Meta Ethics
“What is the metaethical status of moral statements”
introduction I will argue from a moral anti realist perspective as it is a more realistic account of the nature
of moral discourse. I will be using arguments from the naturalistic fallacy and epistemic
queerness in order to strengthen my argument.
The most crucial argument will be that from the naturalistic fallacy as this directly undermines
the claim that moral claims can be derived from non-moral natural claims.
Mill's proof of Shows that moral properties exist and are natural properties: moral cognitivist naturalism.
utilitarianism P1. The only evidence something is visible is if it is visible
P2. like this, the only evidence something is desirable is if it is desired
P3. People desire their own happiness .
C1. Therefore, general happiness is desirable.
P4. People's happiness is good for them.
P5. Happiness is good for the aggregate of all people.
C2. Therefore happiness is good.
Naturalistic fallacy Just because happiness is correlated with good actions, that doesn't mean goodness and
happiness are the same thing. The mistake of deriving a moral conclusion from a naturalistic
premise. So C2 does not derive P5, as Mill commits the naturalistic fallacy.
Good is indefinable and unanalysable
Utilitarianism attempts to define the good in natural terms (as happiness)
Hence making a category mistake.
Moore: moral There are moral properties, however they are non-natural properties/facts.
properties are Intuitionism:ethical judgements are unique and cannot be analysed in non-moral or natural
non-natural. terms.
Moore argues that we grasp these moral facts from self evident intuitions, as we cannot
empirically prove these. Moral principles cannot be deduced from other principles, they are
irreducible in themselves.
Queerness Non-natural properties would be epistemically queer. “Intuition doesn't explain anything”.
Moores alleged non-natural moral properties are so strange we should reject their existence.
How are we to acquire knowledge of these non-natural properties? This pre assumes many
metaphysically absurd “special faculties for determining these non-natural properties’ which
deems this hypothesis absurd.
Moral anti-realism Define nihilism. If anti-realism is true, and if taken to the extreme, then there is no reason not
leads to nihilism to go on a murderous rampage. Without some form of moral guidance, individuals and
societies may struggle to determine what is right or wrong.
However this The logic, just because we don't want something to happen, does not directly undermine
argument does not moral anti-realism.
prove moral
anti-realism to be
false
“What is the metaethical status of moral statements”
introduction I will argue from a moral anti realist perspective as it is a more realistic account of the nature
of moral discourse. I will be using arguments from the naturalistic fallacy and epistemic
queerness in order to strengthen my argument.
The most crucial argument will be that from the naturalistic fallacy as this directly undermines
the claim that moral claims can be derived from non-moral natural claims.
Mill's proof of Shows that moral properties exist and are natural properties: moral cognitivist naturalism.
utilitarianism P1. The only evidence something is visible is if it is visible
P2. like this, the only evidence something is desirable is if it is desired
P3. People desire their own happiness .
C1. Therefore, general happiness is desirable.
P4. People's happiness is good for them.
P5. Happiness is good for the aggregate of all people.
C2. Therefore happiness is good.
Naturalistic fallacy Just because happiness is correlated with good actions, that doesn't mean goodness and
happiness are the same thing. The mistake of deriving a moral conclusion from a naturalistic
premise. So C2 does not derive P5, as Mill commits the naturalistic fallacy.
Good is indefinable and unanalysable
Utilitarianism attempts to define the good in natural terms (as happiness)
Hence making a category mistake.
Moore: moral There are moral properties, however they are non-natural properties/facts.
properties are Intuitionism:ethical judgements are unique and cannot be analysed in non-moral or natural
non-natural. terms.
Moore argues that we grasp these moral facts from self evident intuitions, as we cannot
empirically prove these. Moral principles cannot be deduced from other principles, they are
irreducible in themselves.
Queerness Non-natural properties would be epistemically queer. “Intuition doesn't explain anything”.
Moores alleged non-natural moral properties are so strange we should reject their existence.
How are we to acquire knowledge of these non-natural properties? This pre assumes many
metaphysically absurd “special faculties for determining these non-natural properties’ which
deems this hypothesis absurd.
Moral anti-realism Define nihilism. If anti-realism is true, and if taken to the extreme, then there is no reason not
leads to nihilism to go on a murderous rampage. Without some form of moral guidance, individuals and
societies may struggle to determine what is right or wrong.
However this The logic, just because we don't want something to happen, does not directly undermine
argument does not moral anti-realism.
prove moral
anti-realism to be
false
