,LJU4801 October November Portfolio 2025 - Due
Date 28 October 2025; 100 % TRUSTED workings,
Expert Solved, Explanations and Solutions.
Model answer — LJU4801 Q1 (30 marks)
Introduction (approx. 60–90 words)
Nelson Mandela’s 1962 court statement — that a “thinking
African” is driven into conflict between conscience and law
when the law is immoral — raises a central problem in legal
philosophy: what is the relationship between law and morality?
This question divides theorists into rival camps. Some argue
that law and morality are distinct (legal positivism); others insist
that law necessarily involves moral content (natural law or
moralism). There are intermediate positions and important
debates about civil disobedience, legitimacy, and the normative
duties of citizens. This essay explains the principal theories,
locates Mandela’s statement within them, and assesses its
philosophical force.
1. The main camps in the law–morality debate (substantive
exposition)
(a) Natural law theory
Natural law theory (classically associated with Aquinas) holds
that law derives its authority from moral rightness: an unjust
law is not a true law in the fullest sense. Natural law rests on
, the claim that legal validity is partly normative: legal rules that
are grossly immoral lack legitimacy and, in some versions, do
not bind conscience. Under this view Mandela’s claim — that
immoral laws may be legitimately opposed on conscience
grounds — coheres naturally: law that violates fundamental
moral principles may be contested and need not command
moral obedience.
(b) Legal positivism (exclusive and inclusive)
Legal positivism—associated with Austin and developed by
H.L.A. Hart—separates “what the law is” from “what the law
ought to be.” Validity depends on social facts (rules,
institutions), not moral properties. Two variants matter:
• Exclusive (hard) positivism: legal validity is completely
independent of morality. Even atrociously immoral statutes are
“law” and typically give rise to legal obligations, though not
necessarily moral ones.
• Inclusive (soft) positivism: claims that moral criteria may
sometimes form part of a legal system’s criteria of validity (for
example, if a constitution requires that law be “just”), but this is
contingent, not necessary.
Hart famously argued that legal systems require a “rule of
recognition” (a social rule identifying valid laws), and that
whether moral considerations enter this rule is an empirical
matter.
Date 28 October 2025; 100 % TRUSTED workings,
Expert Solved, Explanations and Solutions.
Model answer — LJU4801 Q1 (30 marks)
Introduction (approx. 60–90 words)
Nelson Mandela’s 1962 court statement — that a “thinking
African” is driven into conflict between conscience and law
when the law is immoral — raises a central problem in legal
philosophy: what is the relationship between law and morality?
This question divides theorists into rival camps. Some argue
that law and morality are distinct (legal positivism); others insist
that law necessarily involves moral content (natural law or
moralism). There are intermediate positions and important
debates about civil disobedience, legitimacy, and the normative
duties of citizens. This essay explains the principal theories,
locates Mandela’s statement within them, and assesses its
philosophical force.
1. The main camps in the law–morality debate (substantive
exposition)
(a) Natural law theory
Natural law theory (classically associated with Aquinas) holds
that law derives its authority from moral rightness: an unjust
law is not a true law in the fullest sense. Natural law rests on
, the claim that legal validity is partly normative: legal rules that
are grossly immoral lack legitimacy and, in some versions, do
not bind conscience. Under this view Mandela’s claim — that
immoral laws may be legitimately opposed on conscience
grounds — coheres naturally: law that violates fundamental
moral principles may be contested and need not command
moral obedience.
(b) Legal positivism (exclusive and inclusive)
Legal positivism—associated with Austin and developed by
H.L.A. Hart—separates “what the law is” from “what the law
ought to be.” Validity depends on social facts (rules,
institutions), not moral properties. Two variants matter:
• Exclusive (hard) positivism: legal validity is completely
independent of morality. Even atrociously immoral statutes are
“law” and typically give rise to legal obligations, though not
necessarily moral ones.
• Inclusive (soft) positivism: claims that moral criteria may
sometimes form part of a legal system’s criteria of validity (for
example, if a constitution requires that law be “just”), but this is
contingent, not necessary.
Hart famously argued that legal systems require a “rule of
recognition” (a social rule identifying valid laws), and that
whether moral considerations enter this rule is an empirical
matter.
