International Relations readings
Kaldor 2013
During last decades 20th century, a new type of organized violence developed, especially in
Africa and eastern Europe. Aspect of globalized era. New war. New= distinguished from war
in earlier era, war= political nature of new type of violence. New war: internal or civil wars,
low-intensity conflict. But most of the time they involve transnational connections, so
distinction between internal and external, aggressions and repression, local and global are
hard to sustain.
Kaldor: new wars
Contradictory process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and
diversification, globalization and localization.
Kaldor and chinkin: wars involve the construction of gender stereotypes and that the gender
stereotypes constructed in new wars are different from those constructed in old wars.
Gendered nature of new wars need to be investigated to identify new approaches and
policies aimed at transforming violent situations.
Gendered recruitment, sexualized violence. International responses, provision of health
services.
War and violence has always been intimate and barbaric.
Old wars: one on one, now impossible because of privatization and transnationalism. The
emergence of new institutions has helped to get to new wars, because fo the new
organization.
Key takeaways
o New war: civil and internal conflicts, often described as low intensity, but involves
many transnational connections
o War and violence have always been barbaric and intimate
o New wars understood in the context of globalization (intensification of global
interconnectedness). This process is involved in integration, fragmentation,
homogenization, globalization.
o Globalization in new wars: international reporters, mercenary troops, military
advisers, international agencies, NGO’s, Red Cross organization etc.
o Privatization of organized violence
o Distinction between external barbarity and domestic civility
Kalyvas 2003
Poor information quality in civil wars
Claims about identity and action may be self-serving and information may be manipulated.
Also, binary categories linked to mutually exclusive motivations, political or private.
,Problem with our current understanding of civil war: our interpretation of identities and
actions of the actors.
2 competing interpretative frames:
- Hobbesian -> ontology of civil wars characterized by breakdown of authority and
anarchy. Privatization of violence
- Schmittian -> ontology based on abstract group loyalties. Impersonal and abstract
features in politics. Echoes Rousseau’s perception of war.
Hobbesian prioritizes private sphere exclusion of political
Schmittian -> political nature of civil wars
Interaction between political and private identities and actions
Civil wars not binary conflicts, but complex processes containing mixes of identities and
actions, 2 forms:
- Actions on the ground seem related to local / private
- Individual local actors take advantage of war to settle local conflicts
We cannot frame binary. Problems are complicated, not black and white, no
oversimplification. Civil wars do not mean anarchy, there are still patterns of organization.
Violence in civil wars is not always rational, also because of identities, ideology or just
because of the nature of human. People have agency, they are not just spies of a bigger
force.
Key takeaways:
o Action and identity in civil wars
o Civil wars are not binary conflicts, but complex processes straddling the divide
between the political and the private, the collective and the individual
o Civil wars include local and supralocal actors, insiders and outsiders, individuals and
organizations
o 2 competing frames:
Hobbesian: ontology characterized by breakdown of authority and anarchy. Also the
privatization of violence. Hobbesian prioritizes the private sphere exclusion in politics
Schmittian: ontology based on abstract group loyalties, impersonal and abstract
features in politics. Prioritizes the political nature of civil wars
o 2 forms of civil wars. 1. Actions on the ground seem related to local/private. 2.
Individual local actors take advantage of war to settle local conflicts.
Fazal and Poast 2019
War is not over: what optimists get wrong about conflict.
Humans now live safer than ancestors did and are less likely to go to war. But all optimism on
peaceful world order is based on shaky foundations. The idea that humanity is past the era
of war is wrong. Anarchic nature of the international politics makes another war plausible.
, Pinker: wars between states and civil wars are in decline, as well as genocide and terrorism.
Reason: rise of democracy and trade. Fewer battle deaths and no more continent spanning
wars -> picture of increase in peace, but in reality, is faulty.
