‘Stalin came to power because Lenin failed to plan for his succession.’ Assess this
view. [30]
Stalin’s rise to power in 1921-29 cannot only be explained by the reason that Lenin failed to
plan for his succession. Indeed, while Lenin’s actions did create the conditions for Stalin’s
ultimate takeover, other factors such as Stalin’s skillful and pragmatic maneuvering of the
situation and the mistakes and weaknesses of other contending Bolsheviks such as Trotsky
also contributed to his rise to power.
Lenin’s failure to plan for party affairs after his death constructed the foundation for Stalin’s
rise to power because of the advantages that Lenin endowed upon Stalin before his death.
Importantly, it was the contradiction in many of his plans for the future of the party that
allowed a dictator like Stalin to come to power. For example, his “Ban on Factions” decree in
the 1921 11th Party Congress in response to the Kronstadt Uprising and the Workers’
Opposition effectively erased all possibilities of a democratic process in the party, which
Stalin took advantage of extensively to threaten and expel his opposition. Yet, we see how
he wanted to expand the Central Committee to 100 members to dilute the power of the party
elite. Besides this, his reluctance to build a cult of personality was also half-hearted, as his
role as the hero of the revolution was already solidified after the 1918 SR assassination
attempt. Stalin later used his cult of personality in propaganda to present himself as the
rightful successor of Lenin with policies in line with his vision. He was able to inherit Lenin’s
mantle as the only person who knew the correct way forward. In a way, Lenin’s untimely
death left a dictator-shaped hole for Stalin to fill. Most notable is Lenin’s appointment of
Stalin as General Secretary in 1922 despite his fierce disagreements with Lenin over the
Georgian question in 1921, endowing Stalin with powerful privileges. Had Lenin foreseen the
potential for Stalin to take over dictatorial power before his death and planned his
succession, it is unlikely that Stalin would have had such an advantage over his other
contenders.
The contingent factor as to why Stalin came to power by 1929, however, was Stalin’s
pragmatic and skilled maneuvering of the political situation he found himself in. Even though
his role as General Secretary was provided by Lenin, it was Stalin who saw the potential of
such a role to enhance his power within the party. With such a role, he oversaw the Lenin
Enrolment of 1923-25, gaining access to the information of candidates joining the party. Over
three years, Stalin allowed 350k new members, mainly peasants and civil servants, to join
the party. Many were looking for the social benefits that party membership would provide
instead of pursuing communism. As a result, a majority of the party owed their allegiance to
Stalin after 1925 for allowing them entry into the party. This meant that Stalin could win
virtually all of the policy votes in the next four years over his contenders. His pursuit of the
‘Socialism in One Country’ policy was also highly successful due to its popularity with the
party, which, because they were no longer as revolutionary active as a result of the Lenin
Enrolment, saw the consolidation of Soviet internal power as a more responsible policy.
Indeed, Stalin was clever in not aligning himself with any particular ideological wing of the
party. His shift to the right with ‘Socialism in One Country’ to defeat Trotsky, Zinoviev, and
Kamenev was complemented by his ‘Great Turn’ to defeat Bukharin and Rykov on the right
in his calls for industrialisation. Hence, without Stalin’s skill and pragmatism, he would not
view. [30]
Stalin’s rise to power in 1921-29 cannot only be explained by the reason that Lenin failed to
plan for his succession. Indeed, while Lenin’s actions did create the conditions for Stalin’s
ultimate takeover, other factors such as Stalin’s skillful and pragmatic maneuvering of the
situation and the mistakes and weaknesses of other contending Bolsheviks such as Trotsky
also contributed to his rise to power.
Lenin’s failure to plan for party affairs after his death constructed the foundation for Stalin’s
rise to power because of the advantages that Lenin endowed upon Stalin before his death.
Importantly, it was the contradiction in many of his plans for the future of the party that
allowed a dictator like Stalin to come to power. For example, his “Ban on Factions” decree in
the 1921 11th Party Congress in response to the Kronstadt Uprising and the Workers’
Opposition effectively erased all possibilities of a democratic process in the party, which
Stalin took advantage of extensively to threaten and expel his opposition. Yet, we see how
he wanted to expand the Central Committee to 100 members to dilute the power of the party
elite. Besides this, his reluctance to build a cult of personality was also half-hearted, as his
role as the hero of the revolution was already solidified after the 1918 SR assassination
attempt. Stalin later used his cult of personality in propaganda to present himself as the
rightful successor of Lenin with policies in line with his vision. He was able to inherit Lenin’s
mantle as the only person who knew the correct way forward. In a way, Lenin’s untimely
death left a dictator-shaped hole for Stalin to fill. Most notable is Lenin’s appointment of
Stalin as General Secretary in 1922 despite his fierce disagreements with Lenin over the
Georgian question in 1921, endowing Stalin with powerful privileges. Had Lenin foreseen the
potential for Stalin to take over dictatorial power before his death and planned his
succession, it is unlikely that Stalin would have had such an advantage over his other
contenders.
The contingent factor as to why Stalin came to power by 1929, however, was Stalin’s
pragmatic and skilled maneuvering of the political situation he found himself in. Even though
his role as General Secretary was provided by Lenin, it was Stalin who saw the potential of
such a role to enhance his power within the party. With such a role, he oversaw the Lenin
Enrolment of 1923-25, gaining access to the information of candidates joining the party. Over
three years, Stalin allowed 350k new members, mainly peasants and civil servants, to join
the party. Many were looking for the social benefits that party membership would provide
instead of pursuing communism. As a result, a majority of the party owed their allegiance to
Stalin after 1925 for allowing them entry into the party. This meant that Stalin could win
virtually all of the policy votes in the next four years over his contenders. His pursuit of the
‘Socialism in One Country’ policy was also highly successful due to its popularity with the
party, which, because they were no longer as revolutionary active as a result of the Lenin
Enrolment, saw the consolidation of Soviet internal power as a more responsible policy.
Indeed, Stalin was clever in not aligning himself with any particular ideological wing of the
party. His shift to the right with ‘Socialism in One Country’ to defeat Trotsky, Zinoviev, and
Kamenev was complemented by his ‘Great Turn’ to defeat Bukharin and Rykov on the right
in his calls for industrialisation. Hence, without Stalin’s skill and pragmatism, he would not
