Quick summary and hyperlinks
: Substance dualism (Descartes) -> Methodological behaviourism (Skinner, Watson) -> Logical behaviourism (Ryle) ->
Identity theory (Smart) + multiple realization + explanatory gap
Functionalism (Lewis) -> Problems of IT (Explanatory gap + Multiple realizations) -> Problem of consciousness (Easy
problem + hard problem) + the knowledge argument + philosophical zombie + inverted spectrum argument -> From the
book (?) mental holism, folk-psychology
Computationalism (Fodor) -> Chinese room (Searle) -> Connectionism (top-down and bottom-up approach) + perceptual
recognition with a large network +back propagation -> Eliminitavism (chruchland) + folk-psychology (book)
Interpretavism (Dennet) + intentional stance + personal level -> embodied cogntion + extended mind (parity principle) +
complementarity principle (book) -> Enactivism + dynamical systems theory
Free will (control and choice) -> Libet’s experiment + Mele’s critique -> Wegner -> psychological presuppositions ->
long-term and short-term intentions + indirect control approach -> Theory of Mind + false belief task -> theory-theory +
simulation theory -> mirror neurons -> implicit false belief task
Verificationism (Vienna Circle) + demarcation problem -> Confirmation principle + Theory-ladenness of observation ->
Falsification (Popper) + auxiliary hypothesis
Paradigms (Kuhn) + anomaly + revolution -> Research programs + positive heuristics
1
, Lecture 1:
Substance dualism
- An idea that mind is immaterial substance that is distinct from the body but causally connected to it
- Very much outdated
- Mind – umbrella-term for all mental states
- Mental – have the property of being intentional (aboutness relation with reference) or the property of being phenomenal
(subjective experiences: smell, vision, taste, etc.)
- Property Dualism: the mind is produced by the physical brain, but some of its properties are non-physical
- Rene Descartes (16-17 century)
Two kinds of substance: extended and thinking
Is it logically possible to doubt the foundations of knowledge?
I think, therefore I am (the fact that when you are thinking, you cannot think that you do not exist)
Cogito ergo sum
X – Y, two things are identical, only if they share all their properties. 2 million same balls are almost identical, but
they differ in space. That’s where the doubt comes. I can doubt an existence of my body, but I cannot doubt the
existence of my thinking. Therefore, my thinking and my body are two distinct substances.
Psychological/methodological behaviourism
- Methodological problems with dualism
- Dualism implies introspection as the only feasible scientific methodology
- Introspection is neither objective, nor intersubjective
- Unconscious mental states cannot be topics of scientific research
- A response to methodological problems with dualism
- Watson and Skinner
Psychological/ methodological Behaviourism
Theoretical problems with substance dualism: Follows from logical behaviourism
- The logical argument for substance dualism is flawed:
Is the morning and evening star is two distinct stars? No, they are the planet Venus, only observed from a different
perspective.
So, our perspective on something is not a property to that thing.
Whether I can or cannot doubt the existence of something is not a property of that thing. So it may well be that my
thinking and some processes in my brain share all their properties
- The interaction problem: how the mind and the brain interact?
- Gilbert Ryle: the dogma of the Ghost in the machine.
We postulate a mind as a hidden locus of control in order to explain the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent
behaviour;
But we can only do that if we understand that difference.
What G. Ryle say is that mind in another word for intelligent behaviour, not a hidden cause for it.
Logical/philosophical behaviourism (theoretical problems with dualism)
- It is a response to logical/conceptual/philosophical/theoretical problems with dualism
- The concept of mind (book by G. Ryle)
2
, We refer mind to refer to intelligent behaviour, mind is not a thing (category mistake)
Mental states are behavioural dispositions (behaviour that thought, ideas, beliefs, intentions, these mental states, might
give rise to)
Logical behaviourism: mind is behaviour or behaviour disposition
- Logical behaviours does exactly the opposite than methodological/psychological behaviourism
Problems with logical behaviourism:
- Super Stoic (able to feel experience without letting it influence our behaviour, such as experiencing pain but not showing
that you are experience pain; divide between mental state and behaviour) and the Perfect Pretender (acting that you are in
pain but not actually being in pain)
- Mental Holism: mental states do not cause behaviour or are not associates on one to one basis; mental states form a
network that all define each other; couple of mental states can be associated with one behaviour
Identity theory:
- The identity between the mind (mental states) and the brain, they are identical
- Edwin G. Boring (1933) proposed that the consciousness is the brain process
- The mind is as manipulative as the brain
- J.J.C. Smart (1920-2012) proposes Mentalistic language ‘topic neutral’: when we use words such as belief and desire,
hope and fear and intention, then we are not making specific metaphysical assumptions about material or immaterial
nature of the mind
- Mental state IS a certain brain state
Problems with Identity theory:
- The ‘explanatory gap’: stating that mental states are brain states are identical doesn’t explain anything. How
intentionality and phenomenality (mental states) can be physical?
- Multiple realizations: according to identity theory, organisms with different brains cannot have the same types of mental
states. So if the brains are different, then the mental states should be different to (for instance, in animals). For example,
pain.
