"The only way to cure the EU's democratic deficit is to give a more
important role to national parliaments. (falling short of fulfilling
the principles of democracy in their practices)
National parliaments should not only assess whether EU
legislation complies with the principle of subsidiarity - they
should also be given a role in reviewing the proportionality of EU
legislation."
EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FORMATIVE ESSAY
Charles Grant stated that ‘EU institutions are geographically distant, hard to understand, and often
deal with obscure technicalities. 1 It is a common opinion that Members of National Parliaments
should get more involved as seen by their positive contribution on some legislation. 2 The doctrine of
subsidiarity holds that nothing should be pursued by a large and complex organisation (like the EU)
that can be carried out just as well by a smaller and simpler body (national parliaments). 3 With
regards to the framework of the EU, supranational institutions are questioned on their competence
to legislate by regulating the exercise of EU powers. This is done by ruling out its intervention when
matters can be dealt with by member states just as competently at a national level. The principle of
proportionality decides if the EU has proposed law that does not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve its aims. However, national parliaments do not play much of a role in this aspect. The
effective participation of national legislatures is critical to guaranteeing responsibility and legitimacy
for the Union's operations. This essay will discuss the EU’s democratic deficit by analysing the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality of EU legislation and if the added involvement of
national parliaments can cure this deficit. 4
The first question answered in this essay is if giving a more important role to national parliament
would cure the democratic deficit faced by the EU. The problem of a democratic deficit is a deep-
rooted political problem rather than one that could be simply resolved by a quick institutional fix.
Mats Persson agrees and states that national parliaments must be involved to a greater extent to
prevent absurd situations, ‘where EU leaders agree to something during a panic-stricken weekend
and then spend months or years to try to figure out what they agreed upon because national
parliaments pose uncomfortable questions’. 5
Many MEPs have no ties to national political systems and most of the time, parliament’s agenda
seem to lie in boosting its own powers. The image of a democratic deficit is becoming a rising issue
for the eurozone's indebted members. The European Commission, the European Central Bank, and
the International Monetary Fund – has compelled national parliaments to accept budget cuts and
structural reforms. The erosion of democracy was observed to be caused by European integration 6,
1
Grant, C. ‘How to Reduce the EU’s Democratic Deficit.’ The Guardian (2013)
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/10/how-to-reduce-eu-democratic-deficit>.
2
House of Lords, ‘The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union’ 9 th Report of Session (2013-14).
3
Donatella M. Viola, ‘National Parliaments in the EU: Synergy Under the Subsidiarity Principle?’ (2021).
4
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.
5
European Parliament Legal Affairs Committee, ‘Report on EU Regulatory Fitness and Subsidiarity and
Proportionality’ (2014) 19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011 (2013/2077(INI)) p60.
6
Pollak J and P. Slominski, ‘EU Parliaments After the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Parliamentary Field?’ (2013).
, the Council’s dominance in the legislative sphere entailed a shrinking of the rights of national
parliaments which cast doubt over the domestic legitimacy of the European construct. To
compensate for the loss of democratic scrutiny, political leaders finally decided to give the European
Parliament (EP) additional decision-making powers, since it is the only directly elected EU entity.
Despite its new role as co-legislator in the post-Lisbon framework 7, the Strasbourg and Brussels
assemblies have not inherited all conventional legislative powers. It still lacks the right of legislative
initiative, which is effectively a monopoly of the European Commission. 8 Furthermore, it does not
have the primary prerogative of approving or rejecting government policy by submitting a petition of
censure against the European Council. Additionally, members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
are ‘mainly unknown, and often despised’ by citizen, emphasizing the lack of a European demos, and
proving that the EU's democratic deficit remains unresolved.
National parliaments – domestic legislators are assumed to be closer to the people and have a better
understanding of their needs. The dilemma of how to translate MP’s legitimate democratic capacity
in EU decision-making has emerged. Interparliamentary cooperation, specifically regarding the
scrutiny of the government by MEPs and MPs is possible and supported – as it is aimed to enable
national parliaments to contribute actively to the good functioning of the EU. 9 MPs can exert indirect
control over the Council by asking their ministers to account for EU-level decisions and, if unhappy,
release a ruling cabinet through a resolution of censure. In other words, national lawmakers might
serve as a mechanism for the domestication and normalisation of EU policymaking within the
democratic processes of member states.10 Therefore, giving a more important role to national
parliaments may directly enhance the transparency of the EU legislative process by closing the
bridge between citizens and EU institutions and defuse democratic deficit claims. Some may argue
however, that this is wishful thinking, and arguably so. The Eurobarometer Poll showed that 44% of
people trust the EU while only 34% trust their national parliaments. Nevertheless, member states
with Eurosceptic tendencies had higher trust in national parliaments.
