500 MPRE Questions & Solutions (2025/2026) – Complete Ethics
Mastery for Bar Exam Success (Guaranteed A+)
1. Conglomerate Corporation owns a little more than half the stock of Giant Company.
Conglomerate's stock, in turn, is public, available on the public stock exchange, as is the
remainder of the stock in Giant Company. The president of Conglomerate Corporation
has asked Attorney Stevenson to represent Giant Company in a deal by which Giant
would make a proposed transfer of certain real property to Conglomerate Corporation.
The property in question is unusual because it contains an underground particle
collider used for scientific research, but also valuable farmland on the surface, as well as
some valuable mineral rights in another part of the parcel. These factors make the
property value difficult to assess by reference to the general real-estate market, which
means it is difficult for anyone to determine the fairness of the transfer price in the
proposed deal. Would it be proper for Attorney Stevenson to facilitate this property
transfer at the behest of the president of Conglomerate, if Attorney Stevenson would be
representing Giant as the client in this specific matter?
a) Yes, because Conglomerate Corporation owns more than half of Giant Company, so the
two corporate entities are one client for purposes of the rules regarding conflicts of interest.
b) Yes, because the virtual impossibility of obtaining an appraisal of the fair market value of
the property means that the lawyer does not have actual knowledge that the deal is unfair to
either party.
c) No, because the attorney would be unable to inform either client fully about whether the
proposed transfer price would be in their best interest.
,d) No, not unless the attorney first obtains effective informed consent of the management of
Giant Company, as well as that of Conglomerate, because the ownership of Conglomerate
and Giant is not identical, and their interests materially differ in the proposed transaction.
d) No, not unless the attorney first obtains effective informed consent of the management of
Giant Company, as well as that of Conglomerate, because the ownership of Conglomerate
and Giant is not identical, and their interests materially differ in the proposed transaction.
RESTATEMENT § 131
2. Mr. Burns, the chief executive officer of Conglomerate Corporation, now faces
criminal charges of discussing prices with the president of a competing firm. If found
guilty, both Mr. Burns and Conglomerate Corporation will be subject to civil and
criminal penalties under state and federal antitrust laws. An attorney has been
representing Conglomerate Corporation. She has conducted a thorough investigation of
the matter, and she has personally concluded that no such pricing discussions occurred.
Both Conglomerate Corporation and Mr. Burns plan to defend on that ground. Mr.
Burns has asked the attorney to represent him, as well as Conglomerate Corporation, in
the proceedings. The legal and factual defenses of Conglomerate Corporation and Mr.
Burns seem completely consistent at the outset of the matter. Would the attorney need
to obtain informed consent to a conflict of interest from both Mr. Burns and a separate
corporate officer at Conglomerate Corporation before proceeding with this dual
representation?
a) Yes, the likelihood of conflicting positions
in such matters as plea bargaining requires the attorney to obtain the informed consent of
both clients before proceeding with the representation.
b) Yes, because it will always be in the best interest of a corporation to blame the individual
who acted in the situation, to avoid liability under a theory of respondeat superior.
,c) No, because their legal and factual assertions appear identical in this case, so the risk of
contradiction or adverse positions in the litigation is de minimis.
d) No, because no one else at Conglomerate Corporation would be able to provide effective
consent to the potential conflict of interest on behalf of the organization, if the chief executive
officer has required the dual representation to occur.
a) Yes, the likelihood of conflicting positions
in such matters as plea bargaining requires the attorney to obtain the informed consent of
both clients before proceeding with the representation.