- Alternative theory: functionalism
Types of Identity theory:
1. Type IT: one area activates one mental state
2. Token IT: every mental state can be activated by different brain areas/processes
Book:
Chapter 1: 1.1; 1.2; 1.3
- Substance dualism were complemented by methodological issues
Introspective reports cannot be verified or falsified by others
- Watson and Skinner, proposed methodological behaviourism
Mind, consciousness, soul are unscientific
- Ryle proposed logical behaviourism
Intelligent behaviour is caused by the mind, whereas non-intelligent from the body
Para-mechanical hypothesis: behaviour and the mind are connected mechanically
The mind controls behaviour, and behaviour is part of our mind
3
: Substance dualism (Descartes) -> Methodological behaviourism (Skinner, Watson) -> Logical behaviourism (Ryle) ->
Identity theory (Smart) + multiple realization + explanatory gap
Functionalism (Lewis) -> Problems of IT (Explanatory gap + Multiple realizations) -> Problem of consciousness (Easy
problem + hard problem) + the knowledge argument + philosophical zombie + inverted spectrum argument -> From the
book (?) mental holism, folk-psychology
Computationalism (Fodor) -> Chinese room (Searle) -> Connectionism (top-down and bottom-up approach) + perceptual
recognition with a large network +back propagation -> Eliminitavism (chruchland) + folk-psychology (book)
Interpretavism (Dennet) + intentional stance + personal level -> embodied cogntion + extended mind (parity principle) +
complementarity principle (book) -> Enactivism + dynamical systems theory
Free will (control and choice) -> Libet’s experiment + Mele’s critique -> Wegner -> psychological presuppositions ->
long-term and short-term intentions + indirect control approach -> Theory of Mind + false belief task -> theory-theory +
simulation theory -> mirror neurons -> implicit false belief task
Verificationism (Vienna Circle) + demarcation problem -> Confirmation principle + Theory-ladenness of observation ->
Falsification (Popper) + auxiliary hypothesis
Paradigms (Kuhn) + anomaly + revolution -> Research programs + positive heuristics
1
, Lecture 1:
Substance dualism
- An idea that mind is immaterial substance that is distinct from the body but causally connected to it
- Very much outdated
- Mind – umbrella-term for all mental states
- Mental – have the property of being intentional (aboutness relation with reference) or the property of being phenomenal
(subjective experiences: smell, vision, taste, etc.)
- Property Dualism: the mind is produced by the physical brain, but some of its properties are non-physical
- Rene Descartes (16-17 century)
Two kinds of substance: extended and thinking
Is it logically possible to doubt the foundations of knowledge?
I think, therefore I am (the fact that when you are thinking, you cannot think that you do not exist)
Cogito ergo sum
X – Y, two things are identical, only if they share all their properties. 2 million same balls are almost identical, but
they differ in space. That’s where the doubt comes. I can doubt an existence of my body, but I cannot doubt the
existence of my thinking. Therefore, my thinking and my body are two distinct substances.
Psychological/methodological behaviourism
- Methodological problems with dualism
- Dualism implies introspection as the only feasible scientific methodology
- Introspection is neither objective, nor intersubjective
- Unconscious mental states cannot be topics of scientific research
- A response to methodological problems with dualism
- Watson and Skinner
Psychological/ methodological Behaviourism
Theoretical problems with substance dualism: Follows from logical behaviourism
- The logical argument for substance dualism is flawed:
Is the morning and evening star is two distinct stars? No, they are the planet Venus, only observed from a different
perspective.
So, our perspective on something is not a property to that thing.
Whether I can or cannot doubt the existence of something is not a property of that thing. So it may well be that my
thinking and some processes in my brain share all their properties
- The interaction problem: how the mind and the brain interact?
- Gilbert Ryle: the dogma of the Ghost in the machine.
We postulate a mind as a hidden locus of control in order to explain the difference between intelligent and non-intelligent
behaviour;
But we can only do that if we understand that difference.
What G. Ryle say is that mind in another word for intelligent behaviour, not a hidden cause for it.
Logical/philosophical behaviourism (theoretical problems with dualism)
- It is a response to logical/conceptual/philosophical/theoretical problems with dualism
- The concept of mind (book by G. Ryle)
2
, We refer mind to refer to intelligent behaviour, mind is not a thing (category mistake)
Mental states are behavioural dispositions (behaviour that thought, ideas, beliefs, intentions, these mental states, might
give rise to)
Logical behaviourism: mind is behaviour or behaviour disposition
- Logical behaviours does exactly the opposite than methodological/psychological behaviourism
Problems with logical behaviourism:
- Super Stoic (able to feel experience without letting it influence our behaviour, such as experiencing pain but not showing
that you are experience pain; divide between mental state and behaviour) and the Perfect Pretender (acting that you are in
pain but not actually being in pain)
- Mental Holism: mental states do not cause behaviour or are not associates on one to one basis; mental states form a
network that all define each other; couple of mental states can be associated with one behaviour
Identity theory:
- The identity between the mind (mental states) and the brain, they are identical
- Edwin G. Boring (1933) proposed that the consciousness is the brain process
- The mind is as manipulative as the brain
- J.J.C. Smart (1920-2012) proposes Mentalistic language ‘topic neutral’: when we use words such as belief and desire,
hope and fear and intention, then we are not making specific metaphysical assumptions about material or immaterial
nature of the mind
- Mental state IS a certain brain state
Problems with Identity theory:
- The ‘explanatory gap’: stating that mental states are brain states are identical doesn’t explain anything. How
intentionality and phenomenality (mental states) can be physical?
- Multiple realizations: according to identity theory, organisms with different brains cannot have the same types of mental
states. So if the brains are different, then the mental states should be different to (for instance, in animals). For example,
pain.
- Alternative theory: functionalism
Types of Identity theory:
1. Type IT: one area activates one mental state
2. Token IT: every mental state can be activated by different brain areas/processes
Book:
Chapter 1: 1.1; 1.2; 1.3
- Substance dualism were complemented by methodological issues
Introspective reports cannot be verified or falsified by others
- Watson and Skinner, proposed methodological behaviourism
Mind, consciousness, soul are unscientific
- Ryle proposed logical behaviourism
Intelligent behaviour is caused by the mind, whereas non-intelligent from the body
Para-mechanical hypothesis: behaviour and the mind are connected mechanically
The mind controls behaviour, and behaviour is part of our mind
3
