Utrecht University
2023/2024
GE2V19007 Secret Intelligence: achterkant van Internationale
Betrekkingen
The Billion Dollar Spy samenvatting
- Nummers na zinnen refereren naar paginanummers
- Schuingedrukte zinnen zijn directe quotes uit het boek
- Gebruikte afkortingen zijn CW (Cold War), SU (Soviet Union), TC
(Tolkachev)
David E. Hoffman, The Billion Dollar Spy. A true story of Cold War
betrayal and
espionage, Doubleday 2015.
PROLOGUE
Winter 1982, CIA loses contact with valuable spy
Decoy with CIA agents, Bill Plunkert is put on the case
- Jack in the box (JIB) used
- Plunkert is tasked to find the missing spy in Moscow
CHAPTER 1: OUT OF THE WILERNESS
The CIA had no spies in Moscow for a long time (16)
- To risky
Until they had an engineer who worked inside the Soviet military
establishment who wanted to work for the CIA
- Operation was eventually destroyed due to betrayal from within (17)
CIA has had long struggle to get inside the USSR
CIA was created in 1947, reaction to Pearl Harbor
- Provide high-quality, objective analysis
- First centralized intelligence agency in America
CIA objective changed because of the onset of Cold War (18)
CW repressive environment in USSR made setting up stations and agents
in Moscow very difficult (19)
- Still, increasing pressure to get feet on the ground
- Information was collected outside of the USSR (20)
Need for spies on the inside, little information was available to US was
concluded in 1953 assessment
Two breakthroughs in the 1950s and early 1960s (21)
, - Pyotr Popev and Oleg Penkovsky volunteered and were both officers
in USSR military
Pyotr Popev was member of GRU
- Met CIA in Vienna between 1953-1955
- His motivation was personal, revenge and disillusion with
communism (22)
- Popov was sent to Moscow but attempts to set up an office failed
- Popov was transferred to East Germany in 1956 and continued
spying there
- Popov was discovered in 1958 and executed in 1960 (23)
Oleg Penkovsky was a colonel in the GRU, tried to volunteer by giving
letters (24)
- Eventually British and American services decided to run Penkovsky
together (25)
- Penkovsky provided much material (26)
- Some difficulties with setting Penkovsky up in Moscow (27)
- Eventually British service took the lead in Moscow (28)
- Penkovsky was last seen in September 1962 when he became
suspicious to the KGB and was executed in 1963
Two other Soviet spies who spied outside the USSR were Dmitri Polyakov
(tophat) and Alexei Kulak (fedora) (29)
- Both valuable agents but not inside Moscow
After loss of Penkovsky, long unproductive period in Moscow for CIA
- Counterintelligence chief of CIA Angleton who incited paranoia and
operational paralysis
Counterintelligence is essential for any spy agency to prevent penetration
from the same espionage methods it uses against others (30).
Counterintelligence requires inward skepticism and outward vigilance
Tension between intelligence and counterintelligence
- Too much questioning of intelligence due to Angleton’s influence
Angleton’s distrust and suspicions were detrimental for setting up
espionage operations in USSR (32)
Younger generation of CIA case officers wanted to lead agency out of this
period
- Burton Gerber, trained for espionage and worked in Frankfurt and
Berlin (33)
Dead drop to exchange messages seen as safest method (34)
Angleton had less attention for Eastern Europe, which is why a newer
generation of agents could set up entering “denied areas”
, Another new generation agent was Haviland Smith (35)
- Began to think of ways to evade surveillance when living in Prague
- Perfected the brush pass (37)
- When moved to Berlin he began to train agents in his methods
- Returned to US CIA in 1963 to set up a course for agents going to
Eastern Europe, still found some caution and timidity (38)
Gerber experimented with meeting agents away from surveillance (39)
Beginning of the CW US relied on technology, but also need for humint
(40)
How to recruit Soviet spies became a question
- Issue of walk-ins
Gerber rules took over Angleton era (42)
- Not every volunteer was a dangle
New chief to replace Angleton was David Blee, he argued that there was a
serious need for agents inside USSR
First agent of new era was Alexander Ogorodnik
CHAPTER 2: MOSCOW STATION
Marti Peterson was a woman living a double life as in Moscow as US
embassy employee and CIA spy (45)
- Coached and guided by Moscow station chief Robert Fulton
- Women would be less suspected by the KGB
Peterson lived under strict rules and was trained by CIA before leaving US
(46)
Ogorodnik operation was in full swing at the Moscow station (47)
- Spy had code name Cktrigon
Signs of difficulty in 1976
- Ogorodnik missed signals in February and March
- Ogorodnik failed to pick up a dead-drop (48)
- He did pick up a cyanide pill in June later threw it out and
requested a new one (49)
- Ogorodnik was supposed to leave a dead-drop package for Peterson
to pick up, but package wasn’t there upon arrival
In January 1976, Futon was approached by a Soviet man who handed him
a note (50)
- Note said he wanted to discuss matters with an American official and
suggested a meeting (51)
- Note was suspected to be a KGB trap
2023/2024
GE2V19007 Secret Intelligence: achterkant van Internationale
Betrekkingen
The Billion Dollar Spy samenvatting
- Nummers na zinnen refereren naar paginanummers
- Schuingedrukte zinnen zijn directe quotes uit het boek
- Gebruikte afkortingen zijn CW (Cold War), SU (Soviet Union), TC
(Tolkachev)
David E. Hoffman, The Billion Dollar Spy. A true story of Cold War
betrayal and
espionage, Doubleday 2015.
