WGU C845 VUN1 Task 1 | Passed on First Attem vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vzvz
pt |Latest Update with Complete Solution
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VUN1 — vz
VUN1 Task 1: Managing Security Operations and Access Controls Information S
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ystems Security - C845 vz vz vz
A. Apply an Access Control Model vz vz vz vz
A.1. Chosen Access Control Model vz vz vz
I have chosen the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. The principles of RBAC are:
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• Role Assignment: A user is assigned to a role based on their job function (e.g., "Financ
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e Analyst").
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• Permission Assignment: Permissions to perform operations on systems are assigned to roles
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, not to individual users.
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• Session Management: A user activates a role to gain the associated permissions for a session.
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• Least Privilege: Users should only have the minimum level of access necessary to perform thei
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r job duties.
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The organization's access control structure, as seen in the user matrix, is implicitly role-
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based (e.g., "Finance manager," "HR coordinator"). Applying a formal RBAC model would streamline thi
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s by ensuring permissions are strictly tied to business functions, reducing complexity and the potenti
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al for user error when assigning permissions.
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A.2. Four Misalignments with RBAC Principles vz vz vz vz
1. Misalignment 1: Privilege Escalation Beyond Role Scope vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Description: The "Junior system admin" (J. Lopez) has "Domain admin" privileges. vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
A junior role should not have the highest level of access in a Windows environm
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ent.
• Conflict with RBAC: This violates the principle of least privilege. The role "Junior syste
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m admin" implies a subset of administrative duties, not unrestricted domain-
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wide control. vz
2. Misalignment 2: Unnecessary Access Across Departments vz vz vz vz vz
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,• Description: The "Finance analyst" (L. Cheng) has "Full access" to the CRM, a system
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, primarily for Sales and Support. A finance role typically does not require full modificatio
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n rights in a customer relationship system.
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• Conflict with RBAC: This violates least privilege and separation of duties. It allows f
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or potential data manipulation outside the user's core business function.
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3. Misalignment 3: Violation of User-Role Assignment Post-Termination
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• Description: The "HR assistant" (P. Ellis), who was terminated on 2025-05-
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20, has an "Active" account status and successfully logged in on 2025-06-29.
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• Conflict with RBAC: RBAC requires timely revocation of role assignments upon a chang
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e in employment status. An active session for a terminated user completely bypasses
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the security provided by the role structure.
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4. Misalignment 4: Overly Broad Privileged Access
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• Description: The "IT administrator" (T. Miller) has "Full admin" access to "All interna
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l systems," and the log shows they made a firewall rule change without a ticket_i
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d.
• Conflict with RBAC: While some access is necessary, blanket "Full admin" access
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violates least privilege and impedes accountability. It does not segment duties within th
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e IT department itself.
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messages.downloaded_by
pt |Latest Update with Complete Solution
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VUN1 — vz
VUN1 Task 1: Managing Security Operations and Access Controls Information S
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
ystems Security - C845 vz vz vz
A. Apply an Access Control Model vz vz vz vz
A.1. Chosen Access Control Model vz vz vz
I have chosen the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. The principles of RBAC are:
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Role Assignment: A user is assigned to a role based on their job function (e.g., "Financ
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
e Analyst").
vz
• Permission Assignment: Permissions to perform operations on systems are assigned to roles
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
, not to individual users.
vz vz vz vz
• Session Management: A user activates a role to gain the associated permissions for a session.
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Least Privilege: Users should only have the minimum level of access necessary to perform thei
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
r job duties.
vz vz
The organization's access control structure, as seen in the user matrix, is implicitly role-
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
based (e.g., "Finance manager," "HR coordinator"). Applying a formal RBAC model would streamline thi
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
s by ensuring permissions are strictly tied to business functions, reducing complexity and the potenti
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
al for user error when assigning permissions.
vz vz vz vz vz vz
A.2. Four Misalignments with RBAC Principles vz vz vz vz
1. Misalignment 1: Privilege Escalation Beyond Role Scope vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Description: The "Junior system admin" (J. Lopez) has "Domain admin" privileges. vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
A junior role should not have the highest level of access in a Windows environm
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
ent.
• Conflict with RBAC: This violates the principle of least privilege. The role "Junior syste
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
m admin" implies a subset of administrative duties, not unrestricted domain-
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
wide control. vz
2. Misalignment 2: Unnecessary Access Across Departments vz vz vz vz vz
messages.downloaded_by
,• Description: The "Finance analyst" (L. Cheng) has "Full access" to the CRM, a system
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
messages.downloaded_by
, primarily for Sales and Support. A finance role typically does not require full modificatio
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
n rights in a customer relationship system.
vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Conflict with RBAC: This violates least privilege and separation of duties. It allows f
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
or potential data manipulation outside the user's core business function.
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
3. Misalignment 3: Violation of User-Role Assignment Post-Termination
vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Description: The "HR assistant" (P. Ellis), who was terminated on 2025-05-
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
20, has an "Active" account status and successfully logged in on 2025-06-29.
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
• Conflict with RBAC: RBAC requires timely revocation of role assignments upon a chang
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
e in employment status. An active session for a terminated user completely bypasses
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz v
the security provided by the role structure.
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4. Misalignment 4: Overly Broad Privileged Access
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• Description: The "IT administrator" (T. Miller) has "Full admin" access to "All interna
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
l systems," and the log shows they made a firewall rule change without a ticket_i
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
d.
• Conflict with RBAC: While some access is necessary, blanket "Full admin" access
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
violates least privilege and impedes accountability. It does not segment duties within th
vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz vz
e IT department itself.
vz vz vz
messages.downloaded_by