War and Statebuilding in Afghanistan key words
Legitimacy
- Great Britain invasion
Invasion in 1839 and again in 1878 (in order to keep their colonies in the
region safe from powerful countries in the region such as Russia)
During the second Anglo-Afghan war the Iron Emir Abdur Rahman Khan
was in power > despotism. Afghanistan now served as a buffer state: there
was internal autonomy with external support
Durand Line; 2200km border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, to divide
Afghanistan from India (now Pakistan), it also divided the Pashtuns. The
line was never recognised by any Afghan government
The Great Game: the trap in which Afghanistan found itself in between two
expanding empires; Russia and Great Britain. From 1830 onwards up to
the end of the 19th century
o Similarities with post 2001 situation: similar atmosphere and
tensions as during the Cold War. A replaced government by
foreigners (first by GB then by SU then by US). Fear of Islam and
the idea of a failed state (and that it needs to be fixed because it
forms a threat). The idea of jihad existed as well during the Great
Game
- Soviet Union invasion
Invasion in 1979
The countryside saw the communists as godless threat > mujahedeen
(supported by the US) counter attacked SU and Kabul government
The Soviets’ major concern was its borders with Afghanistan and the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran, and to stop Amin’s rule
(PDPA party). Also power vacuum; ‘if we’re not there someone else will
get involved’. The US got involved by providing weapons to mujahedeen,
to stop SU (‘give SU their Vietnam’)
The invasion was a flop, but this was hidden from the Soviet population.
Gorbachev initiated ‘peace’ attempts to have a pretext to withdraw from
Afghanistan. 1988 peace agreement Geneva
Withdrawal in 1989, led to the rise of mujahedeen and the Taliban
(mujahedeen always fought against the SU). Now Afghans are fighting
each other with US and SU weapons.
- Taliban
Birthplace in Kandahar
The cornerstone of the Taliban’s claim to Islamic legitimacy is its sharia
enforcement agenda (Semple 2014, p. 5)
Another way to legitimise is their fight for control of Afghanistan; jihad
(Semple 2014, p. 6)
- Pakistan involvement
, Fear of invasion from India so they made a friendly ally with Afghanistan
by distributing money into Afghanistan
Because the US lost an important ally in Iran they turned to Pakistan. They
provided Pakistan with weapons in order to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan
Many Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan
Fearing the instability growing in Afghanistan the Pakistani government
began to slowly withdraw its support in 1994 in favour of the Taliban
(Collins chapter 4, p. 36)
Directly involved in supporting the Taliban > Pakistan’s main purpose of
sponsoring the Taliban was to create a regime in Kabul which would be
favourable to Islamabad and to open an economic bloc extending as far as
Central Asia (Ibrahimi 2017, p. 951)
After 9/11 the Pakistani government moved to full backing of the USA
- Warlords (mujahedeen)
Legitimised the war against SU as a Jihad
After SU’s withdrawal they needed a new legitimacy to fight; some
movements openly employed an ethnic discourse (Hezb-i wahdat,
Jumbesh), while others did so implicitly (Hezb-i islami and Ettehad).
