Accounting for Decision Making and Control
– 9th Edition
ST
SOLUTION
UV
MANUAL
IA
_A
Jerold L. Zimmerman
PP
Complete Solution Manual for Instructors and
RO
Students
VE
© Jerold L. Zimmerman
All rights reserved. Reproduction or distribution without permission is prohibited.
D?
??
©MEDGEEK
, Solutions Manual For Accounting for Decision Making and Control, 9e
Jerold L. Zimmerman
ST
SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS AND CASES
CHAPTER 1
UV
INTRODUCTION
P 1–1: Solution to MBA Students (10 minutes)
[Using accounting information for decision making and control]
IA
Together the two observations highlight the extremes in the trade-offs of using
accounting information for decision and control. In the first case, there is more analysis
of opportunity costs that are hard to capture with typical accounting information. In the
second case, there is less intended interest in opportunity cost and greater emphasis on
_A
control.
P 1–2: Solution to One Cost System Isn't Enough (15 minutes)
[Economic Darwinism]
PP
The first part of the quote describes the tension (and conflict) that arises when a
single accounting system is used for multiple purposes. This part of the statement is an
accurate description of practice. However, the quote has a couple of problems, including:
•While the quote describes the costs of using a single system ("a single system ...
RO
can't perform important managerial functions adequately"), the quote does not describe
the benefits derived from using a single system (lower bookkeeping costs, a single audit,
less confusion).
•Because the quote ignores the benefits of a single system, it ignores the concept
of economic Darwinism. It does not address the question of how surviving (successful)
companies can compete if a single system "can't perform important managerial functions
VE
adequately."
•Also, the quote assumes that managers are bound to their internal accounting
systems, that no other alternative information sources are available. Often managers
develop their own ad hoc, "off-line" information systems for decision making. These
systems include spreadsheets, informal observation, and "walking around."
D?
P 1–3: Solution to U.S. and Japanese Tax Laws (15 minutes)
[Influence of conflicting demands on cost systems]
??
The internal accounting system supports multiple uses, including financial
reporting, taxes, contracting (debt and management compensation), internal decision
making, and internal control. Because multiple purposes are served, trade-offs must be
made among the competing demands. When more emphasis is placed on one purpose
(taxes), less consideration can be given to other uses (internal decision making and
, control). By linking taxes to external reporting, Japanese firms’ financial reports will be
ST
based on accounting procedures that give more weight to tax considerations. In the U.S.,
companies can keep two sets of books, one for taxes and the other for financial reporting.
Thus, in the U.S., there is more of a decoupling of taxes and everything else. Except for
the additional bookkeeping costs of producing the two separate sets of reports, tax
UV
considerations are predicted to have less influence on the choice of internal (and thus
external) accounting procedures in the U.S. than in Japan.
The question is raised as to why firms use the same accounting procedures for
internal reports as they do for external reports. Or for that matter, why do tax laws and
external financial reporting considerations have any effect on internal accounting
procedures? Why don’t firms maintain multiple sets of accounts, one for each purpose
IA
(e.g., financial reporting, internal decision making, and internal control)? Clearly there
are additional bookkeeping costs for maintaining multiple sets of accounts. But also,
there are confusion costs and, in many instances, firms explicitly link senior executive
compensation to externally reported financial statements. Such explicit linkage of
_A
executive pay to externally reported net income presumably exists to control agency costs
between management and shareholders. Once senior management performance and
rewards are linked to external reports, the internal reporting system will become linked to
the external reports and basically less consideration will be given to choosing accounting
procedures that aid in internal decision making and internal control.
PP
In Japan, the firm’s accounting systems are less likely to be used for internal uses
(decision making and control) than in the U.S. Because they cannot rely as much on their
accounting systems for internal uses (because more weight is placed on using accounting
procedures to reduce taxes), Japanese managers are more likely to use non-accounting-
based systems for internal decision making and control.
RO
P 1-4: Solution to Using Accounting for Planning (15 minutes)
[Usefulness of historical costs]
VE
a. Historical costs are of limited use in making planning decisions in a rapidly
changing environment. With changing products, processes and prices, the
historical costs are inadequate approximations of the opportunity costs of using
resources.
