Plato’s Meno
(Com plete Notes)
Meno Section 1: 70 - 80
Su m m ar y & An alysis
Socrates's discussion with Meno begins as Meno asks whether virtue can be taught.
Meno suggests that it may be a result of practice or an inherent trait. Socrates answers
by reminding Meno that Meno's own countrymen, the Thessalians, have recently gained
a reputation for wisdom, due chiefly to the rising fame of Gorgias (a Sophist teacher).
Gorgias, Socrates says, has taught people "to give a bold and grand answer to any
question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do."
Athenians, on the other hand, do not claim to be able to answer such questions, says
Socrates, noting that he himself is certainly among the ignorant. We should note that
Socrates' modesty here is somewhat false, at least in the context of the dialogue that is to
follow. For Socrates (and for Plato), it is much better to know that one does not know
than "boldly and grandly" to claim knowledge when one is in fact ignorant. Thus,
Socrates' modesty simply sets up Meno, the Thessalians, Gorgias, and the Sophists in
general for a fall later on in the elenchus.
Socrates adds to his admission of ignorance the statement that he has not yet
met anyone who knows what virtue is (though he qualifies this statement with regard to
Gorgias, claiming not to remember his meeting with him clearly). This claim astonishes
Meno, who moves quickly, at Socrates' behest, to give a definition of virtue. Meno says
that there are different virtues for men (managing public affairs, helping friends,
harming enemies, and protecting oneself), for women (managing the home, protecting
possessions, and being submissive to one's husband), and for children, slaves, the
elderly, and so on.
This, of course, is not a definition but a list of different kinds of virtue. Socrates points
this error out with a metaphor about Meno's "swarm" of virtues being like a swarm of
bees. The bees differ in size and shape, but "do not differ from one and other in being
bees." In other words, Socrates is after the definitive characteristics of virtue in
general, the "form" (eidos) of virtue. This idea of forms, which suggests that there is an
ideal, non-physical model for each kind of thing, will eventually play a major role in
Plato's dialogues. Here, the term is used sparingly, and Plato seems to be thinking of
forms as somehow inherent in each physical thing rather than as separated in some
mental or divine realm.
, In addition to the bees metaphor, Socrates also uses qualities like health and strength to
show Meno that he is asking after the single form common to all kinds of virtue
(strength in a man, for example, is the same thing as it is in a woman, regardless of how
much of it is present).
Meno, however, is still somewhat unsure what Socrates is getting at. This persistent
confusion should remind us of the originality of Socrates' and Plato's thought at the time
(ideas that are now commonplace to us). The idea that the term "virtue" must refer to
one thing in all of its individual examples (i.e., the idea of a definition) is quite different
from the ancient Greek conception of virtue as various kinds of success in worldly
affairs.
Socrates reminds Meno that no virtuous quality is any good without "moderation and
justice." Meno agrees, and Socrates points out that this idea gets at something common
to all cases of virtue. Meno seems to understand this and makes a second attempt to
define virtue: "What else" is it, he asks, but "to be able to rule over people?"
This definition is immediately thrown out, however, as Socrates reminds Meno that
ruling over others is not virtuous in slaves or children. In any case, Socrates asks,
shouldn't Meno have added "justly and not unjustly" to the phrase "ruling over people?"
Meno agrees, noting that "justice is virtue." Socrates takes that statement as an
opportunity to make a further point about definitions: does Meno mean that
justice is virtue or that it is a virtue?
Meno, however, still fails to grasp this distinction between instances of virtue and the
definition of virtue, and Socrates must use another example. Roundness, he notes, is a
shape, but is not shape itself. Meno again seems to grasp the difference, and clarifies his
statement about justice: it is a virtue, not virtue itself. "There are many other virtues,"
he says, and he goes on to list some of them ("courage...moderation, wisdom, and
munificence, and very many others").
This third attempt by Meno to define virtue contains, of course, the same mistake as his
first attempt. Socrates notes that they have again "found many virtues while looking for
one." Meno again professes confusion, and Socrates again resorts to the example of "a
shape" versus "shape" in general. He also mentions color in the same regard.
Meno, however, simply asks Socrates to answer his own question and define "shape"
and "color" himself, so that Meno will have an example to follow in defining virtue. This
turning of the tables, in which Socrates' interlocutor asks him the questions, is a
relatively rare occurrence in Plato's dialogues. Here, it serves to give Plato the
opportunity to contrast Socrates' style of definition with that of the Sophists.
