Michiel Leezenberg - History & Philosophy of the Humanities
Chapter 2: The Birth of the Modern Natural Sciences
2.1 The Scientific Revolution
classical science: formulated as theories specifying empirical regularities. These theories have a
universal character. Facts become known through experiments. Theories can be used to deduce
predictions and when testing proves them correct these theories receive a new confirmation
Aristotelian science
science formulates universal statements derived from individual observations through induction.
statements should also follow from each other deductively
for Aristotle, we understand something if we know its (4) causes. His view of explanations is thus
teleological.
Ptolemy’s astronomy and Galen’s medicine (4 humors) are also part of Aristotelian science.
Human beings are a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm; the universe
2.1b Renaissance Humanism (14th-16th C): Eloquence & Learning
studies of Latin authors like Cicero, rediscovery of Platonic philosophy, recovery of texts from
antiquity.
Petrarca as a pioneer of Renaissance humanism
15th C: printing presses & fall of Constantinople
new generation of (European) humanists: Erasmus new Bible translation
understanding of universal humanity: humanitas
2.1c Rejection of Humanism & Aristotelian Science
Copernicus: heliocentric > Copernican revolution
primary vs secondary qualities: properties of things themselves versus illusions/perceptions
Aristotle’s teleological explanations replaced by mechanistic: nature as a machine
these developments are a kind of Gestalt Switch
Aristotle, movement = qualitative change, Galileo: = quantitative (new conceptual scheme)
Francis Bacon: rejection of idols, induction & experiments to achieve a systematic increase of
knowledge. Science as a collective activity
Boyle also advocated experiments with witnesses
but Hobbes said the artificiality of experiments was unscientific
The Scientific Revolution is not necessarily a rejection of religious dogma; many scientists wanted
to unite their findings with the church.
Should we account for it internalistically (as a self-contained occurrence) or externalistically (as
caused by its context)? More recent historians & socialist argue that this distinction is moot
because internal and external developments are mutually constitutive
After the scientific revolution, scientific knowledge could no longer be legitimized by common
sense everyday observations or described in ordinary language. This raised a bunch of new
methodological and epistemological questions.
questions about subject/object and mind/body are raised (Descartes)
questions about the legitimacy of observation (Hume)
Kant: category of causation, imposed on our thinking, like space and time. These are all forms of
intuition. (see page 64-65). We only know the phenomenal world, the world as it appears to us.
Transcendental question: what are the conditions for the possibility of knowledge?
Copernican turn: science does not revolve around the known object but the knowing subject. It
revolves around our capacity for understanding rather than the things we (try to) understand.
How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? These are judgements true prior to experience,
but they nonetheless add something to our knowledge. like maths.
The Kantian subject is universal.
subject-object scheme: knowledge = relation of representation between knowing subject and know
object
Chapter 3: Logical Empiricism & Critical Rationalism
, 3.1 Logical Empiricism: The Vienna Circle
Max Planck (1858-1947) discovery of new fields in physics
Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russel - predicate logic
previously Kant: empirical knowledge rests on invariable, indubitable and universal foundation of
synthetic a priori judgements.
neo-Kantians historicized Kant to adapt to new developments in exact sciences
Post WWI, Vienna was the epicenter of the development of sciences
Freud developed his psychoanalysis there
Otto Neurath (1838-1945) named this movement The Vienna Circle
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was a key figure.
The Circle were strict empiricists, rejecting Kant.
Red Vienna of the Interbellum was the Circle’s foundation. They saw the spreading of science
among the working class as their duty.
1928 - Ernst Mach Society, Volksaufklarung, spreading Enlightenment among the working class.
No singular doctrine, an open circle containing many beliefs, but they all had an anti-metaphysical
attitude in common. Something must be wrong with traditional philosophy because it was not
progressing as rapidly as the natural sciences. Also, they thought the Catholic Church was ‘a
reactionary force that obstructed societal progress.’
Otto Neurath (18821945) — an anti-metaphysician and a socialist.
Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), intellectual leader of the Circle, a bourgeoisie liberal
3.1a Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) developed the epistemological ideas of the Circle in detail
a ‘scientific humanist’, an apolitical thinker.
the Logic of Science, not a historical or psychological description of scientific activities but a logical
justification for the results of the work.
Central question for logical empiricists: How can we account for both the success and the change
or growth of scientific knowledge?
Kant’s notion of a priori knowledge became untenable as the foundations he had considered fixed
knowledge (Aristotle, Euclid, Newton) became dubitable
predicate logic replaced Aristotelian syllogisms
non-Euclidean geometry was developed by Lobachevsky and Gauss
and Einstein improved on Newton’s mechanics.
Logic: investigates the structure of and relations between statements, particularly their validity
All statements (propositions) are either universal (covering an entire class of entities) or
singular/existential (covering only individual entities). We can clearly indicate the “truth conditions”
of propositions.
contradictory versus consistent statements
some premises entail a logical conclusion if the premises cannot be true without the conclusion
being true as well.
statements are logically equivalent if they are true in exactly the same circumstances
logical analysis can reveal such relationships between statements
pseudostatements have a familiar grammatical structure but no meaning. For Carnap, logic should
aim to exclude such ‘abuses.’
The scientific approach to philosophy of the Vienna Circle was aimed at a linear progress. They
shared the empiricist principle that only perception or experience is a legitimate source of
knowledge, and they used the method of logical analysis to determine the exact meaning of
statements. Logic could determine what could be meaningfully expressed in language. This
development in philosophy is known as the linguistic turn, not investigating the justification of
knowledge but the meaningfulness of statements.
Not the process of scientific discovery but its result is important, the descriptive context of
discovery is separated from the normative context of justification (the logical or epistemological
justification of the newly gained scientific insight).
