, PLS3709
ASSIGNMENT 2 (TOPIC 2)
SEMESTER 2 2026
DUE SEPTEMBER 2026
Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Question of Private Property: A Critical Examination
Introduction
The term “nihilism” carries with it an air of philosophical scandal. To call someone a nihilist is rarely
a compliment; it suggests a rejection of all that gives life meaning, a descent into a void where
values once stood. Yet the history of the concept reveals something more complex than mere
negation. Nihilism, as Franco Volpi observes, has “no solution but history” (Volpi, 1995: 2). It is a
problem that emerges, transforms, and returns, never fully resolved. Similarly, the institution of
private property has long been a site of philosophical contestation, nowhere more so than in the
work of Karl Marx. For Marx, private property is not a natural right but a historical product of
alienated labor, one that stands in tension with the social essence of human beings. This essay
examines these two questions in turn. First, it considers whether Nietzsche should be understood
as the arch-critic of nihilism or as its strongest advocate, arguing that the apparent contradiction
dissolves once one distinguishes between passive and active nihilism. Second, it asks whether
private property contradicts the social nature of human beings, drawing on Marx’s critique of
alienation and his vision of communism as the positive abolition of private property.
Understanding Nihilism: From Turgenev to Nietzsche
The word “nihilism” first entered philosophical discourse not through Nietzsche but through Ivan
Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons (1862), where the protagonist Bazarov embraces the label to
describe his rejection of traditional values and social order (Volpi, 1995: 4). Turgenev’s nihilist was a
denier, a materialist who refused the inherited ideals of the older generation. Yet it was Nietzsche
and Dostoevsky who became the “founding fathers and great theorists” of the concept, with
Nietzsche developing its more properly philosophical strand (Volpi, 1995: 3).
Nihilism, in its most basic sense, is the belief in nothing—the conviction that the highest values
have devalued themselves. As Nolen Gertz notes, the term is “literally an ideology of nothing,” and
this emptiness makes it peculiarly difficult to define (Gertz, 2019). It has been used to denote a
philosophical position, a psychological mood, a political agenda, and a cultural condition. Nietzsche
himself identified its core in a famous formulation: “Nihilism: it lacks an end, and it lacks an answer
‘why’” (Nietzsche, cited in Conill, 2015). The nihilist confronts a world without purpose, where the
traditional metaphysical and religious frameworks that once provided meaning have collapsed.
ASSIGNMENT 2 (TOPIC 2)
SEMESTER 2 2026
DUE SEPTEMBER 2026
Nihilism, Nietzsche, and the Question of Private Property: A Critical Examination
Introduction
The term “nihilism” carries with it an air of philosophical scandal. To call someone a nihilist is rarely
a compliment; it suggests a rejection of all that gives life meaning, a descent into a void where
values once stood. Yet the history of the concept reveals something more complex than mere
negation. Nihilism, as Franco Volpi observes, has “no solution but history” (Volpi, 1995: 2). It is a
problem that emerges, transforms, and returns, never fully resolved. Similarly, the institution of
private property has long been a site of philosophical contestation, nowhere more so than in the
work of Karl Marx. For Marx, private property is not a natural right but a historical product of
alienated labor, one that stands in tension with the social essence of human beings. This essay
examines these two questions in turn. First, it considers whether Nietzsche should be understood
as the arch-critic of nihilism or as its strongest advocate, arguing that the apparent contradiction
dissolves once one distinguishes between passive and active nihilism. Second, it asks whether
private property contradicts the social nature of human beings, drawing on Marx’s critique of
alienation and his vision of communism as the positive abolition of private property.
Understanding Nihilism: From Turgenev to Nietzsche
The word “nihilism” first entered philosophical discourse not through Nietzsche but through Ivan
Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons (1862), where the protagonist Bazarov embraces the label to
describe his rejection of traditional values and social order (Volpi, 1995: 4). Turgenev’s nihilist was a
denier, a materialist who refused the inherited ideals of the older generation. Yet it was Nietzsche
and Dostoevsky who became the “founding fathers and great theorists” of the concept, with
Nietzsche developing its more properly philosophical strand (Volpi, 1995: 3).
Nihilism, in its most basic sense, is the belief in nothing—the conviction that the highest values
have devalued themselves. As Nolen Gertz notes, the term is “literally an ideology of nothing,” and
this emptiness makes it peculiarly difficult to define (Gertz, 2019). It has been used to denote a
philosophical position, a psychological mood, a political agenda, and a cultural condition. Nietzsche
himself identified its core in a famous formulation: “Nihilism: it lacks an end, and it lacks an answer
‘why’” (Nietzsche, cited in Conill, 2015). The nihilist confronts a world without purpose, where the
traditional metaphysical and religious frameworks that once provided meaning have collapsed.
