,
, CONFIDENTIAL RSK4801
Page 3 of 9
May/June 2025
Instructions:
Read the information below and then answer all the questions related to it.
- Remember to submit your final typed document as a PDF on myExams.
- Use Arial 12-point font and 1.5 line spacing to answer the questions.
- Include page numbers in your document and answer the questions in the correct
sequence.
Section A
Case study: Operational risk – Deep Horizon
On 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig was destroyed by an uncontrolled
eruption of oil and gas. The explosion killed 11 crew members and set off the worst
oil spill in US history. The rig owned by Switzerland-based Transocean Ltd and its
experienced crew were some of the best in the business. BP was the world’s sixth
largest oil company at the time, leasing the oil rig and drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.
Only months earlier, the BP and the Deepwater team celebrated the record for the
deepest oil well ever completed.
Moments before the disaster, an award was handed to the installation manager on
the drilling platform for an excellent safety record. While the award ceremony was
held, high-pressure oil and gas threatened to surge up the pipe from the seafloor.
Despite all their experience and advanced technology, the crew members did not
spot the signs of trouble, and once the blowout started, they did not act quickly
enough to contain it to save the rig. It was mentioned that “disasters are not so much
the initial accident, but the failure to identify the accident early in its birth.”
This disaster was an example of how a series of small mistakes and misjudgements
can escalate into a catastrophe when not caught in time. It was said that BP
consistently made some decisions that favoured speed over safety, and the
company had a reputation for being particularly hard-driving to reach targets. The
Transocean crew was also involved in dubious decision-making, and the federal
regulators who supervised drilling in the Gulf signed off on their plans at every stage.
[TURN OVER]
, CONFIDENTIAL RSK4801
Page 4 of 9
May/June 2025
The reality is that both BP and Transocean had grown dangerously overconfident
and were pushing too close to the edge. Perhaps overly impressed by the team’s
excellent safety record, federal regulators routinely rubber-stamped the
BP/Transocean proposals.
Furthermore, none of the drilling companies operating in the Gulf had a workable
scheme to cope with a massive oil spill. The entire industry succumbed to risk creep.
Over the decades, the drillers gradually moved into deeper waters and sank wells
that involved much more significant internal pressures and hazards. The
technologies and regulations developed initially for shallow waters were updated in
response, but not to a degree commensurate with the growing risks. So, even as
drillers became more proficient, disaster became more likely.
Some severe issues could have caused problems. For example, the alarm system
on the rig was deliberately put out of order to prevent false alarms from waking crew
members. A smoke detector was broken, and the pipes and valves known as the
blowout preventer were poorly maintained. This blowout preventer was the last
defence against a high-pressure gas and oil bursting out of the well.
In designing the structures that would stabilise the pipe and prevent leaks below the
seafloor, BP repeatedly opted for the quickest, rather than the most secure,
approaches. This caused the total operation to be regarded as high-risk and
dangerous. Researchers who studied disasters found that long periods without
accidents can be a risk factor, as workers learn to expect safe operation as the norm
and cannot conceive a devastating failure. It seems that managers and workers with
the most experience are often the last to recognise when risks are getting out of
control. In this case, some senior managers refused to identify anything wrong and
continuously ignored an alarm system, which indicated that the pressure was too
high and rising and blamed it on a false alarm.
However, a second test showed no problem, and the first alarm was ignored. The
work continued as per normal proceedings, and during the next few hours, the crew
[TURN OVER]
, CONFIDENTIAL RSK4801
Page 3 of 9
May/June 2025
Instructions:
Read the information below and then answer all the questions related to it.
- Remember to submit your final typed document as a PDF on myExams.
- Use Arial 12-point font and 1.5 line spacing to answer the questions.
- Include page numbers in your document and answer the questions in the correct
sequence.
Section A
Case study: Operational risk – Deep Horizon
On 20 April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig was destroyed by an uncontrolled
eruption of oil and gas. The explosion killed 11 crew members and set off the worst
oil spill in US history. The rig owned by Switzerland-based Transocean Ltd and its
experienced crew were some of the best in the business. BP was the world’s sixth
largest oil company at the time, leasing the oil rig and drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.
Only months earlier, the BP and the Deepwater team celebrated the record for the
deepest oil well ever completed.
Moments before the disaster, an award was handed to the installation manager on
the drilling platform for an excellent safety record. While the award ceremony was
held, high-pressure oil and gas threatened to surge up the pipe from the seafloor.
Despite all their experience and advanced technology, the crew members did not
spot the signs of trouble, and once the blowout started, they did not act quickly
enough to contain it to save the rig. It was mentioned that “disasters are not so much
the initial accident, but the failure to identify the accident early in its birth.”
This disaster was an example of how a series of small mistakes and misjudgements
can escalate into a catastrophe when not caught in time. It was said that BP
consistently made some decisions that favoured speed over safety, and the
company had a reputation for being particularly hard-driving to reach targets. The
Transocean crew was also involved in dubious decision-making, and the federal
regulators who supervised drilling in the Gulf signed off on their plans at every stage.
[TURN OVER]
, CONFIDENTIAL RSK4801
Page 4 of 9
May/June 2025
The reality is that both BP and Transocean had grown dangerously overconfident
and were pushing too close to the edge. Perhaps overly impressed by the team’s
excellent safety record, federal regulators routinely rubber-stamped the
BP/Transocean proposals.
Furthermore, none of the drilling companies operating in the Gulf had a workable
scheme to cope with a massive oil spill. The entire industry succumbed to risk creep.
Over the decades, the drillers gradually moved into deeper waters and sank wells
that involved much more significant internal pressures and hazards. The
technologies and regulations developed initially for shallow waters were updated in
response, but not to a degree commensurate with the growing risks. So, even as
drillers became more proficient, disaster became more likely.
Some severe issues could have caused problems. For example, the alarm system
on the rig was deliberately put out of order to prevent false alarms from waking crew
members. A smoke detector was broken, and the pipes and valves known as the
blowout preventer were poorly maintained. This blowout preventer was the last
defence against a high-pressure gas and oil bursting out of the well.
In designing the structures that would stabilise the pipe and prevent leaks below the
seafloor, BP repeatedly opted for the quickest, rather than the most secure,
approaches. This caused the total operation to be regarded as high-risk and
dangerous. Researchers who studied disasters found that long periods without
accidents can be a risk factor, as workers learn to expect safe operation as the norm
and cannot conceive a devastating failure. It seems that managers and workers with
the most experience are often the last to recognise when risks are getting out of
control. In this case, some senior managers refused to identify anything wrong and
continuously ignored an alarm system, which indicated that the pressure was too
high and rising and blamed it on a false alarm.
However, a second test showed no problem, and the first alarm was ignored. The
work continued as per normal proceedings, and during the next few hours, the crew
[TURN OVER]