RESTATEMENT § 131
3. An attorney decides to purchase "litigation cost protection" insurance for matters she
handles on a contingency fee basis. Plaintiffs' lawyers can buy this type of insurance on
a case-by-case basis, for a one-time premium payment. The insurance is available for
purchase up to three months after the filing of the initial complaint. Note that this
policy is separate and distinct from malpractice liability insurance. The purpose of this
type of insurance is to reimburse the attorney for litigation costs advanced by the
attorney - only in the event of a trial loss. Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit the attorney from purchasing litigation cost protection insurance for her
contingency fee cases?
a) Yes, because the client and the attorney may have different cost-benefit calculations.
b) Yes, for an attorney may prefer that his
client accept a low settlement offer to ensure that the attorney receives his fee, while the
client wants to reject a settlement offer and take his chances at trial.
, c) No, insurance coverage is categorically outside the scope of the Model Rules.
d) No, the attorney may purchase litigation cost protection insurance so long as she does not
allow the terms of the coverage to adversely affect her independent professional judgment,
the client-lawyer relationship, or the client's continuing best interests.
d) No, the attorney may purchase litigation cost protection insurance so long as she does not
allow the terms of the coverage to adversely affect her independent professional judgment,
the client-lawyer relationship, or the client's continuing best interests.
N.C Formal Ethics Op. 2018-6
4. An attorney purchased "litigation cost protection" insurance at the outset of
representing a plaintiff in a personal injury case. When the attorney recovered funds
for the client through a settlement or favorable trial verdict, the attorney proposed to
receive reimbursement for the insurance premium from the judgment or settlement
funds. The attorney disclosed the cost of the insurance to the client as part of the
representation agreement. Was it proper for the attorney to include in a client's fee
agreement a provision allowing the attorney's purchase of litigation cost protection
insurance and requiring reimbursement of the insurance premium from the client's
funds in the event of a settlement or favorable trial verdict?
a) Yes, because the Model Rules do not purport to regulate insurance for lawyers, which is a
matter of state statute.
b) Yes, if the amount charged to the client is fair and reasonable, and the lawyer fully
explains to the client what litigation cost protection insurance is, why the lawyer believes a
litigation cost protection policy will serve the client's best interests, that the client should get
the advice of independent legal counsel regarding the arrangement, that other lawyers may
advance the client's costs without charging the client the cost of a litigation cost protection
Mastery for Bar Exam Success (Guaranteed A+)
1. Conglomerate Corporation owns a little more than half the stock of Giant Company.
Conglomerate's stock, in turn, is public, available on the public stock exchange, as is the
remainder of the stock in Giant Company. The president of Conglomerate Corporation
has asked Attorney Stevenson to represent Giant Company in a deal by which Giant
would make a proposed transfer of certain real property to Conglomerate Corporation.
The property in question is unusual because it contains an underground particle
collider used for scientific research, but also valuable farmland on the surface, as well as
some valuable mineral rights in another part of the parcel. These factors make the
property value difficult to assess by reference to the general real-estate market, which
means it is difficult for anyone to determine the fairness of the transfer price in the
proposed deal. Would it be proper for Attorney Stevenson to facilitate this property
transfer at the behest of the president of Conglomerate, if Attorney Stevenson would be
representing Giant as the client in this specific matter?
a) Yes, because Conglomerate Corporation owns more than half of Giant Company, so the
two corporate entities are one client for purposes of the rules regarding conflicts of interest.
b) Yes, because the virtual impossibility of obtaining an appraisal of the fair market value of
the property means that the lawyer does not have actual knowledge that the deal is unfair to
either party.
c) No, because the attorney would be unable to inform either client fully about whether the
proposed transfer price would be in their best interest.
,d) No, not unless the attorney first obtains effective informed consent of the management of
Giant Company, as well as that of Conglomerate, because the ownership of Conglomerate
and Giant is not identical, and their interests materially differ in the proposed transaction.
d) No, not unless the attorney first obtains effective informed consent of the management of
Giant Company, as well as that of Conglomerate, because the ownership of Conglomerate
and Giant is not identical, and their interests materially differ in the proposed transaction.