Chapter 2: The Birth of the Modern Natural Sciences
2.1 The Scientific Revolution
classical science: formulated as theories specifying empirical regularities. These theories have a
universal character. Facts become known through experiments. Theories can be used to deduce
predictions and when testing proves them correct these theories receive a new confirmation
Aristotelian science
science formulates universal statements derived from individual observations through induction.
statements should also follow from each other deductively
for Aristotle, we understand something if we know its (4) causes. His view of explanations is thus
teleological.
Ptolemy’s astronomy and Galen’s medicine (4 humors) are also part of Aristotelian science.
Human beings are a microcosm that mirrors the macrocosm; the universe
2.1b Renaissance Humanism (14th-16th C): Eloquence & Learning
studies of Latin authors like Cicero, rediscovery of Platonic philosophy, recovery of texts from
antiquity.
Petrarca as a pioneer of Renaissance humanism
15th C: printing presses & fall of Constantinople
new generation of (European) humanists: Erasmus new Bible translation
understanding of universal humanity: humanitas
2.1c Rejection of Humanism & Aristotelian Science
Copernicus: heliocentric > Copernican revolution
primary vs secondary qualities: properties of things themselves versus illusions/perceptions
Aristotle’s teleological explanations replaced by mechanistic: nature as a machine
these developments are a kind of Gestalt Switch
Aristotle, movement = qualitative change, Galileo: = quantitative (new conceptual scheme)
Francis Bacon: rejection of idols, induction & experiments to achieve a systematic increase of
knowledge. Science as a collective activity
Boyle also advocated experiments with witnesses
but Hobbes said the artificiality of experiments was unscientific
The Scientific Revolution is not necessarily a rejection of religious dogma; many scientists wanted
to unite their findings with the church.
Should we account for it internalistically (as a self-contained occurrence) or externalistically (as
caused by its context)? More recent historians & socialist argue that this distinction is moot
because internal and external developments are mutually constitutive
After the scientific revolution, scientific knowledge could no longer be legitimized by common
sense everyday observations or described in ordinary language. This raised a bunch of new
methodological and epistemological questions.
questions about subject/object and mind/body are raised (Descartes)
questions about the legitimacy of observation (Hume)
Kant: category of causation, imposed on our thinking, like space and time. These are all forms of
intuition. (see page 64-65). We only know the phenomenal world, the world as it appears to us.
Transcendental question: what are the conditions for the possibility of knowledge?
Copernican turn: science does not revolve around the known object but the knowing subject. It
revolves around our capacity for understanding rather than the things we (try to) understand.
How are synthetic a priori judgements possible? These are judgements true prior to experience,
but they nonetheless add something to our knowledge. like maths.
The Kantian subject is universal.
subject-object scheme: knowledge = relation of representation between knowing subject and know
object
Chapter 3: Logical Empiricism & Critical Rationalism
, 3.1 Logical Empiricism: The Vienna Circle
Max Planck (1858-1947) discovery of new fields in physics
Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russel - predicate logic
previously Kant: empirical knowledge rests on invariable, indubitable and universal foundation of
synthetic a priori judgements.
neo-Kantians historicized Kant to adapt to new developments in exact sciences
Post WWI, Vienna was the epicenter of the development of sciences
Freud developed his psychoanalysis there
Otto Neurath (1838-1945) named this movement The Vienna Circle
Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was a key figure.
The Circle were strict empiricists, rejecting Kant.
Red Vienna of the Interbellum was the Circle’s foundation. They saw the spreading of science
among the working class as their duty.
1928 - Ernst Mach Society, Volksaufklarung, spreading Enlightenment among the working class.
No singular doctrine, an open circle containing many beliefs, but they all had an anti-metaphysical
attitude in common. Something must be wrong with traditional philosophy because it was not
progressing as rapidly as the natural sciences. Also, they thought the Catholic Church was ‘a
reactionary force that obstructed societal progress.’
Otto Neurath (18821945) — an anti-metaphysician and a socialist.
Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), intellectual leader of the Circle, a bourgeoisie liberal
3.1a Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) developed the epistemological ideas of the Circle in detail
a ‘scientific humanist’, an apolitical thinker.
the Logic of Science, not a historical or psychological description of scientific activities but a logical
justification for the results of the work.
Central question for logical empiricists: How can we account for both the success and the change
or growth of scientific knowledge?
Kant’s notion of a priori knowledge became untenable as the foundations he had considered fixed
knowledge (Aristotle, Euclid, Newton) became dubitable
predicate logic replaced Aristotelian syllogisms
non-Euclidean geometry was developed by Lobachevsky and Gauss
and Einstein improved on Newton’s mechanics.
Logic: investigates the structure of and relations between statements, particularly their validity
All statements (propositions) are either universal (covering an entire class of entities) or
singular/existential (covering only individual entities). We can clearly indicate the “truth conditions”
of propositions.
contradictory versus consistent statements
some premises entail a logical conclusion if the premises cannot be true without the conclusion
being true as well.
statements are logically equivalent if they are true in exactly the same circumstances
logical analysis can reveal such relationships between statements
pseudostatements have a familiar grammatical structure but no meaning. For Carnap, logic should
aim to exclude such ‘abuses.’
The scientific approach to philosophy of the Vienna Circle was aimed at a linear progress. They
shared the empiricist principle that only perception or experience is a legitimate source of
knowledge, and they used the method of logical analysis to determine the exact meaning of
statements. Logic could determine what could be meaningfully expressed in language. This
development in philosophy is known as the linguistic turn, not investigating the justification of
knowledge but the meaningfulness of statements.
Not the process of scientific discovery but its result is important, the descriptive context of
discovery is separated from the normative context of justification (the logical or epistemological
justification of the newly gained scientific insight).
