PVL3703
Assignment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due August 2025
, PVL3703
Assignment 1
Semester 2 Due August 2025
Response 1
1. Reconceptualising Conduct in the Law of Delict
In delictual law, the foundational requirement of conduct is defined not by mere physical
action, but by the presence of volitional control. As stated by Neethling, Potgieter, and
Visser (2015:30), conduct consists of a willed bodily movement or omission under the
conscious control of the actor’s mind. Acts committed during states of automatism—
such as sleepwalking, epileptic seizures, or reflexes—are excluded due to the absence
of consciousness or intent.
Tumelo’s case squarely engages this threshold inquiry. His stabbing of Mandla occurred
while sleepwalking, a condition typically understood to negate volitional capacity. On the
face of it, such conduct would not satisfy the legal requirement of voluntariness, echoing
the principle in R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N), where a seizure-induced act was
deemed legally non-attributable.
However, contemporary legal reasoning increasingly encourages a contextual rather
than mechanistic assessment. Jurisprudence and medical scholarship reveal that
conditions such as parasomnia may be predictable and manageable. Courts are urged
to look beyond the act itself to its precipitating factors, especially where the actor
possesses foresight of the condition and the means to prevent its manifestation.
Assignment 1
Semester 2 2025
Due August 2025
, PVL3703
Assignment 1
Semester 2 Due August 2025
Response 1
1. Reconceptualising Conduct in the Law of Delict
In delictual law, the foundational requirement of conduct is defined not by mere physical
action, but by the presence of volitional control. As stated by Neethling, Potgieter, and
Visser (2015:30), conduct consists of a willed bodily movement or omission under the
conscious control of the actor’s mind. Acts committed during states of automatism—
such as sleepwalking, epileptic seizures, or reflexes—are excluded due to the absence
of consciousness or intent.
Tumelo’s case squarely engages this threshold inquiry. His stabbing of Mandla occurred
while sleepwalking, a condition typically understood to negate volitional capacity. On the
face of it, such conduct would not satisfy the legal requirement of voluntariness, echoing
the principle in R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N), where a seizure-induced act was
deemed legally non-attributable.
However, contemporary legal reasoning increasingly encourages a contextual rather
than mechanistic assessment. Jurisprudence and medical scholarship reveal that
conditions such as parasomnia may be predictable and manageable. Courts are urged
to look beyond the act itself to its precipitating factors, especially where the actor
possesses foresight of the condition and the means to prevent its manifestation.