RESTATEMENT § 131
2. Mr. Burns, the chief executive officer of Conglomerate Corporation, now faces
criminal charges of discussing prices with the president of a competing firm. If found
guilty, both Mr. Burns and Conglomerate Corporation will be subject to civil and
criminal penalties under state and federal antitrust laws. An attorney has been
representing Conglomerate Corporation. She has conducted a thorough investigation of
the matter, and she has personally concluded that no such pricing discussions occurred.
Both Conglomerate Corporation and Mr. Burns plan to defend on that ground. Mr.
Burns has asked the attorney to represent him, as well as Conglomerate Corporation, in
the proceedings. The legal and factual defenses of Conglomerate Corporation and Mr.
Burns seem completely consistent at the outset of the matter. Would the attorney need
to obtain informed consent to a conflict of interest from both Mr. Burns and a separate
corporate officer at Conglomerate Corporation before proceeding with this dual
representation?
a) Yes, the likelihood of conflicting positions
in such matters as plea bargaining requires the attorney to obtain the informed consent of
both clients before proceeding with the representation.
b) Yes, because it will always be in the best interest of a corporation to blame the individual
who acted in the situation, to avoid liability under a theory of respondeat superior.
,c) No, because their legal and factual assertions appear identical in this case, so the risk of
contradiction or adverse positions in the litigation is de minimis.
d) No, because no one else at Conglomerate Corporation would be able to provide effective
consent to the potential conflict of interest on behalf of the organization, if the chief executive
officer has required the dual representation to occur.
a) Yes, the likelihood of conflicting positions
in such matters as plea bargaining requires the attorney to obtain the informed consent of
both clients before proceeding with the representation.
RESTATEMENT § 131
3. An attorney decides to purchase "litigation cost protection" insurance for matters she
handles on a contingency fee basis. Plaintiffs' lawyers can buy this type of insurance on
a case-by-case basis, for a one-time premium payment. The insurance is available for
purchase up to three months after the filing of the initial complaint. Note that this
policy is separate and distinct from malpractice liability insurance. The purpose of this
type of insurance is to reimburse the attorney for litigation costs advanced by the
attorney - only in the event of a trial loss. Do the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibit the attorney from purchasing litigation cost protection insurance for her
contingency fee cases?
a) Yes, because the client and the attorney may have different cost-benefit calculations.
b) Yes, for an attorney may prefer that his
client accept a low settlement offer to ensure that the attorney receives his fee, while the
client wants to reject a settlement offer and take his chances at trial.
, c) No, insurance coverage is categorically outside the scope of the Model Rules.
d) No, the attorney may purchase litigation cost protection insurance so long as she does not
allow the terms of the coverage to adversely affect her independent professional judgment,
the client-lawyer relationship, or the client's continuing best interests.
d) No, the attorney may purchase litigation cost protection insurance so long as she does not
allow the terms of the coverage to adversely affect her independent professional judgment,
the client-lawyer relationship, or the client's continuing best interests.
N.C Formal Ethics Op. 2018-6
4. An attorney purchased "litigation cost protection" insurance at the outset of
representing a plaintiff in a personal injury case. When the attorney recovered funds
for the client through a settlement or favorable trial verdict, the attorney proposed to
receive reimbursement for the insurance premium from the judgment or settlement
funds. The attorney disclosed the cost of the insurance to the client as part of the
representation agreement. Was it proper for the attorney to include in a client's fee
agreement a provision allowing the attorney's purchase of litigation cost protection
insurance and requiring reimbursement of the insurance premium from the client's
funds in the event of a settlement or favorable trial verdict?
a) Yes, because the Model Rules do not purport to regulate insurance for lawyers, which is a
matter of state statute.
b) Yes, if the amount charged to the client is fair and reasonable, and the lawyer fully
explains to the client what litigation cost protection insurance is, why the lawyer believes a
litigation cost protection policy will serve the client's best interests, that the client should get
the advice of independent legal counsel regarding the arrangement, that other lawyers may
advance the client's costs without charging the client the cost of a litigation cost protection