It is problematic to rely on body counts, improvement in military medicine, today’s soldiers
die less often from injury due to more protective equipment, better medical care, transport
to hospitals, all have led to less kills, but no less injuries.
International committee of the red cross is impartial. Does not discriminate between
civilians and combats.
Recent history does not point to a decline of war at large. There has not been and third
world war, but that does not necessarily mean that we have reached an era of great power
peace. WW1 and 2 have skewed our perception of war. The list of recent great power
conflicts is a lot larger if we included proxy wars. Most violent conflicts nowadays are not
comparable to World War 1 & 2. Countries have not laid down their nuclear arms.
Overconfidence in the decline of war may lead states to underestimate the possibility of
escalation danger. Danger is more present in an era of populist leaders disregarding the
advice of diplomats.
War is in decline could become a self-defeating prophecy.
Key takeaways:
o War is not over, optimists are wrong
o Optimism about safety and likeliness to go to war being in decline is built on shaky
foundations. Anarchic nature of international politics makes another war plausible
o Relying on body counts is problematic due to improvement in military medicine,
hospital transport, impartiality of the red cross etc. there may be less kills nowadays,
but the injuries remain the same
o The absence of a third world war does not mean world peace. Our perception of war
is skewed due to world wars one and two, as we do not pay attention to proxy wars
that include great powers as well.
Deaton 2013
The great escape has left behind almost a billion people. Since WW2 rich countries tried to
help closing gaps using foreign aid; the flow of resources from rich to poor countries to
improve their lives. Earlier times; resource flow from poor to rich; colonial exploitation. Later
years other way round. But only few poor countries have succeeded to become rich from
exporting raw materials. Aim of article: figure out whether foreign aid did indeed hasten the
great escape or whether through mixed motives, politics, or the law of unintended
consequences, it did the opposite.
If every American pays 0.30$ a day to poor countries, it would end global poverty. But this
calculation tells us nothing about global poverty. Because it wouldn’t make structural
changes to improve health and save lives. These calculations are examples of the aid illusion,
Kaldor 2013
During last decades 20th century, a new type of organized violence developed, especially in
Africa and eastern Europe. Aspect of globalized era. New war. New= distinguished from war
in earlier era, war= political nature of new type of violence. New war: internal or civil wars,
low-intensity conflict. But most of the time they involve transnational connections, so
distinction between internal and external, aggressions and repression, local and global are
hard to sustain.
Kaldor: new wars
Contradictory process involving both integration and fragmentation, homogenization and
diversification, globalization and localization.
Kaldor and chinkin: wars involve the construction of gender stereotypes and that the gender
stereotypes constructed in new wars are different from those constructed in old wars.
Gendered nature of new wars need to be investigated to identify new approaches and
policies aimed at transforming violent situations.
Gendered recruitment, sexualized violence. International responses, provision of health
services.
War and violence has always been intimate and barbaric.
Old wars: one on one, now impossible because of privatization and transnationalism. The
emergence of new institutions has helped to get to new wars, because fo the new
organization.
Key takeaways
o New war: civil and internal conflicts, often described as low intensity, but involves
many transnational connections
o War and violence have always been barbaric and intimate
o New wars understood in the context of globalization (intensification of global
interconnectedness). This process is involved in integration, fragmentation,
homogenization, globalization.
o Globalization in new wars: international reporters, mercenary troops, military
advisers, international agencies, NGO’s, Red Cross organization etc.
o Privatization of organized violence
o Distinction between external barbarity and domestic civility
Kalyvas 2003
Poor information quality in civil wars
Claims about identity and action may be self-serving and information may be manipulated.
Also, binary categories linked to mutually exclusive motivations, political or private.
,Problem with our current understanding of civil war: our interpretation of identities and
actions of the actors.
2 competing interpretative frames:
- Hobbesian -> ontology of civil wars characterized by breakdown of authority and
anarchy. Privatization of violence
- Schmittian -> ontology based on abstract group loyalties. Impersonal and abstract
features in politics. Echoes Rousseau’s perception of war.
