ENR 3200 Exam 1 OSU Practice Questions and Answers | Environmental
Resources Study Guide
Hardin's logical framework - ANS ✔✔- *resources are biophysically finite*: limits to tech
solutions; tradeoffs
- *commons are everywhere*: many resources are "free"/unowned/not allocated by markets;
self-interested individuals will rationally exploit common pool resources
Tragedy of the Commons - ANS ✔✔- Garrett Hardin
- *nature of the governance setting*: open access to resource, others can't be excluded
- *nature of the actions*: individuals are self-interested
ToC: tradeoffs - ANS ✔✔impossible to achieve the "greatest good for the greatest number" -
difficult to distribute resources equitably
commons are ___ and ___ - ANS ✔✔everywhere; vulnerable to exploitation because individuals
rationally pursue their *self interests*
- individuals are utility maximizers
- decisions based on cost-benefit analysis of resources to *me*
- individuals do not account for externalities
Hardin's two solutions - ANS ✔✔1. privatization
2. state control (favored by Hardin)
privatization - ANS ✔✔- sell it off
- only possible under following conditions: resources are divisible/can be distributed equally,
property rights can be protected
,state control characterized by... - ANS ✔✔- top-down management, often external
- resentment (especially if decisions made by outsiders)
- "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon"
Hardin's influence - ANS ✔✔- impact on careers of biologists
- got people talking about/studying "the commons"
- encouraged a paradigm of more centralized control over nat. resources
- cast doubt on the promise of tech solutions for complex problems
wicked problems - ANS ✔✔- broad disagreement about what the problem is, no consensus on a
solution
- affect large number of stakeholder group
- feature high uncertainty and complexity
where did Hardin go wrong? - ANS ✔✔1. common property does not equal open access
2. resource users are selfish
classifying different types of goods - ANS ✔✔1. *excludable*: possible to prevent access
2. *rivalrous*: consumption by one person prevents consumption by others
private goods - ANS ✔✔excludable and rivalrous
common pool resources - ANS ✔✔non-excludable and rivalrous
club goods - ANS ✔✔non-rivalrous and excludable
, public goods - ANS ✔✔non-rivalrous and non-excludable
resource users aren't always "selfish" - ANS ✔✔behavior also shaped by both values and social
norms
how else has our thinking about environmental problems changed since 1958? - ANS ✔✔-
population growth is important, but less
- less focus on catastrophe, more on stressors
- much larger "portfolio" of policy interventions
levels of social organization Hardin focused on - ANS ✔✔state, communities, individual people
can "communities" manage their own common pool resources? - ANS ✔✔*YES*; it's a
"struggle", but we understand better the conditions under which long-run successful common
pool resource management is possible
institutions - ANS ✔✔may be formal (laws/regulations) or informal (social norms)
what conditions favor effective common pool resource management? - ANS ✔✔- rates of
change in resources, resource-user populations, technology, and economic and social conditions
are moderate
- the resource/use of resources can be monitored, and info can be verified/understood at
relatively low cost
- communities maintain frequent face-to-face communication and dense social networks
- users support effective monitoring and rule enforcement
functions (roles) of effective institutions - ANS ✔✔1. provide necessary info
2. deal with conflict
Resources Study Guide
Hardin's logical framework - ANS ✔✔- *resources are biophysically finite*: limits to tech
solutions; tradeoffs
- *commons are everywhere*: many resources are "free"/unowned/not allocated by markets;
self-interested individuals will rationally exploit common pool resources
Tragedy of the Commons - ANS ✔✔- Garrett Hardin
- *nature of the governance setting*: open access to resource, others can't be excluded
- *nature of the actions*: individuals are self-interested
ToC: tradeoffs - ANS ✔✔impossible to achieve the "greatest good for the greatest number" -
difficult to distribute resources equitably
commons are ___ and ___ - ANS ✔✔everywhere; vulnerable to exploitation because individuals
rationally pursue their *self interests*
- individuals are utility maximizers
- decisions based on cost-benefit analysis of resources to *me*
- individuals do not account for externalities
Hardin's two solutions - ANS ✔✔1. privatization
2. state control (favored by Hardin)
privatization - ANS ✔✔- sell it off
- only possible under following conditions: resources are divisible/can be distributed equally,
property rights can be protected
,state control characterized by... - ANS ✔✔- top-down management, often external
- resentment (especially if decisions made by outsiders)
- "mutual coercion mutually agreed upon"
Hardin's influence - ANS ✔✔- impact on careers of biologists
- got people talking about/studying "the commons"
- encouraged a paradigm of more centralized control over nat. resources
- cast doubt on the promise of tech solutions for complex problems
wicked problems - ANS ✔✔- broad disagreement about what the problem is, no consensus on a
solution
- affect large number of stakeholder group
- feature high uncertainty and complexity
where did Hardin go wrong? - ANS ✔✔1. common property does not equal open access
2. resource users are selfish
classifying different types of goods - ANS ✔✔1. *excludable*: possible to prevent access
2. *rivalrous*: consumption by one person prevents consumption by others
private goods - ANS ✔✔excludable and rivalrous
common pool resources - ANS ✔✔non-excludable and rivalrous
club goods - ANS ✔✔non-rivalrous and excludable
, public goods - ANS ✔✔non-rivalrous and non-excludable
resource users aren't always "selfish" - ANS ✔✔behavior also shaped by both values and social
norms
how else has our thinking about environmental problems changed since 1958? - ANS ✔✔-
population growth is important, but less
- less focus on catastrophe, more on stressors
- much larger "portfolio" of policy interventions
levels of social organization Hardin focused on - ANS ✔✔state, communities, individual people
can "communities" manage their own common pool resources? - ANS ✔✔*YES*; it's a
"struggle", but we understand better the conditions under which long-run successful common
pool resource management is possible
institutions - ANS ✔✔may be formal (laws/regulations) or informal (social norms)
what conditions favor effective common pool resource management? - ANS ✔✔- rates of
change in resources, resource-user populations, technology, and economic and social conditions
are moderate
- the resource/use of resources can be monitored, and info can be verified/understood at
relatively low cost
- communities maintain frequent face-to-face communication and dense social networks
- users support effective monitoring and rule enforcement
functions (roles) of effective institutions - ANS ✔✔1. provide necessary info
2. deal with conflict
