Is Moral Anti-Realism Convincing?
Statement of Intent: I will argue that moral anti-realism is the case and particularly prescriptivism is the
most convincing metaethical theory. I will first show that moral properties are not real through Mackie’s
argument from Queerness, and then I will show that non-cognitivism is the case and general objections
towards non-cognitivism fail. Most crucially I will then show that prescriptivism is the most convincing
account of morality.
RICE 1:
R: Mackie's Argument from Queerness, if moral were real they would be so queer and undiscoverable that
it shows it probably isn’t real. Metaphysical Queerness shows that because moral judgements are
motivating but statements of facts can’t be motivating as to know the truth is not enough to be motivated
and so if moral properties did exist they’d have to be unique and have a ‘to be persuedness’ property built
into it which is queer. Furthermore you have epistemological queerness in which if moral were real we
would have no way to discover them as our usual methods of gaining knowledge fail. We can’t rely on
intuition because we can be wrong about our intuitions and there is no sense experience, introspection
etc. Therefore because they would be so queer and unknowable they point towards moral properties no
being real.
I: Some moral realist accept that moral properties are unlike any other property ie Moore’s Intuitionism
which says that morals are non-natural properties ie can’t be tesed through science, it doesn't necessarily
prove that moral properties MUST not exist. Furthermore moral properties are not really unique to this
queerness eg. the same is true of mathematical truths but we don’t say that maths is not real? So the
moral realist could accept Mackie’s argument that moral properties are queer and unlike other properties
usually but he has failed to show that therefore they are definitively not real.
C: Pushing the objection further, there are just too many questions unanswered such as what is the
connection between natural property and moral properties ie that causing pain is wrong. The only thing
we can identify is someone's preference but it is possible for someone's preference to be different then
its impossible for their to be an objective statement. Furthermore, Moore’s Intuitionism is really
unconvincing because if you accept morality is something extraordinary it is much simpler and likelier
then its not real rather then persisting that it is real. Furthermore intuitionism would have to say that moral
properties are a priori synthetic which violated Hume’s Fork
E: This is not the most crucial argument because it doesn’t show FOR sure that moral realism is not the
case but that it is implausible. The rationalist could get away from this argument by saying we won’t need
to experience it to know moral facts but then this opens a can of worms of whether rationalism is the case
and someone could just accept that they’re queer despite that being a very weak stance. It’s strength is
that it pulls out a variety of reasons why they would be queer.
RICE 2:
R: Non cognitivism is the case and therefore anti-realism must be the case. Hume’s Fork. Moral
Judgements are not analytically true (as it would be a contradiction to deny moral judgments yet we can)
nor can they be synthetic as what makes it wrong is the emotions and passions rather then from the
matter of fact. Therefore moral judgements are not propositions and reasons of judgement. Propositions
can be true or false (has a truth aptness to it). If moral judgements are not propositions they don’t express
a truth value and therefore not cognitive and therefore not realist. Is a stronger argument then priori
because it is much more definitive it is a it MUST be the case that anti- realism is the case rather then the
prior being that it is implausible. Furthermore, this argument points towards better anti-relist theories such
as prescriptivism and emotivism which is my aim.
Is Moral Anti-Realism Convincing? 1
Statement of Intent: I will argue that moral anti-realism is the case and particularly prescriptivism is the
most convincing metaethical theory. I will first show that moral properties are not real through Mackie’s
argument from Queerness, and then I will show that non-cognitivism is the case and general objections
towards non-cognitivism fail. Most crucially I will then show that prescriptivism is the most convincing
account of morality.
RICE 1:
R: Mackie's Argument from Queerness, if moral were real they would be so queer and undiscoverable that
it shows it probably isn’t real. Metaphysical Queerness shows that because moral judgements are
motivating but statements of facts can’t be motivating as to know the truth is not enough to be motivated
and so if moral properties did exist they’d have to be unique and have a ‘to be persuedness’ property built
into it which is queer. Furthermore you have epistemological queerness in which if moral were real we
would have no way to discover them as our usual methods of gaining knowledge fail. We can’t rely on
intuition because we can be wrong about our intuitions and there is no sense experience, introspection
etc. Therefore because they would be so queer and unknowable they point towards moral properties no
being real.
I: Some moral realist accept that moral properties are unlike any other property ie Moore’s Intuitionism
which says that morals are non-natural properties ie can’t be tesed through science, it doesn't necessarily
prove that moral properties MUST not exist. Furthermore moral properties are not really unique to this
queerness eg. the same is true of mathematical truths but we don’t say that maths is not real? So the
moral realist could accept Mackie’s argument that moral properties are queer and unlike other properties
usually but he has failed to show that therefore they are definitively not real.
C: Pushing the objection further, there are just too many questions unanswered such as what is the
connection between natural property and moral properties ie that causing pain is wrong. The only thing
we can identify is someone's preference but it is possible for someone's preference to be different then
its impossible for their to be an objective statement. Furthermore, Moore’s Intuitionism is really
unconvincing because if you accept morality is something extraordinary it is much simpler and likelier
then its not real rather then persisting that it is real. Furthermore intuitionism would have to say that moral
properties are a priori synthetic which violated Hume’s Fork
E: This is not the most crucial argument because it doesn’t show FOR sure that moral realism is not the
case but that it is implausible. The rationalist could get away from this argument by saying we won’t need
to experience it to know moral facts but then this opens a can of worms of whether rationalism is the case
and someone could just accept that they’re queer despite that being a very weak stance. It’s strength is
that it pulls out a variety of reasons why they would be queer.
RICE 2:
R: Non cognitivism is the case and therefore anti-realism must be the case. Hume’s Fork. Moral
Judgements are not analytically true (as it would be a contradiction to deny moral judgments yet we can)
nor can they be synthetic as what makes it wrong is the emotions and passions rather then from the
matter of fact. Therefore moral judgements are not propositions and reasons of judgement. Propositions
can be true or false (has a truth aptness to it). If moral judgements are not propositions they don’t express
a truth value and therefore not cognitive and therefore not realist. Is a stronger argument then priori
because it is much more definitive it is a it MUST be the case that anti- realism is the case rather then the
prior being that it is implausible. Furthermore, this argument points towards better anti-relist theories such
as prescriptivism and emotivism which is my aim.
Is Moral Anti-Realism Convincing? 1