Hobbesian prioritizes private sphere exclusion of political
Schmittian -> political nature of civil wars
Interaction between political and private identities and actions
Civil wars not binary conflicts, but complex processes containing mixes of identities and
actions, 2 forms:
- Actions on the ground seem related to local / private
- Individual local actors take advantage of war to settle local conflicts
We cannot frame binary. Problems are complicated, not black and white, no
oversimplification. Civil wars do not mean anarchy, there are still patterns of organization.
Violence in civil wars is not always rational, also because of identities, ideology or just
because of the nature of human. People have agency, they are not just spies of a bigger
force.
Key takeaways:
o Action and identity in civil wars
o Civil wars are not binary conflicts, but complex processes straddling the divide
between the political and the private, the collective and the individual
o Civil wars include local and supralocal actors, insiders and outsiders, individuals and
organizations
o 2 competing frames:
Hobbesian: ontology characterized by breakdown of authority and anarchy. Also the
privatization of violence. Hobbesian prioritizes the private sphere exclusion in politics
Schmittian: ontology based on abstract group loyalties, impersonal and abstract
features in politics. Prioritizes the political nature of civil wars
o 2 forms of civil wars. 1. Actions on the ground seem related to local/private. 2.
Individual local actors take advantage of war to settle local conflicts.
Fazal and Poast 2019
War is not over: what optimists get wrong about conflict.
Humans now live safer than ancestors did and are less likely to go to war. But all optimism on
peaceful world order is based on shaky foundations. The idea that humanity is past the era
of war is wrong. Anarchic nature of the international politics makes another war plausible.
, Pinker: wars between states and civil wars are in decline, as well as genocide and terrorism.
Reason: rise of democracy and trade. Fewer battle deaths and no more continent spanning
wars -> picture of increase in peace, but in reality, is faulty.
It is problematic to rely on body counts, improvement in military medicine, today’s soldiers
die less often from injury due to more protective equipment, better medical care, transport
to hospitals, all have led to less kills, but no less injuries.
International committee of the red cross is impartial. Does not discriminate between
civilians and combats.
Recent history does not point to a decline of war at large. There has not been and third
world war, but that does not necessarily mean that we have reached an era of great power
peace. WW1 and 2 have skewed our perception of war. The list of recent great power
conflicts is a lot larger if we included proxy wars. Most violent conflicts nowadays are not
comparable to World War 1 & 2. Countries have not laid down their nuclear arms.
Overconfidence in the decline of war may lead states to underestimate the possibility of
escalation danger. Danger is more present in an era of populist leaders disregarding the
advice of diplomats.
War is in decline could become a self-defeating prophecy.
Key takeaways:
o War is not over, optimists are wrong
o Optimism about safety and likeliness to go to war being in decline is built on shaky
foundations. Anarchic nature of international politics makes another war plausible
o Relying on body counts is problematic due to improvement in military medicine,
hospital transport, impartiality of the red cross etc. there may be less kills nowadays,
but the injuries remain the same
o The absence of a third world war does not mean world peace. Our perception of war
is skewed due to world wars one and two, as we do not pay attention to proxy wars
that include great powers as well.
Deaton 2013
The great escape has left behind almost a billion people. Since WW2 rich countries tried to
help closing gaps using foreign aid; the flow of resources from rich to poor countries to
improve their lives. Earlier times; resource flow from poor to rich; colonial exploitation. Later
years other way round. But only few poor countries have succeeded to become rich from
exporting raw materials. Aim of article: figure out whether foreign aid did indeed hasten the
great escape or whether through mixed motives, politics, or the law of unintended
consequences, it did the opposite.
If every American pays 0.30$ a day to poor countries, it would end global poverty. But this
calculation tells us nothing about global poverty. Because it wouldn’t make structural
changes to improve health and save lives. These calculations are examples of the aid illusion,
