, CRW2601 ASSIGNMENT 1 SEMESTER 2 2026
DUE DATE: 26 AUGUST 2026
2 ANSWERS PROVIDED
(a) Voluntary Act and Liability
A fundamental requirement for criminal liability is that the accused’s conduct must be
voluntary. X’s epileptic fit was involuntary because she had no control over her bodily
movements while experiencing the seizure. Such conduct may constitute automatism and
cannot ordinarily be regarded as a voluntary act (Unisa, 2021). In R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N),
the court recognised the relevance of an epileptic attack in determining whether the accused
acted voluntarily. However, X had knowingly suffered from epilepsy for five years and was
aware that she could experience another seizure. Her decision to drive was voluntary,
notwithstanding the fact that she had been free from seizures for six months. Consequently,
while the collision itself occurred during an involuntary epileptic fit, X’s prior voluntary decision
to drive despite her known condition could provide a basis for liability (Unisa, 2021).
(b) Factual and Legal Causation
Factual causation is established by applying the conditio sine qua non or “but-for” test, which
asks whether the harmful consequence would have occurred but for the accused’s conduct
(Unisa, 2021). In International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A), the court
confirmed the importance of this enquiry. If X had not driven and collided with Y’s vehicle, Y
would not have sustained the injuries that resulted in her hospitalisation. X’s conduct is
therefore a factual cause of Y’s death.
Legal causation requires the consequence to be sufficiently closely connected to the accused’s
conduct and not too remote (Unisa, 2021). Y’s failure to follow the doctor’s instructions caused
a secondary infection which ultimately resulted in her death. This raises the possibility of a
DUE DATE: 26 AUGUST 2026
2 ANSWERS PROVIDED
(a) Voluntary Act and Liability
A fundamental requirement for criminal liability is that the accused’s conduct must be
voluntary. X’s epileptic fit was involuntary because she had no control over her bodily
movements while experiencing the seizure. Such conduct may constitute automatism and
cannot ordinarily be regarded as a voluntary act (Unisa, 2021). In R v Mkize 1959 (2) SA 260 (N),
the court recognised the relevance of an epileptic attack in determining whether the accused
acted voluntarily. However, X had knowingly suffered from epilepsy for five years and was
aware that she could experience another seizure. Her decision to drive was voluntary,
notwithstanding the fact that she had been free from seizures for six months. Consequently,
while the collision itself occurred during an involuntary epileptic fit, X’s prior voluntary decision
to drive despite her known condition could provide a basis for liability (Unisa, 2021).
(b) Factual and Legal Causation
Factual causation is established by applying the conditio sine qua non or “but-for” test, which
asks whether the harmful consequence would have occurred but for the accused’s conduct
(Unisa, 2021). In International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A), the court
confirmed the importance of this enquiry. If X had not driven and collided with Y’s vehicle, Y
would not have sustained the injuries that resulted in her hospitalisation. X’s conduct is
therefore a factual cause of Y’s death.
Legal causation requires the consequence to be sufficiently closely connected to the accused’s
conduct and not too remote (Unisa, 2021). Y’s failure to follow the doctor’s instructions caused
a secondary infection which ultimately resulted in her death. This raises the possibility of a
