Which Interpretation Regarding the Home Rule Crisis is More
Convincing?- 2021 Past Paper Question (CCEA)
Interpretation A suggests that the Irish nationalists had the most to
celebrate about the Home Rule Bill when it was delivered in September 1914,
suggesting that this group achieved the most. Contrastingly, Interpretation B
implies that the Ulster Unionists (particularly within Antrim, Armagh, Down,
Derry, Fermanagh, and Tyrone) were more successful, as partition was
virtually secured. Overall, Interpretation B is the most convincing interpretation
as it is the only interpretation to acknowledge how much Redmond lost in
partition, failing to even truly deliver Home Rule.
Laffan interprets that the Irish nationalists had the most to celebrate out
of any group, as Home Rule was placed on the statute book, albeit with a
Suspensory Act so it would be implemented when “the war had ended”. Laffan
suggests that this was a great achievement, as “Redmond had succeeded
where others had failed”. This argument is at least partially convincing, as
Home Rule had previously failed in 1886 and 1893. Therefore, it must be
acknowledged that Redmond was at least partially successful. His dedication
and dismissal of Ulster Unionism as “mere bluff” meant that many members of
the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) did view Home Rule as a success. The
interpretation is also partially convincing as it was “impossible for Ulster
Unionists to know if exclusion would be granted” after the Londonderry
byelection in January 1913. The election, won by Hogg (a pro-Home Rule
Liberal), meant that Home Rulers outnumbered Unionist MPs (17/16) in Ulster,
which can be considered a positive outcome for the nationalists. The
interpretation is also convincing as it discusses how the nationalists avoided a
“Unionist rebellion”, which had seemed all-too-possible with the Larne
Gun-Running (24th-25th April 1914), where the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
had illegally imported 24,600 rifles into Ulster. The fact that all-out civil war
, was prevented can be interpreted as a significant success, making the
interpretation more convincing.
However, Interpretation A is still less convincing than Interpretation B as
it can be significantly challenged. For example, Interpretation A argues that
there was “no way of knowing if Asquith would concede” to concede to
Unionist demands. Whilst partition was not officially promised, this statement
may be challenged as Asquith had issued a proviso on 6th February 1912 to
say that Ulster would receive special circumstances if sufficient pressure was
placed on Westminster. Given the significant Unionist activity in Ulster (such
as the Craigavon Demonstration on 23rd September 1911), it may be argued
that it was almost certain that partition would be delivered at some point. This
makes the interpretation less convincing, as it highlights how Redmond had
given up six counties, suggesting that he was not the most successful party.
This is seen in Interpretation B, making this interpretation more convincing.
Whilst Fanning agrees with Laffan about the nationalists’ initial “wild
enthusiasm”, he challenges the first interpretation by arguing that “the
achievement of Home Rule was more apparent than real”. The Irish
Parliamentary Party (IPP) did not achieve Home Rule for 32 counties and can
not be described as successful.
Therefore, it’s clear that Interpretation B argues that the Unionists
benefitted from the outcome of the Home Rule Crisis more than the
nationalists. Nationalist enthusiasm was “misplaced”, as the Suspensory Act
meant that Home Rule was like a “continually post-dated cheque” (MacNeill).
This makes the interpretation that the Unionists were more successful the
more convincing of the two interpretations. This is especially true because
Carson’s “New Unionism” was increasingly Ulster-centric, and the Ulster
Unionists in the six counties cared little for what happened on the rest of the
island. At this stage, Fanning argues that partition was inevitable, as the
ministers could no longer “reverse their tracks”. For example, the
Convincing?- 2021 Past Paper Question (CCEA)
Interpretation A suggests that the Irish nationalists had the most to
celebrate about the Home Rule Bill when it was delivered in September 1914,
suggesting that this group achieved the most. Contrastingly, Interpretation B
implies that the Ulster Unionists (particularly within Antrim, Armagh, Down,
Derry, Fermanagh, and Tyrone) were more successful, as partition was
virtually secured. Overall, Interpretation B is the most convincing interpretation
as it is the only interpretation to acknowledge how much Redmond lost in
partition, failing to even truly deliver Home Rule.
Laffan interprets that the Irish nationalists had the most to celebrate out
of any group, as Home Rule was placed on the statute book, albeit with a
Suspensory Act so it would be implemented when “the war had ended”. Laffan
suggests that this was a great achievement, as “Redmond had succeeded
where others had failed”. This argument is at least partially convincing, as
Home Rule had previously failed in 1886 and 1893. Therefore, it must be
acknowledged that Redmond was at least partially successful. His dedication
and dismissal of Ulster Unionism as “mere bluff” meant that many members of
the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) did view Home Rule as a success. The
interpretation is also partially convincing as it was “impossible for Ulster
Unionists to know if exclusion would be granted” after the Londonderry
byelection in January 1913. The election, won by Hogg (a pro-Home Rule
Liberal), meant that Home Rulers outnumbered Unionist MPs (17/16) in Ulster,
which can be considered a positive outcome for the nationalists. The
interpretation is also convincing as it discusses how the nationalists avoided a
“Unionist rebellion”, which had seemed all-too-possible with the Larne
Gun-Running (24th-25th April 1914), where the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
had illegally imported 24,600 rifles into Ulster. The fact that all-out civil war
, was prevented can be interpreted as a significant success, making the
interpretation more convincing.
However, Interpretation A is still less convincing than Interpretation B as
it can be significantly challenged. For example, Interpretation A argues that
there was “no way of knowing if Asquith would concede” to concede to
Unionist demands. Whilst partition was not officially promised, this statement
may be challenged as Asquith had issued a proviso on 6th February 1912 to
say that Ulster would receive special circumstances if sufficient pressure was
placed on Westminster. Given the significant Unionist activity in Ulster (such
as the Craigavon Demonstration on 23rd September 1911), it may be argued
that it was almost certain that partition would be delivered at some point. This
makes the interpretation less convincing, as it highlights how Redmond had
given up six counties, suggesting that he was not the most successful party.
This is seen in Interpretation B, making this interpretation more convincing.
Whilst Fanning agrees with Laffan about the nationalists’ initial “wild
enthusiasm”, he challenges the first interpretation by arguing that “the
achievement of Home Rule was more apparent than real”. The Irish
Parliamentary Party (IPP) did not achieve Home Rule for 32 counties and can
not be described as successful.
Therefore, it’s clear that Interpretation B argues that the Unionists
benefitted from the outcome of the Home Rule Crisis more than the
nationalists. Nationalist enthusiasm was “misplaced”, as the Suspensory Act
meant that Home Rule was like a “continually post-dated cheque” (MacNeill).
This makes the interpretation that the Unionists were more successful the
more convincing of the two interpretations. This is especially true because
Carson’s “New Unionism” was increasingly Ulster-centric, and the Ulster
Unionists in the six counties cared little for what happened on the rest of the
island. At this stage, Fanning argues that partition was inevitable, as the
ministers could no longer “reverse their tracks”. For example, the
