INTRO: Outline Eliminative materialism and Folk Psychology
Eliminative materialism faces problems as a theory of the mind as Folk psychology
overcomes the justi cations eliminativists use to reject it. However, the defeating issue is
that FP concepts can never been fully eliminated as Eliminativism is self-refuting.
1. ASSES ELIMINATIVIST’S REASONS FOR REJECTING FOLK PSYCHOLOGY,
Not coherent with other scienti c knowledge
CRANE: still use original terms
Weak
➢ Actions can be explained through causes in neurobiology, BUT we don’t need to remove our
original terms.
Arguably what EM says:
➢ Churchland isn’t denying existence of the mental phenomena we refer to as ‘beliefs’, ‘pain’,
‘thought’, etc., he’s just saying this FP isn’t the technically correct theory as to their nature.
Minor
Stagnant & Unproductive
➢ There has been no progress made in FP since ancient Greek times.
CRANE: Nothing came along to refute it
➢ Seems stagnant is because it is a ne theory of the mind and how it works. Evidence has not
come along to refute it so it has not needed to change.
Neuroscience?
Stronger
STERELNY: It has adapted and changed
➢ We now commonly discuss why people do things in terms of subconscious desires (FP term
for this is freudian slips). We can also see how subconscious desires occur in neuronal
activity. Therefore, FP is in line with new scienti c theories such as neuroscience.
Signi cant issue
Explanatory failures
➢ Can’t explain things like mental illness, sleep or learning.
Good explanatory + predictive power
➢ FP makes more accurate predications about how people behave than even the best
neuroscientists could. Therefore FP has better practical application.
2. ASSESS ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM, IN ORDER TO SECURE THE IDEA FP IS STRONGER
EM = self refuting
➢ Churchland is expressing his belief (FP concept) in the truth of EM - showing beliefs exist
Defeating
Commits the fallacy of begging the question
➢ It assumes the very things it’s trying to prove: beliefs exist. Churchland could just reply that
what his opponent is calling a belief is actually something else (neuroscience explanation).
Even discussing requires (FP concept) intentionally
➢ It’s not clear how neuroscience could ever o er an alternative account of intentionality, and
so folk psychology cannot ever be fully eliminated.
Eliminative materialism fails as a theory of the mind as Folk psychology concepts not only hold better
explanatory power and practical application, but also these concepts can never been fully eliminated as
philosophical discussion requires intentionality (FP concept).
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