LCR4805
Assessment 2
Semester 2 2025
Unique No: 801278
Due September 2025
, LCR4805
Assessment 2: 801278
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
Selected Private and Criminal Law Principles of the Internet
Question 1
Theft and the Information Age: A Critical Analysis of South African Law and
Comparative Jurisdictions
South African common law defines theft as the unlawful and intentional appropriation of
movable corporeal property belonging to another, with the intention to permanently
deprive the owner thereof. Judicial precedent underscores several key elements: the
property must be corporeal (tangible and physically transferable), the conduct must
involve appropriation (assumption of control inconsistent with the rights of the owner),
and the accused must act with the requisite intention (animus furandi). Classic
examples include cash, livestock, or physical goods. This definition reveals a doctrinal
emphasis on tangibility and dispossession.
The central difficulty in applying this framework to information lies in its incorporeal
character. South African courts have consistently rejected attempts to extend theft to
intangible interests. In S v Mintoor 1996 (1) SACR 514 (C), the court held that copying
confidential information did not constitute theft since the owner retained the original data
and no permanent dispossession occurred. Similarly, in Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Marnitz 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA), the court affirmed that incorporeal assets, including
trade secrets, fall outside the scope of common-law theft. Even where appropriation has
been broadened to cover certain incorporeals, such as credit in S v Kotze 1965 (1) SA
118 (A), courts have resisted extending protection to pure information.
Assessment 2
Semester 2 2025
Unique No: 801278
Due September 2025
, LCR4805
Assessment 2: 801278
Semester 2 2025
Due September 2025
Selected Private and Criminal Law Principles of the Internet
Question 1
Theft and the Information Age: A Critical Analysis of South African Law and
Comparative Jurisdictions
South African common law defines theft as the unlawful and intentional appropriation of
movable corporeal property belonging to another, with the intention to permanently
deprive the owner thereof. Judicial precedent underscores several key elements: the
property must be corporeal (tangible and physically transferable), the conduct must
involve appropriation (assumption of control inconsistent with the rights of the owner),
and the accused must act with the requisite intention (animus furandi). Classic
examples include cash, livestock, or physical goods. This definition reveals a doctrinal
emphasis on tangibility and dispossession.
The central difficulty in applying this framework to information lies in its incorporeal
character. South African courts have consistently rejected attempts to extend theft to
intangible interests. In S v Mintoor 1996 (1) SACR 514 (C), the court held that copying
confidential information did not constitute theft since the owner retained the original data
and no permanent dispossession occurred. Similarly, in Nissan South Africa (Pty) Ltd v
Marnitz 2005 (1) SA 441 (SCA), the court affirmed that incorporeal assets, including
trade secrets, fall outside the scope of common-law theft. Even where appropriation has
been broadened to cover certain incorporeals, such as credit in S v Kotze 1965 (1) SA
118 (A), courts have resisted extending protection to pure information.
