, HSY3705
ASSIGNMENT 5 SEPTEMBER
2 2026
DUE SEPTEMBER 2026
Negotiations between 1990 and 1993 were necessary because the apartheid state faced a
deepening legitimacy crisis that made continued minority rule unsustainable, while the ANC
recognised that negotiations offered a strategic route to power that military struggle alone could
not deliver. The unbanning of the ANC and other organisations in February 1990 was not an act of
generosity but a calculated response to the regime's eroding authority, economic stagnation, and
international isolation.¹ For the National Party government, negotiations became the only viable
mechanism to manage a transition it could no longer control unilaterally. For the ANC, the
negotiation strategy was underpinned by a sober assessment that the liberation movement,
despite its mass support, had not defeated the state militarily and that prolonging confrontation
risked economic collapse and right-wing counter-revolution.² This mutual recognition of
stalemate—neither side capable of outright victory—created the structural imperative for a
negotiated settlement.
The process was deeply contested because each side entered negotiations with fundamentally
incompatible visions of the post-apartheid constitutional order, and each sought to use its leverage
to entrench its preferred outcome. The NP pushed for a two-phase transition with an appointed
interim government, a rotating presidency, and maximum devolution of power to dilute majority
rule, while the ANC demanded a single-stage transition to majority rule under a unitary state.³
These were not technical disagreements but proxies for the deeper struggle over whether
apartheid's beneficiaries would retain effective veto power. The NP's insistence on "minority
protection" was viewed by the ANC as a mechanism for entrenching "neo-apartheid," while the
ANC's majoritarian position was perceived by the NP as a recipe for the "tyranny of the majority."⁴
CODESA II broke down in May 1992 precisely over the question of special majorities required to
adopt the constitution—a dispute that encapsulated the broader conflict between democratic
legitimacy and minority veto.⁵
ASSIGNMENT 5 SEPTEMBER
2 2026
DUE SEPTEMBER 2026
Negotiations between 1990 and 1993 were necessary because the apartheid state faced a
deepening legitimacy crisis that made continued minority rule unsustainable, while the ANC
recognised that negotiations offered a strategic route to power that military struggle alone could
not deliver. The unbanning of the ANC and other organisations in February 1990 was not an act of
generosity but a calculated response to the regime's eroding authority, economic stagnation, and
international isolation.¹ For the National Party government, negotiations became the only viable
mechanism to manage a transition it could no longer control unilaterally. For the ANC, the
negotiation strategy was underpinned by a sober assessment that the liberation movement,
despite its mass support, had not defeated the state militarily and that prolonging confrontation
risked economic collapse and right-wing counter-revolution.² This mutual recognition of
stalemate—neither side capable of outright victory—created the structural imperative for a
negotiated settlement.
The process was deeply contested because each side entered negotiations with fundamentally
incompatible visions of the post-apartheid constitutional order, and each sought to use its leverage
to entrench its preferred outcome. The NP pushed for a two-phase transition with an appointed
interim government, a rotating presidency, and maximum devolution of power to dilute majority
rule, while the ANC demanded a single-stage transition to majority rule under a unitary state.³
These were not technical disagreements but proxies for the deeper struggle over whether
apartheid's beneficiaries would retain effective veto power. The NP's insistence on "minority
protection" was viewed by the ANC as a mechanism for entrenching "neo-apartheid," while the
ANC's majoritarian position was perceived by the NP as a recipe for the "tyranny of the majority."⁴
CODESA II broke down in May 1992 precisely over the question of special majorities required to
adopt the constitution—a dispute that encapsulated the broader conflict between democratic
legitimacy and minority veto.⁵
