International Relations Versailles Treaties Questions
Q1 (20)
To what extent did the Paris Peace Settlement fulfil the aims of the Big Four with regard to
Germany?
The harsh terms of the Paris Peace Settlement can be viewed principally as a consequence of
the aims of the French government to permanently weaken Germany and vindicate their suffering in
the First World War. It is certainly credible to suggest that the French leader, Georges Clemenceau,
achieved the majority of his aims; the diktak imposed on Germany together with the humiliation of
the war-guilt clause were seen as justice for the defeat of France by Germany in 1871 and for the 4.1
million French casualties in the First World War. Alsace and Lorraine, a traditionally French region
lost to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, was returned to France – the return of the territory was
a national triumph at the time and also contributed to the sense that revenge had rightly been done
among the French people. In terms of weakening Germany further, France were able to secure the
establishment of nation states on Germany’s eastern frontier in the hope that this would deter
another invasion of France by Germany. Without a doubt, the creation of strong and independent
states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, helped fill the vacuum of power left by the dissolution of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and subsequently ensured that Germany could not emerge as strong
as they were in 1914. The prohibition of Anschluss further satisfied the French government in this
regard, safe in the knowledge that Germany would not attempt to expand its influence once more.
Perhaps most crucial to France was the limitation of the German army to just 100,000 men with a
ban on conscription. Given the prowess of the German army and their ability to use conscription to
inspire nationalism, this was of immense importance to France, who could now overpower Germany
without the support of allies if a land invasion was required, a luxury that they had not enjoyed
before the war. It could be argued, therefore, that the Paris Peace Settlement almost completely
fulfilled the aims of France with regard to Germany. There were, however, some limitations of the
treaty in the eyes of some French hardliners. Principally among them was France’s failure to
establish the Rhineland region as an independent state. Instead, the region was demilitarised with a
limited period of occupation – which France feared would, with justification in view of later events,
enable the rearmament of Germany on their western frontier and put them in a position to invade
France once again. Clearly, Germany was not completely on its knees and with the removal of Russia
as a rival, it seemed that France’s enemy was in many respects an even greater power in 1919 as it
was in 1914, now without significant challenges to its eastern frontier.
In Britain, the dissatisfaction of the government with the settlement centred on the very fact
that France had achieved too many of its aims at the expense of permanently weakening Germany.
This was not in the interests of Britain’s aims, since it was feared that Germany would turn to
communism if its economy was seriously destroyed by the Paris Peace Settlement. Britain also
needed to maintain Germany as a strong trading partner after the war in order to be able to repay a
$1 billion debt to the USA, however France’s push for depriving Germany of ports like Memel and
Danzig made this impossible. From this perspective, Britain’s aims were not fulfilled by the
settlement. Nevertheless, there were some aspects of obvious benefit to Britain, the most notable of
which being the £6.6 billion reparations destined to Britain, France and Belgium. This satisfied the
electorate in Britain, who wanted to see the prime minister, David Lloyd-George, deliver on his
promise to secure the ‘maximum possible indemnity’ from Germany. As a result, reparations fulfilled
the aims of the government to both use the Paris Peace settlement to their political advantage and
Q1 (20)
To what extent did the Paris Peace Settlement fulfil the aims of the Big Four with regard to
Germany?
The harsh terms of the Paris Peace Settlement can be viewed principally as a consequence of
the aims of the French government to permanently weaken Germany and vindicate their suffering in
the First World War. It is certainly credible to suggest that the French leader, Georges Clemenceau,
achieved the majority of his aims; the diktak imposed on Germany together with the humiliation of
the war-guilt clause were seen as justice for the defeat of France by Germany in 1871 and for the 4.1
million French casualties in the First World War. Alsace and Lorraine, a traditionally French region
lost to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War, was returned to France – the return of the territory was
a national triumph at the time and also contributed to the sense that revenge had rightly been done
among the French people. In terms of weakening Germany further, France were able to secure the
establishment of nation states on Germany’s eastern frontier in the hope that this would deter
another invasion of France by Germany. Without a doubt, the creation of strong and independent
states, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, helped fill the vacuum of power left by the dissolution of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and subsequently ensured that Germany could not emerge as strong
as they were in 1914. The prohibition of Anschluss further satisfied the French government in this
regard, safe in the knowledge that Germany would not attempt to expand its influence once more.
Perhaps most crucial to France was the limitation of the German army to just 100,000 men with a
ban on conscription. Given the prowess of the German army and their ability to use conscription to
inspire nationalism, this was of immense importance to France, who could now overpower Germany
without the support of allies if a land invasion was required, a luxury that they had not enjoyed
before the war. It could be argued, therefore, that the Paris Peace Settlement almost completely
fulfilled the aims of France with regard to Germany. There were, however, some limitations of the
treaty in the eyes of some French hardliners. Principally among them was France’s failure to
establish the Rhineland region as an independent state. Instead, the region was demilitarised with a
limited period of occupation – which France feared would, with justification in view of later events,
enable the rearmament of Germany on their western frontier and put them in a position to invade
France once again. Clearly, Germany was not completely on its knees and with the removal of Russia
as a rival, it seemed that France’s enemy was in many respects an even greater power in 1919 as it
was in 1914, now without significant challenges to its eastern frontier.
In Britain, the dissatisfaction of the government with the settlement centred on the very fact
that France had achieved too many of its aims at the expense of permanently weakening Germany.
This was not in the interests of Britain’s aims, since it was feared that Germany would turn to
communism if its economy was seriously destroyed by the Paris Peace Settlement. Britain also
needed to maintain Germany as a strong trading partner after the war in order to be able to repay a
$1 billion debt to the USA, however France’s push for depriving Germany of ports like Memel and
Danzig made this impossible. From this perspective, Britain’s aims were not fulfilled by the
settlement. Nevertheless, there were some aspects of obvious benefit to Britain, the most notable of
which being the £6.6 billion reparations destined to Britain, France and Belgium. This satisfied the
electorate in Britain, who wanted to see the prime minister, David Lloyd-George, deliver on his
promise to secure the ‘maximum possible indemnity’ from Germany. As a result, reparations fulfilled
the aims of the government to both use the Paris Peace settlement to their political advantage and