Historical costs may, however, be useful for control purposes, as they
D?
provide information about the activities of managers and can be used as
performance measures to evaluate managers.
b. The purpose of accounting systems is to provide information for planning
purposes and control. Although historical costs are not generally appropriate for
??
planning purposes, additional measures are costly to make. An accounting system
should include additional measures if the benefits of improved decision making
are greater than the costs of the additional information.
,ST
P 1–5: Solution to Budgeting (15 minutes)
[Trade-off between decision making and control]
In this firm, the bonus is based on meeting the budget. Two incentives exist:
sales people will under-forecast future sales and they have little incentive to sell more
UV
than the budget.
This firm tries to use the budget for two functions: decision making and control.
In deciding on next year’s production plans, sales peoples’ forecasts of future sales are
important. However, these same forecasts (after revision by supervisors) are used as part
of the compensation scheme to motivate the sales people to achieve their goals. By using
the budget (forecasts) as part of the control system, the firm gives up some of the
IA
budget’s usefulness as a decision making tool to set production plans. While senior
managers might recognize that the sales people’s forecasts are low, they don’t know
exactly how low. This introduces more uncertainty into planning for next year’s
production.
_A
P 1-6: Solution to Golf Specialties (20 minutes)
[Average versus variable cost of an incremental order]
PP
a. Given that the variable cost per head cover is 1.10 euros, the fixed cost per week
is:
AC = FC / Q + VC
RO
3.10 = FC/600 + 1.10 3.50 = FC/500 + 1.10
FC = 1,200 euros FC = 1,200 euros
VE
b. The change in total cost if the 100 unit Kojo offer is accepted is:
600 × 3.10 euros – 500 × 3.50 euros = 110 euros
Or, each head cover has variable cost of 1.10 euro. Since Kojo is willing to pay 2
D?
euros per head cover or 200 euros for 100 covers, by accepting this order GS
makes 90 euros a week. Therefore, GS should accept Kojo’s offer if these are all
the relevant facts.
c. GS should consider the following non-quantitative factors:
What prevents Kojo from reselling the head covers back to dealers in
??
Europe at prices below GS’s current price of 4.25 euros?
If GS sells the head covers to Kojo at 2 euros, what prevents GS’s
European customers from learning of this special deal and demand similar
price concessions. In other words, why do we expect to be able to
implement this price discrimination strategy?
– 9th Edition
ST
SOLUTION
UV
MANUAL
IA
_A
Jerold L. Zimmerman
PP
Complete Solution Manual for Instructors and
RO
Students
VE
© Jerold L. Zimmerman
All rights reserved. Reproduction or distribution without permission is prohibited.
D?
??
©MEDGEEK
, Solutions Manual For Accounting for Decision Making and Control, 9e
Jerold L. Zimmerman
ST
SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS AND CASES
CHAPTER 1
UV
INTRODUCTION
P 1–1: Solution to MBA Students (10 minutes)
[Using accounting information for decision making and control]
IA
Together the two observations highlight the extremes in the trade-offs of using
accounting information for decision and control. In the first case, there is more analysis
of opportunity costs that are hard to capture with typical accounting information. In the
second case, there is less intended interest in opportunity cost and greater emphasis on
_A
control.
P 1–2: Solution to One Cost System Isn't Enough (15 minutes)
[Economic Darwinism]
PP
The first part of the quote describes the tension (and conflict) that arises when a
single accounting system is used for multiple purposes. This part of the statement is an
accurate description of practice. However, the quote has a couple of problems, including:
•While the quote describes the costs of using a single system ("a single system ...
RO
can't perform important managerial functions adequately"), the quote does not describe
the benefits derived from using a single system (lower bookkeeping costs, a single audit,
less confusion).
•Because the quote ignores the benefits of a single system, it ignores the concept
of economic Darwinism. It does not address the question of how surviving (successful)
companies can compete if a single system "can't perform important managerial functions
VE
adequately."
•Also, the quote assumes that managers are bound to their internal accounting
systems, that no other alternative information sources are available. Often managers
develop their own ad hoc, "off-line" information systems for decision making. These
systems include spreadsheets, informal observation, and "walking around."
D?
P 1–3: Solution to U.S. and Japanese Tax Laws (15 minutes)
[Influence of conflicting demands on cost systems]
??