A ‘red’ card system was proposed by David Cameron in 2016 during the Brexit period 11 and
thereafter, Jan Zahradil, a Czech member of the European Parliament, advocated for national
legislatures to be granted the power to essentially reject EU draft laws or replace current legislation.
Essentially, the red card system would give national legislatures a collective veto power over EU
legislation. Opponents of this approach, however, contend that it makes little practical difference
since if a proposal receives a red card, it would be rejected by the Council nonetheless, which calls
into the question of giving national parliaments a more important role possibly being ineffective.
Nonetheless, national legislatures must have a solid influence on the moves toward tighter
economic monitoring embodied in the European Semester. This is a critical component of national
parliaments' responsibility in scrutinizing their governments' economic and financial policies rather
than just give mere opinion.
7
Robert Schütze, ‘European Union Law’ (3rd Ed OUP, 2021).
8
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska, ‘Boosting the Role of National Parliaments in EU Democracy’ (2019) Carnegie
Europe.
9
Article 12 TEU.
10
Kröger S. and R. Bellamy, ‘Beyond a Constraining Dissensus: The Role of National Parliaments in
Domesticating and Normalising the Politicisation of European Integration’ (2016) Comparative European
Politics 14(2) 131-153.
11
Dr Sara Hagemann, ‘Cameron’s Red Card System for National Parliaments Sends a Political Messgae’ UK in
Changing Europe (2016) < https://ukandeu.ac.uk/camerons-red-card-system-for-national-parliaments-will-
have-little-effect-but-sends-a-political-message/> .
important role to national parliaments. (falling short of fulfilling
the principles of democracy in their practices)
National parliaments should not only assess whether EU
legislation complies with the principle of subsidiarity - they
should also be given a role in reviewing the proportionality of EU
legislation."
EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FORMATIVE ESSAY
Charles Grant stated that ‘EU institutions are geographically distant, hard to understand, and often
deal with obscure technicalities. 1 It is a common opinion that Members of National Parliaments
should get more involved as seen by their positive contribution on some legislation. 2 The doctrine of
subsidiarity holds that nothing should be pursued by a large and complex organisation (like the EU)
that can be carried out just as well by a smaller and simpler body (national parliaments). 3 With
regards to the framework of the EU, supranational institutions are questioned on their competence
to legislate by regulating the exercise of EU powers. This is done by ruling out its intervention when
matters can be dealt with by member states just as competently at a national level. The principle of
proportionality decides if the EU has proposed law that does not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve its aims. However, national parliaments do not play much of a role in this aspect. The
effective participation of national legislatures is critical to guaranteeing responsibility and legitimacy
for the Union's operations. This essay will discuss the EU’s democratic deficit by analysing the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality of EU legislation and if the added involvement of
national parliaments can cure this deficit. 4
The first question answered in this essay is if giving a more important role to national parliament
would cure the democratic deficit faced by the EU. The problem of a democratic deficit is a deep-
rooted political problem rather than one that could be simply resolved by a quick institutional fix.
Mats Persson agrees and states that national parliaments must be involved to a greater extent to
prevent absurd situations, ‘where EU leaders agree to something during a panic-stricken weekend
and then spend months or years to try to figure out what they agreed upon because national
parliaments pose uncomfortable questions’. 5
Many MEPs have no ties to national political systems and most of the time, parliament’s agenda
seem to lie in boosting its own powers. The image of a democratic deficit is becoming a rising issue
for the eurozone's indebted members. The European Commission, the European Central Bank, and
the International Monetary Fund – has compelled national parliaments to accept budget cuts and
structural reforms. The erosion of democracy was observed to be caused by European integration 6,
1
Grant, C. ‘How to Reduce the EU’s Democratic Deficit.’ The Guardian (2013)
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/10/how-to-reduce-eu-democratic-deficit>.
