Commentary
Saving Realism
from the So-Called
Realists
A foreign-policy approach based in security and pragmatism
is now characterized by retrenchment and radicalism
By Hal Brands and Peter Feaver
T
HE UNITED STATES has entered a school of thought traditionally focused on precisely
an age of global turbulence. Great- these issues—should be having its moment in the sun.
power competition has returned And yet realism is currently in crisis.
with a vengeance; the world is be- Realism was once a sophisticated intellectual
ing roiled by conflict and disorder. tradition that represented the best in American state-
While inter-state violence has not craft. Eminent Cold War realists were broadly sup-
returned to the peak levels seen in portive of America’s postwar internationalism and its
the last century, the security challenges facing Ameri- stabilizing role in global affairs, even as they stressed
can policymakers today are greater than at any time the need for prudence and restraint in employing U.S.
since the Cold War. The need for an intellectual disci- power. Above all, Cold War–era realism was based on a
pline devoted to power politics and forging a stable in- hard-earned understanding that Americans must deal
ternational order is thus as pressing as ever. Realism— with the geopolitical realities as they are, rather than
retreat to the false comfort provided by the Atlantic
Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished and Pacific oceans.
Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins More recently, however, those who call them-
School of Advanced International Studies. Peter selves realists have lost touch with this tradition.
Feaver is a professor of political science and public Within academia, realism has become synonymous
policy at Duke University. with a preference for radical retrenchment and the
Commentary 15
BRANDSFEAVER.indd 15 8/10/17 4:12 PM
, Realists once placed a high value on policies that restrained
potential aggressors and created a basis for stability within
an inherently competitive global environment.
deliberate destruction of arrangements that have preventing another disastrous global crack-up—one
fostered international stability and prosperity for de- that would inevitably reach out and touch the United
cades. Within government, the Trump administration States, just as the world wars had. Realist thinkers
appears to be embracing an equally misguided version understood that America was uniquely capable of sta-
of realism—an approach that masquerades as shrewd bilizing the international order and containing Soviet
realpolitik but is likely to prove profoundly damaging power after World War II, even as they disagreed—
to American power and influence. Neither of these ap- sometimes sharply—over the precise nature and ex-
proaches is truly “realist,” as neither promotes core tent of American commitments. Moreover, although
American interests or deals with the world as it really Cold War realists recognized the paramount role of
is. The United States surely needs the insights that an power in international affairs, most also recognized
authentically realist approach to global affairs can that U.S. power would be most effective if harnessed
provide. But first, American realism will have to un- to a compelling concept of American moral purpose
dergo a reformation. and exercised primarily through enduring partner-
ships with nations that shared core American values.
The Realist Tradition “An idealistic policy undisciplined by political realism
is bound to be unstable and ineffective,” the political
Realism has taken many forms over the years, but it scientist Robert Osgood wrote. “Political realism un-
has always been focused on the imperatives of power, guided by moral purpose will be self-defeating and fu-
order, and survival in an anarchic global arena. The tile.” Most realists were thus sympathetic to the major
classical realists—Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes— initiatives of postwar foreign policy, such as the cre-
considered how states and leaders should behave in ation of U.S.-led military alliances and the cultivation
a dangerous world in which there was no overarch- of a thriving Western community composed primarily
ing morality or governing authority strong enough to of liberal democracies.
regulate state behavior. The great modern realists— At the same time, Cold War realists spoke of
thinkers and statesmen such as Reinhold Niebuhr, the need for American restraint. They worried that
Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry Kiss- America’s liberal idealism, absent a sense of limits,
inger—grappled with the same issues during and after would carry the country into quixotic crusades. They
the catastrophic upheaval that characterized the first thought that excessive commitments at the periphery
half of the 20th century. of the global system could weaken the international
They argued that it was impossible to transcend order against its radical challengers. They believed
the tragic nature of international politics through that a policy of outright confrontation toward the
good intentions or moralistic maxims, and that seek- Kremlin could be quite dangerous. “Absolute security
ing to do so would merely empower the most ruthless for one power means absolute insecurity for all oth-
members of the international system. They contend- ers,” Kissinger wrote. Realists therefore advocated
ed, on the basis of bitter experience, that aggression policies meant to temper American ambition and the
and violence were always a possibility in international most perilous aspects of superpower competition.
affairs, and that states that desired peace would thus They supported—and, in Kissinger’s case, led—arms-
have to prepare for war and show themselves ready to control agreements and political negotiations with
wield coercive power. Most important, realist thinkers Moscow. They often objected to America’s costliest
tended to place a high value on policies and arrange- interventions in the Third World. Kennan and Mor-
ments that restrained potential aggressors and cre- genthau were among the first mainstream figures to
ated a basis for stability within an inherently competi- go public with opposition to American involvement
tive global environment. in Vietnam (Morgenthau did so in the pages of Com-
For this very reason, leading Cold War–era re- mentary in May 1962).