However this needs to be put into context, since ethnic identity often
wasn’t that strong (for example social characteristics (work etc) were
stronger identities) (Dorronsoro 2007, §31)
Blocking the modernization (westernization) of Kabul
Warlords failed to translate their victory against the Soviets into a
legitimate state-based regime. Instead, they dragged the country through a
civil war into which the Taliban entered (Mukhopadhyay, p. 8)
- Afghan government (president Karzai, president Ghani)
Kabul has never had close ties to the countryside, it mainly governed itself
and other large cities. The state continued to represent an institution of
last resort in which citizens (from the countryside) had limited faith and
trust: only if informal institutions (tribal, religious, elders) proved unable
to address a given problem, would district, provincial or national officials
become involved in the politics of daily life (Mukhopadhyay 2007, p. 6)
Najibullah regime 1986-1992 PDPA
Installation of Karzai government in 2002; legitimacy was at the heart of
reconstituting the Afghan government (Barfield, p. 7). The Karzai
government would not have been formed if not for the “Global War on
Terror” (Mukhopadhyay 2007, p. 6)
Declining because of its corruption and failure to govern > gives extra
legitimacy and support to Taliban
Questionable monopoly on the use of force
Legitimacy
- Great Britain invasion
Invasion in 1839 and again in 1878 (in order to keep their colonies in the
region safe from powerful countries in the region such as Russia)
During the second Anglo-Afghan war the Iron Emir Abdur Rahman Khan
was in power > despotism. Afghanistan now served as a buffer state: there
was internal autonomy with external support
Durand Line; 2200km border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, to divide
Afghanistan from India (now Pakistan), it also divided the Pashtuns. The
line was never recognised by any Afghan government
The Great Game: the trap in which Afghanistan found itself in between two
expanding empires; Russia and Great Britain. From 1830 onwards up to
the end of the 19th century
o Similarities with post 2001 situation: similar atmosphere and
tensions as during the Cold War. A replaced government by
foreigners (first by GB then by SU then by US). Fear of Islam and
the idea of a failed state (and that it needs to be fixed because it
forms a threat). The idea of jihad existed as well during the Great
Game
- Soviet Union invasion
Invasion in 1979
The countryside saw the communists as godless threat > mujahedeen
(supported by the US) counter attacked SU and Kabul government
The Soviets’ major concern was its borders with Afghanistan and the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism from Iran, and to stop Amin’s rule
(PDPA party). Also power vacuum; ‘if we’re not there someone else will
get involved’. The US got involved by providing weapons to mujahedeen,
to stop SU (‘give SU their Vietnam’)
The invasion was a flop, but this was hidden from the Soviet population.
Gorbachev initiated ‘peace’ attempts to have a pretext to withdraw from
Afghanistan. 1988 peace agreement Geneva
Withdrawal in 1989, led to the rise of mujahedeen and the Taliban
(mujahedeen always fought against the SU). Now Afghans are fighting
each other with US and SU weapons.
- Taliban
Birthplace in Kandahar
The cornerstone of the Taliban’s claim to Islamic legitimacy is its sharia
enforcement agenda (Semple 2014, p. 5)
Another way to legitimise is their fight for control of Afghanistan; jihad
(Semple 2014, p. 6)
- Pakistan involvement
, Fear of invasion from India so they made a friendly ally with Afghanistan
by distributing money into Afghanistan
Because the US lost an important ally in Iran they turned to Pakistan. They
provided Pakistan with weapons in order to fight the Soviets in
Afghanistan
Many Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan
Fearing the instability growing in Afghanistan the Pakistani government
began to slowly withdraw its support in 1994 in favour of the Taliban
(Collins chapter 4, p. 36)
Directly involved in supporting the Taliban > Pakistan’s main purpose of
sponsoring the Taliban was to create a regime in Kabul which would be
favourable to Islamabad and to open an economic bloc extending as far as
Central Asia (Ibrahimi 2017, p. 951)
After 9/11 the Pakistani government moved to full backing of the USA
- Warlords (mujahedeen)
Legitimised the war against SU as a Jihad
After SU’s withdrawal they needed a new legitimacy to fight; some
movements openly employed an ethnic discourse (Hezb-i wahdat,
Jumbesh), while others did so implicitly (Hezb-i islami and Ettehad).
However this needs to be put into context, since ethnic identity often
wasn’t that strong (for example social characteristics (work etc) were
stronger identities) (Dorronsoro 2007, §31)
Blocking the modernization (westernization) of Kabul
Warlords failed to translate their victory against the Soviets into a
legitimate state-based regime. Instead, they dragged the country through a
civil war into which the Taliban entered (Mukhopadhyay, p. 8)
- Afghan government (president Karzai, president Ghani)
Kabul has never had close ties to the countryside, it mainly governed itself
and other large cities. The state continued to represent an institution of
last resort in which citizens (from the countryside) had limited faith and
trust: only if informal institutions (tribal, religious, elders) proved unable
to address a given problem, would district, provincial or national officials
become involved in the politics of daily life (Mukhopadhyay 2007, p. 6)
Najibullah regime 1986-1992 PDPA
Installation of Karzai government in 2002; legitimacy was at the heart of
reconstituting the Afghan government (Barfield, p. 7). The Karzai
government would not have been formed if not for the “Global War on
Terror” (Mukhopadhyay 2007, p. 6)
Declining because of its corruption and failure to govern > gives extra
legitimacy and support to Taliban
Questionable monopoly on the use of force