2
House of Lords, ‘The Role of National Parliaments in the European Union’ 9 th Report of Session (2013-14).
3
Donatella M. Viola, ‘National Parliaments in the EU: Synergy Under the Subsidiarity Principle?’ (2021).
4
Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Protocol (No 2) on the application of the principles of
subsidiarity and proportionality.
5
European Parliament Legal Affairs Committee, ‘Report on EU Regulatory Fitness and Subsidiarity and
Proportionality’ (2014) 19th report on Better Lawmaking covering the year 2011 (2013/2077(INI)) p60.
6
Pollak J and P. Slominski, ‘EU Parliaments After the Treaty of Lisbon: Towards a Parliamentary Field?’ (2013).
, the Council’s dominance in the legislative sphere entailed a shrinking of the rights of national
parliaments which cast doubt over the domestic legitimacy of the European construct. To
compensate for the loss of democratic scrutiny, political leaders finally decided to give the European
Parliament (EP) additional decision-making powers, since it is the only directly elected EU entity.
Despite its new role as co-legislator in the post-Lisbon framework 7, the Strasbourg and Brussels
assemblies have not inherited all conventional legislative powers. It still lacks the right of legislative
initiative, which is effectively a monopoly of the European Commission. 8 Furthermore, it does not
have the primary prerogative of approving or rejecting government policy by submitting a petition of
censure against the European Council. Additionally, members of the European Parliament (MEPs)
are ‘mainly unknown, and often despised’ by citizen, emphasizing the lack of a European demos, and
proving that the EU's democratic deficit remains unresolved.
National parliaments – domestic legislators are assumed to be closer to the people and have a better
understanding of their needs. The dilemma of how to translate MP’s legitimate democratic capacity
in EU decision-making has emerged. Interparliamentary cooperation, specifically regarding the
scrutiny of the government by MEPs and MPs is possible and supported – as it is aimed to enable
national parliaments to contribute actively to the good functioning of the EU. 9 MPs can exert indirect
control over the Council by asking their ministers to account for EU-level decisions and, if unhappy,
release a ruling cabinet through a resolution of censure. In other words, national lawmakers might
serve as a mechanism for the domestication and normalisation of EU policymaking within the
democratic processes of member states.10 Therefore, giving a more important role to national
parliaments may directly enhance the transparency of the EU legislative process by closing the
bridge between citizens and EU institutions and defuse democratic deficit claims. Some may argue
however, that this is wishful thinking, and arguably so. The Eurobarometer Poll showed that 44% of
people trust the EU while only 34% trust their national parliaments. Nevertheless, member states
with Eurosceptic tendencies had higher trust in national parliaments.
A ‘red’ card system was proposed by David Cameron in 2016 during the Brexit period 11 and
thereafter, Jan Zahradil, a Czech member of the European Parliament, advocated for national
legislatures to be granted the power to essentially reject EU draft laws or replace current legislation.
Essentially, the red card system would give national legislatures a collective veto power over EU
legislation. Opponents of this approach, however, contend that it makes little practical difference
since if a proposal receives a red card, it would be rejected by the Council nonetheless, which calls
into the question of giving national parliaments a more important role possibly being ineffective.
Nonetheless, national legislatures must have a solid influence on the moves toward tighter
economic monitoring embodied in the European Semester. This is a critical component of national
parliaments' responsibility in scrutinizing their governments' economic and financial policies rather
than just give mere opinion.
7
Robert Schütze, ‘European Union Law’ (3rd Ed OUP, 2021).
8
Agata Gostyńska-Jakubowska, ‘Boosting the Role of National Parliaments in EU Democracy’ (2019) Carnegie
Europe.
9
Article 12 TEU.
10
Kröger S. and R. Bellamy, ‘Beyond a Constraining Dissensus: The Role of National Parliaments in
Domesticating and Normalising the Politicisation of European Integration’ (2016) Comparative European
Politics 14(2) 131-153.
11
Dr Sara Hagemann, ‘Cameron’s Red Card System for National Parliaments Sends a Political Messgae’ UK in
Changing Europe (2016) < https://ukandeu.ac.uk/camerons-red-card-system-for-national-parliaments-will-
have-little-effect-but-sends-a-political-message/> .
