, Lloyd George, was a brilliant politician with a wealth of experience
with Ireland. He was known as the "Welsh wizard" who displayed his skills to win
public support, given his offer of a conference seemed fair and generous. He was
determined to make Sinn Fein accept the treaty to his own terms.
- He was also skilled in reminding the Irish delegation that a resumption of hostilities
was not beyond the realm of possibility. This is seen with final proposals on 1st
December that other than minor concessions made on defence, the terms had nod
strayed much from the original status offer made to de Valera on 20th July.
- The team comprised Austin Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, and Winston Churchill,
outstanding negotiators with extensive political experience who would unite in making
Sinn Fein accept the crown and empire. Also on the team were Hamar Greenwood,
Chief Secretary for Ireland; Laming Worthington-Evans, Secretary of State for War;
and Gordon Hewart, Attorney-General.
- The British delegation's superior negotiating skills in its sub-conference tactic further
weakened the Irish side and caused suspicion and mistrust to grow among the Sinn
Fein representatives.
- The sub-conference only involved Griffith and Collins while isolating Childers, who
was the most doctrinaire Republican and stance on rejecting dominion status.
Therefore, the superior negotiating skills of the British delegation definitely made an impact
and reduced the ability of the Irish to alter far from the terms; that being said, in terms of
achieving a republic for Sinn Fein was never a realistic prospect.
, The weakness of the Irish delegation is also clear.
- This was first due to the formation of a weak team, which contrasted significantly with
the British.
- The team was first to be said without De Valera, the more politically experienced
leader, who made the team lack authority in his absence. This left Arthur Griffith to
lead the delegation.
- The team was also made up of Michael Collins, a soldier who felt it wasn't his place,
and Robert Barton, Erskine Childers, George Duffy and Easmon Duggan. The team
was formidable and able, but division amongst has created a crucial weakness.
There was personal bitterness that Collins didn't trust Childers as he was suspected
of being in secret communication with de Valera.
- The Dail also did not ensure they were fully prepared; the limits of concessions they
may offer were not clarified, and the delegation set off with Griffith and Childers far
apart on the crucial question of national status.
- This created an opportunity for Lloyd George to cultivate a relationship with Griffith,
who was more willing than others to compromise and gullible. This is seen when
Griffith provided assurances that the Irish would accept allegiance to the Crown if
they received satisfactory guarantees of unity.
- There was also confusion over the concept of external association, which was a main
point in the negotiation.
This has shown that the Irish team was nowhere near as united and well-organised as the
British delegation. Yet this is not the direct cause of the failure to achieve a republic.
In addition, from early on, they have also already placed themselves at a disadvantage by
not only accepting the British invitation to the conference but also not having a counter
document ready to respond to the British team's opening proposal of dominion status.
- By the time the counter-proposals were submitted, the Irish had already abandoned
the term "republic," asking instead for "association" status within the empire.
- Another issue for the Irish was the lack of clarity around their role as
plenipotentiaries.
- The contradictory instructions from de Valera and the Dail meant confusion over
whether the Irish negotiating team had full powers to sign a Treaty without prior
consent from Dublin. They had full powers, but before a decision was made, they had
to contact Dunblin and await a reply. This led to Collins and Griffith being unhappy
with the limitation, and they ignored the instructions when the crunch came. There
were also divisions again within Sinn Fein.
- When the delegates presented the treaty to the Dail cabinet, it split with De Valera,
Brugha and Stack voting against it and Griffit, Collins, Barton and Cosgrave voting for
it.
- Those with pro-treaty ideas thought that it was the best that could be gotten, and that
anti-treaty saw the Irish Republic as betrayed because the delegation had exceeded
its power and instructions as plenipotentiaries.
Therefore, the weakness of the Irish delegation, similar to the superior negotiating skills of
the British delegation, both contributed to preventing Sinn Fein from achieving much during
negotiations to an extent, but again, in terms of republic for Sinn Fein was never a realistic
prospect
republic in the Anglo-Irisih treaty talks of 1921. How far would you agree with this statement
(20) (Modal answer)
Treaty negotiations took place between 11 October and 6 December 1921. It argued that
Superior British negotiating skills prevented Sinn Fein from achieving a republic, but there
were also additional reasons for their failure. This includes the weakness of their Irish
delegation, division within Sinn Fein, and, most importantly, the fact that it was never a
realistic prospect.
