Ford & Jennings – Changing cleavage politics
Cleavages structured the political conflict through processes of industrialization and nation
building. They reflected the different mix of social conflict that were salient at the outset of
mass democracy.
1. Traditional cleavages:
a. Ethnicity
b. Religion
c. Region
d. Class
2. Three-part formula
a. Structural cleavages: conflicting group interest
b. Cultural: group identities
c. Political: mobilization of identities
3. New cleavages:
a. Higher education
b. New middle class
c. Globalization
d. Aging of societies
4. New ideological conflicts
a. Materialist versus postmaterialist (Inglehart): change of values
b. Winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi)
c. Political integration of green-alternative-liberal and traditional-authoritarian-
nationalist voters (capitalize on social discontent)
Kriesi – cleavage politics
1. Sociocultural professionals (working class) pro-welfare state
2. Managers (service class) market solutions and free exchange)
3. Winners and losers of globalization
4. Cleavages are shaped by collective political actors, who selectively reinforce some
preferences and ignore others in the process of the translation of social divisions into
politics.
Achterberg & Houtman – value coherence
1. Economic dimension: equality
2. Cultural dimension: individual freedom
3. Two-dimensionality is found for lower educated, as there is cultural and economic
insecurity, which leads to less value coherence.
4. Educational level political competence ideological (value) coherence.
a. Political ideology is formed at the top by well-informed elites who trickle
down their ideological beliefs to the masses (functionalism).
5. Egalitarianism and authoritarianism is necessary to supplement economic and cultural
insecurity.
a. Economic insecurity (low level of education, low income, high risk of
unemployment) inclined to be pro-welfare
b. Cultural insecurity (individual freedom and cultural diversity)
1
, Daenekindt, de Koster & van der Waal – cultural belief sytems
1. Populist radical right parties remarkably combine moral progressiveness (attitudes
towards gender issues, sexual minorities) with conservatism (immigration).
2. Three cultural belief systems
a. Integrated one: all cultural attitudes are interdependent
b. Intermediate
c. Partitioned: positions on one cultural attitude are barely related to positions on
others
3. Political party agendas, individuals education and religion appear key to understanding
variation in belief systems
Achterberg & Houtman – unnatural voting
1. Death of class debate
a. Unnatural voting is not driven by economic cues and class
b. Right-wing working-class voting is caused by cultural conservatism that stems
from limited cultural capital
2. Natural party for the class
a. Working class: favour economic redistribution and vote for leftist parties,
owning to their poor economic position.
b. Middle-class: held to reject economic redistribution and vote for rightist
parties, because of their privileged position.
3. Economic motives: leftist voters of the middle class are assumed to pursue economic
interest.
4. Cultural motives: (Lipset) economic values (distribution of wealth) and cultural values
(individual liberty and social order)
5. Inglehart: postmaterialism, working class authoritarianism (focus on social order) and
middle-class postmaterialism (focus on individual freedom).
6. Cultural progressiveness is caused by education
a. Education is cultural capital
b. Education leads to cultural participation
c. Social mobility
Nieuwbeerta & Ultee – class voting explanations
1. Material interest of voters (economic interest)
a. Alford: income differences increase trying to change that with voting
b. Kerr: lower general standard of living lower classes want to improve their
economic respects
c. Class mobility: social class mobility weakens class conflict
d. Macro-level theory: working in different classes of work leads to different
voting behaviours
e. Korpi: union density, union membership.
2. Non-material interest of voters (cultural)
a. Ethnic minorities are in favour of positive discrimination
b. Religion/ minorities: People with the same economic interest do not fully share
the same non-material interest.
3. Characteristics of parties and politicians
2
Cleavages structured the political conflict through processes of industrialization and nation
building. They reflected the different mix of social conflict that were salient at the outset of
mass democracy.
1. Traditional cleavages:
a. Ethnicity
b. Religion
c. Region
d. Class
2. Three-part formula
a. Structural cleavages: conflicting group interest
b. Cultural: group identities
c. Political: mobilization of identities
3. New cleavages:
a. Higher education
b. New middle class
c. Globalization
d. Aging of societies
4. New ideological conflicts
a. Materialist versus postmaterialist (Inglehart): change of values
b. Winners and losers of globalization (Kriesi)
c. Political integration of green-alternative-liberal and traditional-authoritarian-
nationalist voters (capitalize on social discontent)
Kriesi – cleavage politics
1. Sociocultural professionals (working class) pro-welfare state
2. Managers (service class) market solutions and free exchange)
3. Winners and losers of globalization
4. Cleavages are shaped by collective political actors, who selectively reinforce some
preferences and ignore others in the process of the translation of social divisions into
politics.
Achterberg & Houtman – value coherence
1. Economic dimension: equality
2. Cultural dimension: individual freedom
3. Two-dimensionality is found for lower educated, as there is cultural and economic
insecurity, which leads to less value coherence.
4. Educational level political competence ideological (value) coherence.
a. Political ideology is formed at the top by well-informed elites who trickle
down their ideological beliefs to the masses (functionalism).
5. Egalitarianism and authoritarianism is necessary to supplement economic and cultural
insecurity.
a. Economic insecurity (low level of education, low income, high risk of
unemployment) inclined to be pro-welfare
b. Cultural insecurity (individual freedom and cultural diversity)
1
, Daenekindt, de Koster & van der Waal – cultural belief sytems
1. Populist radical right parties remarkably combine moral progressiveness (attitudes
towards gender issues, sexual minorities) with conservatism (immigration).
2. Three cultural belief systems
a. Integrated one: all cultural attitudes are interdependent
b. Intermediate
c. Partitioned: positions on one cultural attitude are barely related to positions on
others
3. Political party agendas, individuals education and religion appear key to understanding
variation in belief systems
Achterberg & Houtman – unnatural voting
1. Death of class debate
a. Unnatural voting is not driven by economic cues and class
b. Right-wing working-class voting is caused by cultural conservatism that stems
from limited cultural capital
2. Natural party for the class
a. Working class: favour economic redistribution and vote for leftist parties,
owning to their poor economic position.
b. Middle-class: held to reject economic redistribution and vote for rightist
parties, because of their privileged position.
3. Economic motives: leftist voters of the middle class are assumed to pursue economic
interest.
4. Cultural motives: (Lipset) economic values (distribution of wealth) and cultural values
(individual liberty and social order)
5. Inglehart: postmaterialism, working class authoritarianism (focus on social order) and
middle-class postmaterialism (focus on individual freedom).
6. Cultural progressiveness is caused by education
a. Education is cultural capital
b. Education leads to cultural participation
c. Social mobility
Nieuwbeerta & Ultee – class voting explanations
1. Material interest of voters (economic interest)
a. Alford: income differences increase trying to change that with voting
b. Kerr: lower general standard of living lower classes want to improve their
economic respects
c. Class mobility: social class mobility weakens class conflict
d. Macro-level theory: working in different classes of work leads to different
voting behaviours
e. Korpi: union density, union membership.
2. Non-material interest of voters (cultural)
a. Ethnic minorities are in favour of positive discrimination
b. Religion/ minorities: People with the same economic interest do not fully share
the same non-material interest.
3. Characteristics of parties and politicians
2