PROLOGUE
Winter 1982, CIA loses contact with valuable spy
Decoy with CIA agents, Bill Plunkert is put on the case
- Jack in the box (JIB) used
- Plunkert is tasked to find the missing spy in Moscow
CHAPTER 1: OUT OF THE WILERNESS
The CIA had no spies in Moscow for a long time (16)
- To risky
Until they had an engineer who worked inside the Soviet military
establishment who wanted to work for the CIA
- Operation was eventually destroyed due to betrayal from within (17)
CIA has had long struggle to get inside the USSR
CIA was created in 1947, reaction to Pearl Harbor
- Provide high-quality, objective analysis
- First centralized intelligence agency in America
CIA objective changed because of the onset of Cold War (18)
CW repressive environment in USSR made setting up stations and agents
in Moscow very difficult (19)
- Still, increasing pressure to get feet on the ground
- Information was collected outside of the USSR (20)
Need for spies on the inside, little information was available to US was
concluded in 1953 assessment
Two breakthroughs in the 1950s and early 1960s (21)
, - Pyotr Popev and Oleg Penkovsky volunteered and were both officers
in USSR military
Pyotr Popev was member of GRU
- Met CIA in Vienna between 1953-1955
- His motivation was personal, revenge and disillusion with
communism (22)
- Popov was sent to Moscow but attempts to set up an office failed
- Popov was transferred to East Germany in 1956 and continued
spying there
- Popov was discovered in 1958 and executed in 1960 (23)
Oleg Penkovsky was a colonel in the GRU, tried to volunteer by giving
letters (24)
- Eventually British and American services decided to run Penkovsky
together (25)
- Penkovsky provided much material (26)
- Some difficulties with setting Penkovsky up in Moscow (27)
- Eventually British service took the lead in Moscow (28)
- Penkovsky was last seen in September 1962 when he became
suspicious to the KGB and was executed in 1963
Two other Soviet spies who spied outside the USSR were Dmitri Polyakov
(tophat) and Alexei Kulak (fedora) (29)
- Both valuable agents but not inside Moscow
After loss of Penkovsky, long unproductive period in Moscow for CIA
- Counterintelligence chief of CIA Angleton who incited paranoia and
operational paralysis
Counterintelligence is essential for any spy agency to prevent penetration
from the same espionage methods it uses against others (30).
Counterintelligence requires inward skepticism and outward vigilance
Tension between intelligence and counterintelligence
- Too much questioning of intelligence due to Angleton’s influence
Angleton’s distrust and suspicions were detrimental for setting up
espionage operations in USSR (32)
Younger generation of CIA case officers wanted to lead agency out of this
period
- Burton Gerber, trained for espionage and worked in Frankfurt and
Berlin (33)
Dead drop to exchange messages seen as safest method (34)
Angleton had less attention for Eastern Europe, which is why a newer
generation of agents could set up entering “denied areas”
, Another new generation agent was Haviland Smith (35)
- Began to think of ways to evade surveillance when living in Prague
- Perfected the brush pass (37)
- When moved to Berlin he began to train agents in his methods
- Returned to US CIA in 1963 to set up a course for agents going to
Eastern Europe, still found some caution and timidity (38)
Gerber experimented with meeting agents away from surveillance (39)
Beginning of the CW US relied on technology, but also need for humint
(40)
How to recruit Soviet spies became a question
- Issue of walk-ins
Gerber rules took over Angleton era (42)
- Not every volunteer was a dangle
New chief to replace Angleton was David Blee, he argued that there was a
serious need for agents inside USSR
First agent of new era was Alexander Ogorodnik
CHAPTER 2: MOSCOW STATION
Marti Peterson was a woman living a double life as in Moscow as US
embassy employee and CIA spy (45)
- Coached and guided by Moscow station chief Robert Fulton
- Women would be less suspected by the KGB
Peterson lived under strict rules and was trained by CIA before leaving US
(46)
Ogorodnik operation was in full swing at the Moscow station (47)
- Spy had code name Cktrigon
Signs of difficulty in 1976
- Ogorodnik missed signals in February and March
- Ogorodnik failed to pick up a dead-drop (48)
- He did pick up a cyanide pill in June later threw it out and
requested a new one (49)
- Ogorodnik was supposed to leave a dead-drop package for Peterson
to pick up, but package wasn’t there upon arrival
In January 1976, Futon was approached by a Soviet man who handed him
a note (50)
- Note said he wanted to discuss matters with an American official and
suggested a meeting (51)
- Note was suspected to be a KGB trap
