MINORITY CONFLICTS: QUESTIONS, ANSWERS
AND HOPES
GÁBOR KARDOS
Department o f International Law
Telephone number: (36-1)411-6532
e-mail:
Why are minority-majority conflicts dangerous?
If the majority - and mainly national or ethnic - minority or minorities are in
conflict over political representation, redistribution of income, social inclusion
or cultural coexistence, this could lead to a situation in which the country be
comes destabilised, and such situation poses danger not only for the state itself
and for the neighbours but also for the international community. The main
problem is that minority conflicts can not be resolved easily. According to a
study on conditions of non-violent resolution of conflicts seven hypothesis
concerning the nature of the conflict could explain why it is difficult to achieve
a peaceful settlement.' The minority conflicts fit at least into four of them. Con
flicts are more difficult to solve
- the more different structural variables (economic, social, ethnic, reli
gious. cultural, political) cumulate,
- the more dimensions of sovereignty are at stake i.e. territory, boundaries,
independence, political participation,
- the more they are ideologically loaded, ideology touches upon basic val
ues and basic identification issues (language, religion, culture and sym
bols),
- the less there are institutionalised rules for the management of conflicts."
As far as the first hypothesis is concerned, practical examples clearly show that
to overcome a minority conflict it is highly necessary that structural variables
or social cleavages do not overlap each other. One of the most important rea
sons of the success of the Swiss model - beside direct democracy, proportional
1 Sec: Frank R. Pfetsch: Conditions for Non-Violent Resolution of Conflicts. In: Emst-Otto
Czempiel. Liparit Kinzadjan. Zdcnes Masopust (cds.): Non-Violence in International Crises.
Vienna. ISSC. 1990. pp. 104-105.
2 Ibid.
, 364_________________________ GÁBOR KARDOS___________________
repiesentation and federalism —is that cross-cutting social cleavages has come
to existence. Not all German speaking Swiss are Protestant and not all rural
people are Catholic and French speaking any more.3
In conjunction with the second hypothesis it is obvious that most (but not all)
aspirations of at least the bigger minorities touch directly upon certain aspects
of sovereignty. The quest for identity and for its attributions are at the core of
the minority conflicts.
Regarding the culture of conflict minority groups „often lack the commitment
to and experience of conflict management practice”4 and from the side of the
government there is a lack of desire to be engaged in „collective standard set
ting which is basically a dialogue in search of common solutions.”5
Minority conflicts present a „clear and present danger” for the international
community. It comes predominantly from the fact that a great number of peo
ple in minority position are not committed to preservation of the state system as
it stands now. They do not identify themselves primarily with a state but with
people, they are first and foremost Tamils or Armeniens.6 The lack of
identification or ambivalent identification with the state they live in could lead
to a desire for secession and accession to an existing state or establishment of a
new one. In conjunction with such territorial changes you can easily come to
the conclusion of veritas duplex. Inviolability of borders could keep minority
conflicts alive. An author describes this situation in the following way: ’’There
are too many borders that were delineated by dictators, and authoritarian re
gimes, imposed by war or fiat, and sometimes specifically designed to contain
ethnic mixes that would preclude viable independence. To „recognise” them is
a prescription for war, not peace.”7 On the other hand the possibility of the
Ievision of borders could lead to a domino effect, rewarding secessionism.
Consequently the reason why territorial change could not serve the settlement
process comes from procedural considerations. Simply from the fact that there
is no change in borders without at least bitter conflict, if not war, because no
slate accepts easily and peacefully a border revision at its own expense. To
have the consensus of all parties involved in a negotiated border change is an
illusion, especially because the majority national consciousness regards the
Walter Kalin: Federalism and the Resolution of Minority Conflict. In: Günther Bachter (ed.):
Federalism against Ethnicity? Zürich, Verlag Rüegger. 1997, pp. 179-180.
I)a\ id Garment, the International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict, Concepts. Indicators and
Theories. Journal of Peace Research Vol. 30. 1993. p. 145.
Asbjorn Hide: Ethnic conflicts and minority protection: Roles for the international community
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu 12ec/uu 12ee0q.htm
Ted Robert Gurr: Why Do Minorites Rebel? In: Günther Bachlcr. ibid. p. 3
C. G. Jacobsen: Myths. Politics, and the Not-So-New World Order. Journal o f Peace
Research. Vol. 3. 1993, p. 249.