(Com plete Notes)
Meno Section 1: 70 - 80
Su m m ar y & An alysis
Socrates's discussion with Meno begins as Meno asks whether virtue can be taught.
Meno suggests that it may be a result of practice or an inherent trait. Socrates answers
by reminding Meno that Meno's own countrymen, the Thessalians, have recently gained
a reputation for wisdom, due chiefly to the rising fame of Gorgias (a Sophist teacher).
Gorgias, Socrates says, has taught people "to give a bold and grand answer to any
question you may be asked, as experts are likely to do."
Athenians, on the other hand, do not claim to be able to answer such questions, says
Socrates, noting that he himself is certainly among the ignorant. We should note that
Socrates' modesty here is somewhat false, at least in the context of the dialogue that is to
follow. For Socrates (and for Plato), it is much better to know that one does not know
than "boldly and grandly" to claim knowledge when one is in fact ignorant. Thus,
Socrates' modesty simply sets up Meno, the Thessalians, Gorgias, and the Sophists in
general for a fall later on in the elenchus.
Socrates adds to his admission of ignorance the statement that he has not yet
met anyone who knows what virtue is (though he qualifies this statement with regard to
Gorgias, claiming not to remember his meeting with him clearly). This claim astonishes
Meno, who moves quickly, at Socrates' behest, to give a definition of virtue. Meno says
that there are different virtues for men (managing public affairs, helping friends,
harming enemies, and protecting oneself), for women (managing the home, protecting
possessions, and being submissive to one's husband), and for children, slaves, the
elderly, and so on.
This, of course, is not a definition but a list of different kinds of virtue. Socrates points
this error out with a metaphor about Meno's "swarm" of virtues being like a swarm of
bees. The bees differ in size and shape, but "do not differ from one and other in being
bees." In other words, Socrates is after the definitive characteristics of virtue in
general, the "form" (eidos) of virtue. This idea of forms, which suggests that there is an
ideal, non-physical model for each kind of thing, will eventually play a major role in
Plato's dialogues. Here, the term is used sparingly, and Plato seems to be thinking of
forms as somehow inherent in each physical thing rather than as separated in some
mental or divine realm.
, In addition to the bees metaphor, Socrates also uses qualities like health and strength to
show Meno that he is asking after the single form common to all kinds of virtue
(strength in a man, for example, is the same thing as it is in a woman, regardless of how
much of it is present).
Meno, however, is still somewhat unsure what Socrates is getting at. This persistent
confusion should remind us of the originality of Socrates' and Plato's thought at the time
(ideas that are now commonplace to us). The idea that the term "virtue" must refer to
one thing in all of its individual examples (i.e., the idea of a definition) is quite different
from the ancient Greek conception of virtue as various kinds of success in worldly
affairs.
Socrates reminds Meno that no virtuous quality is any good without "moderation and
justice." Meno agrees, and Socrates points out that this idea gets at something common
to all cases of virtue. Meno seems to understand this and makes a second attempt to
define virtue: "What else" is it, he asks, but "to be able to rule over people?"
This definition is immediately thrown out, however, as Socrates reminds Meno that
ruling over others is not virtuous in slaves or children. In any case, Socrates asks,
shouldn't Meno have added "justly and not unjustly" to the phrase "ruling over people?"
Meno agrees, noting that "justice is virtue." Socrates takes that statement as an
opportunity to make a further point about definitions: does Meno mean that
justice is virtue or that it is a virtue?
Meno, however, still fails to grasp this distinction between instances of virtue and the
definition of virtue, and Socrates must use another example. Roundness, he notes, is a
shape, but is not shape itself. Meno again seems to grasp the difference, and clarifies his
statement about justice: it is a virtue, not virtue itself. "There are many other virtues,"
he says, and he goes on to list some of them ("courage...moderation, wisdom, and
munificence, and very many others").
This third attempt by Meno to define virtue contains, of course, the same mistake as his
first attempt. Socrates notes that they have again "found many virtues while looking for
one." Meno again professes confusion, and Socrates again resorts to the example of "a
shape" versus "shape" in general. He also mentions color in the same regard.
Meno, however, simply asks Socrates to answer his own question and define "shape"
and "color" himself, so that Meno will have an example to follow in defining virtue. This
turning of the tables, in which Socrates' interlocutor asks him the questions, is a
relatively rare occurrence in Plato's dialogues. Here, it serves to give Plato the
opportunity to contrast Socrates' style of definition with that of the Sophists.