The internal accounting system supports multiple uses, including financial
reporting, taxes, contracting (debt and management compensation), internal decision
making, and internal control. Because multiple purposes are served, trade-offs must be
made among the competing demands. When more emphasis is placed on one purpose
(taxes), less consideration can be given to other uses (internal decision making and
, control). By linking taxes to external reporting, Japanese firms’ financial reports will be
ST
based on accounting procedures that give more weight to tax considerations. In the U.S.,
companies can keep two sets of books, one for taxes and the other for financial reporting.
Thus, in the U.S., there is more of a decoupling of taxes and everything else. Except for
the additional bookkeeping costs of producing the two separate sets of reports, tax
UV
considerations are predicted to have less influence on the choice of internal (and thus
external) accounting procedures in the U.S. than in Japan.
The question is raised as to why firms use the same accounting procedures for
internal reports as they do for external reports. Or for that matter, why do tax laws and
external financial reporting considerations have any effect on internal accounting
procedures? Why don’t firms maintain multiple sets of accounts, one for each purpose
IA
(e.g., financial reporting, internal decision making, and internal control)? Clearly there
are additional bookkeeping costs for maintaining multiple sets of accounts. But also,
there are confusion costs and, in many instances, firms explicitly link senior executive
compensation to externally reported financial statements. Such explicit linkage of
_A
executive pay to externally reported net income presumably exists to control agency costs
between management and shareholders. Once senior management performance and
rewards are linked to external reports, the internal reporting system will become linked to
the external reports and basically less consideration will be given to choosing accounting
procedures that aid in internal decision making and internal control.
PP
In Japan, the firm’s accounting systems are less likely to be used for internal uses
(decision making and control) than in the U.S. Because they cannot rely as much on their
accounting systems for internal uses (because more weight is placed on using accounting
procedures to reduce taxes), Japanese managers are more likely to use non-accounting-
based systems for internal decision making and control.
RO
P 1-4: Solution to Using Accounting for Planning (15 minutes)
[Usefulness of historical costs]
VE
a. Historical costs are of limited use in making planning decisions in a rapidly
changing environment. With changing products, processes and prices, the
historical costs are inadequate approximations of the opportunity costs of using
resources.
Historical costs may, however, be useful for control purposes, as they
D?
provide information about the activities of managers and can be used as
performance measures to evaluate managers.
b. The purpose of accounting systems is to provide information for planning
purposes and control. Although historical costs are not generally appropriate for
??
planning purposes, additional measures are costly to make. An accounting system
should include additional measures if the benefits of improved decision making
are greater than the costs of the additional information.
,ST
P 1–5: Solution to Budgeting (15 minutes)
[Trade-off between decision making and control]
In this firm, the bonus is based on meeting the budget. Two incentives exist:
sales people will under-forecast future sales and they have little incentive to sell more
UV
than the budget.
This firm tries to use the budget for two functions: decision making and control.
In deciding on next year’s production plans, sales peoples’ forecasts of future sales are
important. However, these same forecasts (after revision by supervisors) are used as part
of the compensation scheme to motivate the sales people to achieve their goals. By using
the budget (forecasts) as part of the control system, the firm gives up some of the
IA
budget’s usefulness as a decision making tool to set production plans. While senior
managers might recognize that the sales people’s forecasts are low, they don’t know
exactly how low. This introduces more uncertainty into planning for next year’s
production.
_A
P 1-6: Solution to Golf Specialties (20 minutes)
[Average versus variable cost of an incremental order]
PP
a. Given that the variable cost per head cover is 1.10 euros, the fixed cost per week
is:
AC = FC / Q + VC
RO
3.10 = FC/600 + 1.10 3.50 = FC/500 + 1.10
FC = 1,200 euros FC = 1,200 euros
VE
b. The change in total cost if the 100 unit Kojo offer is accepted is:
600 × 3.10 euros – 500 × 3.50 euros = 110 euros
Or, each head cover has variable cost of 1.10 euro. Since Kojo is willing to pay 2
D?
euros per head cover or 200 euros for 100 covers, by accepting this order GS
makes 90 euros a week. Therefore, GS should accept Kojo’s offer if these are all
the relevant facts.
c. GS should consider the following non-quantitative factors:
What prevents Kojo from reselling the head covers back to dealers in
??
Europe at prices below GS’s current price of 4.25 euros?
If GS sells the head covers to Kojo at 2 euros, what prevents GS’s
European customers from learning of this special deal and demand similar
price concessions. In other words, why do we expect to be able to
implement this price discrimination strategy?