AND HOPES
GÁBOR KARDOS
Department o f International Law
Telephone number: (36-1)411-6532
e-mail:
Why are minority-majority conflicts dangerous?
If the majority - and mainly national or ethnic - minority or minorities are in
conflict over political representation, redistribution of income, social inclusion
or cultural coexistence, this could lead to a situation in which the country be
comes destabilised, and such situation poses danger not only for the state itself
and for the neighbours but also for the international community. The main
problem is that minority conflicts can not be resolved easily. According to a
study on conditions of non-violent resolution of conflicts seven hypothesis
concerning the nature of the conflict could explain why it is difficult to achieve
a peaceful settlement.' The minority conflicts fit at least into four of them. Con
flicts are more difficult to solve
- the more different structural variables (economic, social, ethnic, reli
gious. cultural, political) cumulate,
- the more dimensions of sovereignty are at stake i.e. territory, boundaries,
independence, political participation,
- the more they are ideologically loaded, ideology touches upon basic val
ues and basic identification issues (language, religion, culture and sym
bols),
- the less there are institutionalised rules for the management of conflicts."
As far as the first hypothesis is concerned, practical examples clearly show that
to overcome a minority conflict it is highly necessary that structural variables
or social cleavages do not overlap each other. One of the most important rea
sons of the success of the Swiss model - beside direct democracy, proportional
1 Sec: Frank R. Pfetsch: Conditions for Non-Violent Resolution of Conflicts. In: Emst-Otto
Czempiel. Liparit Kinzadjan. Zdcnes Masopust (cds.): Non-Violence in International Crises.
Vienna. ISSC. 1990. pp. 104-105.
2 Ibid.
, 364_________________________ GÁBOR KARDOS___________________
repiesentation and federalism —is that cross-cutting social cleavages has come
to existence. Not all German speaking Swiss are Protestant and not all rural
people are Catholic and French speaking any more.3
In conjunction with the second hypothesis it is obvious that most (but not all)
aspirations of at least the bigger minorities touch directly upon certain aspects
of sovereignty. The quest for identity and for its attributions are at the core of
the minority conflicts.
Regarding the culture of conflict minority groups „often lack the commitment
to and experience of conflict management practice”4 and from the side of the
government there is a lack of desire to be engaged in „collective standard set
ting which is basically a dialogue in search of common solutions.”5
Minority conflicts present a „clear and present danger” for the international
community. It comes predominantly from the fact that a great number of peo
ple in minority position are not committed to preservation of the state system as
it stands now. They do not identify themselves primarily with a state but with
people, they are first and foremost Tamils or Armeniens.6 The lack of
identification or ambivalent identification with the state they live in could lead
to a desire for secession and accession to an existing state or establishment of a
new one. In conjunction with such territorial changes you can easily come to
the conclusion of veritas duplex. Inviolability of borders could keep minority
conflicts alive. An author describes this situation in the following way: ’’There
are too many borders that were delineated by dictators, and authoritarian re
gimes, imposed by war or fiat, and sometimes specifically designed to contain
ethnic mixes that would preclude viable independence. To „recognise” them is
a prescription for war, not peace.”7 On the other hand the possibility of the
Ievision of borders could lead to a domino effect, rewarding secessionism.
Consequently the reason why territorial change could not serve the settlement
process comes from procedural considerations. Simply from the fact that there
is no change in borders without at least bitter conflict, if not war, because no
slate accepts easily and peacefully a border revision at its own expense. To
have the consensus of all parties involved in a negotiated border change is an
illusion, especially because the majority national consciousness regards the
Walter Kalin: Federalism and the Resolution of Minority Conflict. In: Günther Bachter (ed.):
Federalism against Ethnicity? Zürich, Verlag Rüegger. 1997, pp. 179-180.
I)a\ id Garment, the International Dimension of Ethnic Conflict, Concepts. Indicators and
Theories. Journal of Peace Research Vol. 30. 1993. p. 145.
Asbjorn Hide: Ethnic conflicts and minority protection: Roles for the international community
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu 12ec/uu 12ee0q.htm
Ted Robert Gurr: Why Do Minorites Rebel? In: Günther Bachlcr. ibid. p. 3
C. G. Jacobsen: Myths. Politics, and the Not-So-New World Order. Journal o f Peace
Research. Vol. 3. 1993, p. 249.