alists advocated a robust American internationalism During the Cold War, then, realism was a sup-
as the best way of restraining malevolent actors and ple, nuanced doctrine. It emphasized the need for
16 Saving Realism from the So-Called Realists : September 2017
BRANDSFEAVER.indd 16 8/10/17 4:12 PM
Saving Realism
from the So-Called
Realists
A foreign-policy approach based in security and pragmatism
is now characterized by retrenchment and radicalism
By Hal Brands and Peter Feaver
T
HE UNITED STATES has entered a school of thought traditionally focused on precisely
an age of global turbulence. Great- these issues—should be having its moment in the sun.
power competition has returned And yet realism is currently in crisis.
with a vengeance; the world is be- Realism was once a sophisticated intellectual
ing roiled by conflict and disorder. tradition that represented the best in American state-
While inter-state violence has not craft. Eminent Cold War realists were broadly sup-
returned to the peak levels seen in portive of America’s postwar internationalism and its
the last century, the security challenges facing Ameri- stabilizing role in global affairs, even as they stressed
can policymakers today are greater than at any time the need for prudence and restraint in employing U.S.
since the Cold War. The need for an intellectual disci- power. Above all, Cold War–era realism was based on a
pline devoted to power politics and forging a stable in- hard-earned understanding that Americans must deal
ternational order is thus as pressing as ever. Realism— with the geopolitical realities as they are, rather than
retreat to the false comfort provided by the Atlantic
Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished and Pacific oceans.
Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins More recently, however, those who call them-
School of Advanced International Studies. Peter selves realists have lost touch with this tradition.
Feaver is a professor of political science and public Within academia, realism has become synonymous
policy at Duke University. with a preference for radical retrenchment and the
Commentary 15
BRANDSFEAVER.indd 15 8/10/17 4:12 PM
, Realists once placed a high value on policies that restrained
potential aggressors and created a basis for stability within
an inherently competitive global environment.
deliberate destruction of arrangements that have preventing another disastrous global crack-up—one
fostered international stability and prosperity for de- that would inevitably reach out and touch the United
cades. Within government, the Trump administration States, just as the world wars had. Realist thinkers
appears to be embracing an equally misguided version understood that America was uniquely capable of sta-
of realism—an approach that masquerades as shrewd bilizing the international order and containing Soviet
realpolitik but is likely to prove profoundly damaging power after World War II, even as they disagreed—
to American power and influence. Neither of these ap- sometimes sharply—over the precise nature and ex-
proaches is truly “realist,” as neither promotes core tent of American commitments. Moreover, although
American interests or deals with the world as it really Cold War realists recognized the paramount role of
is. The United States surely needs the insights that an power in international affairs, most also recognized
authentically realist approach to global affairs can that U.S. power would be most effective if harnessed
provide. But first, American realism will have to un- to a compelling concept of American moral purpose
dergo a reformation. and exercised primarily through enduring partner-
ships with nations that shared core American values.
The Realist Tradition “An idealistic policy undisciplined by political realism
is bound to be unstable and ineffective,” the political
Realism has taken many forms over the years, but it scientist Robert Osgood wrote. “Political realism un-
has always been focused on the imperatives of power, guided by moral purpose will be self-defeating and fu-
order, and survival in an anarchic global arena. The tile.” Most realists were thus sympathetic to the major
classical realists—Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes— initiatives of postwar foreign policy, such as the cre-
considered how states and leaders should behave in ation of U.S.-led military alliances and the cultivation
a dangerous world in which there was no overarch- of a thriving Western community composed primarily
ing morality or governing authority strong enough to of liberal democracies.
regulate state behavior. The great modern realists— At the same time, Cold War realists spoke of
thinkers and statesmen such as Reinhold Niebuhr, the need for American restraint. They worried that
Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Henry Kiss- America’s liberal idealism, absent a sense of limits,
inger—grappled with the same issues during and after would carry the country into quixotic crusades. They
the catastrophic upheaval that characterized the first thought that excessive commitments at the periphery
half of the 20th century. of the global system could weaken the international
They argued that it was impossible to transcend order against its radical challengers. They believed
the tragic nature of international politics through that a policy of outright confrontation toward the
good intentions or moralistic maxims, and that seek- Kremlin could be quite dangerous. “Absolute security
ing to do so would merely empower the most ruthless for one power means absolute insecurity for all oth-
members of the international system. They contend- ers,” Kissinger wrote. Realists therefore advocated
ed, on the basis of bitter experience, that aggression policies meant to temper American ambition and the
and violence were always a possibility in international most perilous aspects of superpower competition.
affairs, and that states that desired peace would thus They supported—and, in Kissinger’s case, led—arms-
have to prepare for war and show themselves ready to control agreements and political negotiations with
wield coercive power. Most important, realist thinkers Moscow. They often objected to America’s costliest
tended to place a high value on policies and arrange- interventions in the Third World. Kennan and Mor-
ments that restrained potential aggressors and cre- genthau were among the first mainstream figures to
ated a basis for stability within an inherently competi- go public with opposition to American involvement
tive global environment. in Vietnam (Morgenthau did so in the pages of Com-
For this very reason, leading Cold War–era re- mentary in May 1962).
alists advocated a robust American internationalism During the Cold War, then, realism was a sup-
as the best way of restraining malevolent actors and ple, nuanced doctrine. It emphasized the need for
16 Saving Realism from the So-Called Realists : September 2017
BRANDSFEAVER.indd 16 8/10/17 4:12 PM
