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VUN1— VUN1Task1:ManagingSecurityOperationsandAccessControls
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Information Systems Security - C845
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A. ApplyanAccessControlModel .7 .7 .7 .7
A.1. Chosen Access Control Model .7 .7 .7
IhavechosentheRole-BasedAccessControl(RBAC)model.TheprinciplesofRBACare:
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• RoleAssignment:Auserisassignedto arolebasedontheirjobfunction(e.g.,"Finance
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Analyst").
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• PermissionAssignment:Permissionstoperformoperationsonsystemsareassignedtoroles, not
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to individual users.
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• SessionManagement:Auseractivatesaroletogaintheassociatedpermissionsforasession.
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• LeastPrivilege:Users shouldonlyhavetheminimumlevelofaccessnecessarytoperform their job
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duties.
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The organization's access control structure, as seen in the user matrix, is implicitly role-based (e.g., "Finance
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manager,""HRcoordinator").ApplyingaformalRBACmodelwouldstreamlinethisbyensuring permissions are
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strictly tied to business functions, reducing complexity and the potential for user error when assigning
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permissions.
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A.2. Four Misalignments with RBAC Principles . 7 . 7 . 7 . 7
1. Misalignment 1: Privilege Escalation Beyond Role Scope .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
• Description:The"Juniorsystemadmin"(J.Lopez)has"Domainadmin"privileges.A .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
junior role should not have the highest level of access in a Windows environment.
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• ConflictwithRBAC:Thisviolates theprincipleofleastprivilege.Therole"Juniorsystem .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
admin"impliesasubsetofadministrativeduties,notunrestricteddomain-widecontrol.
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2. Misalignment 2: Unnecessary Access Across Departments .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
• Description:The "Financeanalyst" (L.Cheng) has "Full access" to the CRM, a system .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7 .7
, primarilyforSalesandSupport. Afinanceroletypicallydoesnotrequire fullmodification rights
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in a customer relationship system.
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• Conflict with RBAC: This violates least privilege and separation of duties. It allows for
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potential data manipulation outside the user's core business function.
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3. Misalignment3:Violation ofUser-RoleAssignment Post-Termination
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• Description: The "HR assistant" (P. Ellis), who was terminated on 2025-05-20, has an
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"Active" account status and successfully logged in on 2025-06-29.
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• Conflict with RBAC: RBAC requires timely revocation of role assignments upon a change in
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employment status. An active session for a terminated user completely bypasses the
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security provided by the role structure.
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4. Misalignment4: Overly Broad Privileged Access
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• Description: The "IT administrator" (T. Miller) has "Full admin" access to "All internal
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systems," and the log shows they made a firewall rule change without a ticket_id.
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• ConflictwithRBAC:Whilesomeaccessisnecessary,blanket"Fulladmin"access
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violates least privilege and impedes accountability. It does not segment duties within the IT
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department itself.
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