JTB 25 marker: How should propositional knowledge be defined?
Propositional knowledge is knowledge that, i.e. knowledge of facts. Plato proposes the tripartite
view as one definition of propositional knowledge, however this theory cannot overcome various
Gettier style cases which criticise the claim that the three conditions are jointly sufficient. Multiple
theories are proposed as responses, however the main cause of their failure is that propositional
knowledge cannot be defined because it lacks real essence. In this essay I will argue that these
attempts to define knowledge are unsuccessful.
Plato argues that knowledge can be defined as a justified true belief. If a tour guide leads you to a
town correctly, they would be a good guide. If the tour guide happened to guess the way, they
would also be good. However, Plato claims we prefer the tour guide who knew the way (had
knowledge) since it was secured by reasons, i.e. conditions. He argues each condition is necessary,
meaning they are requirements of knowledge. We cannot know something we do not believe,
cannot justify or do not know to be true. Plato also claims that JTB is jointly sufficient. This means to
say that when all three conditions are met, the result will always be knowledge.
However, JTB faces criticisms that not all conditions are necessary and there are examples which
illustrate this. We could have knowledge without justification, since people who are able to predict
certain things do so without reason. Believing a false fact doesn’t mean we don’t have knowledge of
it, e.g. a cavewoman believing the earth was flat isn’t true but arguably she had knowledge. Belief
also may not be needed for knowledge, e.g. a student doubting themselves in an exam when their
answer was correct. Alternatively, Edmund Gettier argues that the three conditions are not jointly
sufficient – this is because the definition allows cases of luck to count as knowledge. Smith and Jones
go for an interview, where Smith hears the boss say Jones will be hired. Smith also sees Jones count
ten coins from his pocket, which leads him to conclude that the person with ten coins in his pocket
will get the job. However, Smith is given the job. He then finds out that he has ten coins in his
pocket. This would count as knowledge according to JTB, but there is the inclination to say that he
doesn’t hold knowledge since he was right by chance. This shows that the tripartite definition is not
sufficient. The following theories alter the tripartite view aiming to defend it from Gettier style cases.
Infallibilism aims to overcome this criticism by replacing the J condition with certainty. It aims to
strengthen the condition so that cases of luck are not admissible. It claims knowledge is only allowed
if the belief is unable to be wrong. For example, we cannot rationally doubt that two plus two is four
so this would succeed as knowledge. Infallibilism cannot be victim to Gettier cases since their means
of justification can be doubted. In Gettier case one, Smith could have misheard the interviewer,
meaning he would not be able to class his belief as knowledge.
The main criticism of infallibilism is that its criteria is too strict. It results in us having very little
knowledge, excluding most of our claims about the world, science and history. The claim ‘water boils
at 100C can be doubted, since I could’ve read the thermometer incorrectly or my teacher mislead
me.
To conclude, I would argue that infallibilism’s rigidness causes it to fail. Although Gettier cases show
the tripartite definition set the bar too low for knowledge, infallibilism sets it too high.
Reliabilism allows us more knowledge as its criteria is less harsh. It replaces the justification
condition with a reliable process. A reliable method is one that often produces true beliefs. Since
knowledge is based on reliability and not absolute certainty it has the advantage of allowing children
and animals knowledge too. Their reliable processes include vision and memory and permits the
knowledge about the world.
Propositional knowledge is knowledge that, i.e. knowledge of facts. Plato proposes the tripartite
view as one definition of propositional knowledge, however this theory cannot overcome various
Gettier style cases which criticise the claim that the three conditions are jointly sufficient. Multiple
theories are proposed as responses, however the main cause of their failure is that propositional
knowledge cannot be defined because it lacks real essence. In this essay I will argue that these
attempts to define knowledge are unsuccessful.
Plato argues that knowledge can be defined as a justified true belief. If a tour guide leads you to a
town correctly, they would be a good guide. If the tour guide happened to guess the way, they
would also be good. However, Plato claims we prefer the tour guide who knew the way (had
knowledge) since it was secured by reasons, i.e. conditions. He argues each condition is necessary,
meaning they are requirements of knowledge. We cannot know something we do not believe,
cannot justify or do not know to be true. Plato also claims that JTB is jointly sufficient. This means to
say that when all three conditions are met, the result will always be knowledge.
However, JTB faces criticisms that not all conditions are necessary and there are examples which
illustrate this. We could have knowledge without justification, since people who are able to predict
certain things do so without reason. Believing a false fact doesn’t mean we don’t have knowledge of
it, e.g. a cavewoman believing the earth was flat isn’t true but arguably she had knowledge. Belief
also may not be needed for knowledge, e.g. a student doubting themselves in an exam when their
answer was correct. Alternatively, Edmund Gettier argues that the three conditions are not jointly
sufficient – this is because the definition allows cases of luck to count as knowledge. Smith and Jones
go for an interview, where Smith hears the boss say Jones will be hired. Smith also sees Jones count
ten coins from his pocket, which leads him to conclude that the person with ten coins in his pocket
will get the job. However, Smith is given the job. He then finds out that he has ten coins in his
pocket. This would count as knowledge according to JTB, but there is the inclination to say that he
doesn’t hold knowledge since he was right by chance. This shows that the tripartite definition is not
sufficient. The following theories alter the tripartite view aiming to defend it from Gettier style cases.
Infallibilism aims to overcome this criticism by replacing the J condition with certainty. It aims to
strengthen the condition so that cases of luck are not admissible. It claims knowledge is only allowed
if the belief is unable to be wrong. For example, we cannot rationally doubt that two plus two is four
so this would succeed as knowledge. Infallibilism cannot be victim to Gettier cases since their means
of justification can be doubted. In Gettier case one, Smith could have misheard the interviewer,
meaning he would not be able to class his belief as knowledge.
The main criticism of infallibilism is that its criteria is too strict. It results in us having very little
knowledge, excluding most of our claims about the world, science and history. The claim ‘water boils
at 100C can be doubted, since I could’ve read the thermometer incorrectly or my teacher mislead
me.
To conclude, I would argue that infallibilism’s rigidness causes it to fail. Although Gettier cases show
the tripartite definition set the bar too low for knowledge, infallibilism sets it too high.
Reliabilism allows us more knowledge as its criteria is less harsh. It replaces the justification
condition with a reliable process. A reliable method is one that often produces true beliefs. Since
knowledge is based on reliability and not absolute certainty it has the advantage of allowing children
and animals knowledge too. Their reliable processes include vision and memory and permits the
knowledge about the world.
