, STEP 2: EVALUATE THE ACT USING KANT’S CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE
3. Conceivability of the Maxim in a World Governed by Universal Law
To evaluate the maxim underlying extreme wealth accumulation, we may formulate it as follows:
“Whenever I am able to accumulate vast wealth through legally permissible means, I will do so in
order to advance my own interests and economic security.” According to Immanuel Kant, the first
formulation of the categorical imperative requires that one act only according to maxims that one
could will to become universal laws (Kant, 1785/1993). The question, therefore, is whether a world
in which everyone who could accumulate extreme wealth did so for personal advantage would be
logically conceivable and coherent.
Such a world is indeed conceivable. There is no direct contradiction in imagining a society where
individuals universally pursue wealth maximisation through lawful means. Markets,
entrepreneurship and investment could still function. However, Kant distinguishes between logical
possibility and moral permissibility. Even if everyone sought to become extremely wealthy, not
everyone could succeed, because wealth depends on economic scarcity and unequal distribution.
The universalisation of the maxim would therefore generate structural inequality as a necessary
feature of the system. Yet this does not produce a logical contradiction in the strict Kantian sense;
rather, it reveals a tension between self-interest and broader moral duties.
Kant’s concern would shift to whether such universal pursuit of wealth undermines the humanity
of others. If the maxim involves treating employees, communities or competitors merely as means
to profit, then it would violate the second formulation of the categorical imperative, which
commands that humanity must always be treated as an end in itself (Kant, 1785/1993). Thus, while
the maxim is conceivable as a universal law, its moral acceptability would depend on whether
wealth accumulation respects the rational agency and dignity of all persons involved.
4. Would You Rationally Act on Your Maxim in Such a World?
The next Kantian test asks whether one could will to act on the maxim in a world where it is
universally followed. Even if conceivable, the question is whether a rational agent could
consistently desire such a world. If everyone pursued extreme wealth as a primary end, society
might become dominated by competition, instrumental relationships and widening inequality. A
rational person must ask whether such a world would safeguard their own dignity and security as a
moral agent.
Kant argues that rational beings necessarily will certain ends, such as personal development and
the preservation of their rational agency (Kant, 1785/1993). In a world where wealth accumulation
overrides moral duty, social trust and mutual respect could deteriorate. If individuals prioritise
profit above moral law, exploitation becomes more likely. In such a society, even the wealthy could
not guarantee that they themselves would never be treated merely as instruments in future
interactions. Therefore, a rational agent might hesitate to will the universalisation of this maxim if
it risks undermining the equal moral worth of persons.
3. Conceivability of the Maxim in a World Governed by Universal Law
To evaluate the maxim underlying extreme wealth accumulation, we may formulate it as follows:
“Whenever I am able to accumulate vast wealth through legally permissible means, I will do so in
order to advance my own interests and economic security.” According to Immanuel Kant, the first
formulation of the categorical imperative requires that one act only according to maxims that one
could will to become universal laws (Kant, 1785/1993). The question, therefore, is whether a world
in which everyone who could accumulate extreme wealth did so for personal advantage would be
logically conceivable and coherent.
Such a world is indeed conceivable. There is no direct contradiction in imagining a society where
individuals universally pursue wealth maximisation through lawful means. Markets,
entrepreneurship and investment could still function. However, Kant distinguishes between logical
possibility and moral permissibility. Even if everyone sought to become extremely wealthy, not
everyone could succeed, because wealth depends on economic scarcity and unequal distribution.
The universalisation of the maxim would therefore generate structural inequality as a necessary
feature of the system. Yet this does not produce a logical contradiction in the strict Kantian sense;
rather, it reveals a tension between self-interest and broader moral duties.
Kant’s concern would shift to whether such universal pursuit of wealth undermines the humanity
of others. If the maxim involves treating employees, communities or competitors merely as means
to profit, then it would violate the second formulation of the categorical imperative, which
commands that humanity must always be treated as an end in itself (Kant, 1785/1993). Thus, while
the maxim is conceivable as a universal law, its moral acceptability would depend on whether
wealth accumulation respects the rational agency and dignity of all persons involved.
4. Would You Rationally Act on Your Maxim in Such a World?
The next Kantian test asks whether one could will to act on the maxim in a world where it is
universally followed. Even if conceivable, the question is whether a rational agent could
consistently desire such a world. If everyone pursued extreme wealth as a primary end, society
might become dominated by competition, instrumental relationships and widening inequality. A
rational person must ask whether such a world would safeguard their own dignity and security as a
moral agent.
Kant argues that rational beings necessarily will certain ends, such as personal development and
the preservation of their rational agency (Kant, 1785/1993). In a world where wealth accumulation
overrides moral duty, social trust and mutual respect could deteriorate. If individuals prioritise
profit above moral law, exploitation becomes more likely. In such a society, even the wealthy could
not guarantee that they themselves would never be treated merely as instruments in future
interactions. Therefore, a rational agent might hesitate to will the universalisation of this maxim if
it risks undermining the equal moral worth of persons.