The superior negotiating skills of the British delegation were by no means significant.
This is due to the strength of the British team.
- The team leader, Lloyd George, was a brilliant politician with a wealth of experience
with Ireland. He was known as the "Welsh wizard" who displayed his skills to win
public support, given his offer of a conference seemed fair and generous. He was
determined to make Sinn Fein accept the treaty to his own terms.
- He was also skilled in reminding the Irish delegation that a resumption of hostilities
was not beyond the realm of possibility. This is seen with final proposals on 1st
December that other than minor concessions made on defence, the terms had nod
strayed much from the original status offer made to de Valera on 20th July.
- The team comprised Austin Chamberlain, Lord Birkenhead, and Winston Churchill,
outstanding negotiators with extensive political experience who would unite in making
Sinn Fein accept the crown and empire. Also on the team were Hamar Greenwood,
Chief Secretary for Ireland; Laming Worthington-Evans, Secretary of State for War;
and Gordon Hewart, Attorney-General.
- The British delegation's superior negotiating skills in its sub-conference tactic further
weakened the Irish side and caused suspicion and mistrust to grow among the Sinn
Fein representatives.
- The sub-conference only involved Griffith and Collins while isolating Childers, who
was the most doctrinaire Republican and stance on rejecting dominion status.
Therefore, the superior negotiating skills of the British delegation definitely made an impact
and reduced the ability of the Irish to alter far from the terms; that being said, in terms of
achieving a republic for Sinn Fein was never a realistic prospect.
, The weakness of the Irish delegation is also clear.
- This was first due to the formation of a weak team, which contrasted significantly with
the British.
- The team was first to be said without De Valera, the more politically experienced
leader, who made the team lack authority in his absence. This left Arthur Griffith to
lead the delegation.
- The team was also made up of Michael Collins, a soldier who felt it wasn't his place,
and Robert Barton, Erskine Childers, George Duffy and Easmon Duggan. The team
was formidable and able, but division amongst has created a crucial weakness.
There was personal bitterness that Collins didn't trust Childers as he was suspected
of being in secret communication with de Valera.
- The Dail also did not ensure they were fully prepared; the limits of concessions they
may offer were not clarified, and the delegation set off with Griffith and Childers far
apart on the crucial question of national status.
- This created an opportunity for Lloyd George to cultivate a relationship with Griffith,
who was more willing than others to compromise and gullible. This is seen when
Griffith provided assurances that the Irish would accept allegiance to the Crown if
they received satisfactory guarantees of unity.
- There was also confusion over the concept of external association, which was a main
point in the negotiation.
This has shown that the Irish team was nowhere near as united and well-organised as the
British delegation. Yet this is not the direct cause of the failure to achieve a republic.
In addition, from early on, they have also already placed themselves at a disadvantage by
not only accepting the British invitation to the conference but also not having a counter
document ready to respond to the British team's opening proposal of dominion status.
- By the time the counter-proposals were submitted, the Irish had already abandoned
the term "republic," asking instead for "association" status within the empire.
- Another issue for the Irish was the lack of clarity around their role as
plenipotentiaries.
- The contradictory instructions from de Valera and the Dail meant confusion over
whether the Irish negotiating team had full powers to sign a Treaty without prior
consent from Dublin. They had full powers, but before a decision was made, they had
to contact Dunblin and await a reply. This led to Collins and Griffith being unhappy
with the limitation, and they ignored the instructions when the crunch came. There
were also divisions again within Sinn Fein.
- When the delegates presented the treaty to the Dail cabinet, it split with De Valera,
Brugha and Stack voting against it and Griffit, Collins, Barton and Cosgrave voting for
it.
- Those with pro-treaty ideas thought that it was the best that could be gotten, and that
anti-treaty saw the Irish Republic as betrayed because the delegation had exceeded
its power and instructions as plenipotentiaries.
Therefore, the weakness of the Irish delegation, similar to the superior negotiating skills of
the British delegation, both contributed to preventing Sinn Fein from achieving much during
negotiations to an extent, but again, in terms of republic for Sinn Fein was never a realistic
prospect
