Summary of the reading materials for the course (2024) Cyber Conflict in International Relations.
INCLUDES notes from (Total: 54 pages):
● See * Summary List * on page 1.
Cyber Conflict in International Relations Notes on Readings
Table of Contents
* Summary List * 1
“The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth” 2
“Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War” 7
“Literature Review and Research Design” 11
Part III: Writing about literature 11
“A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” 15
“Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations” 16
1 Sovereignty 16
Rule 1 - Sovereignty (general principle) 16
5 Cyber operations not per se regulated by international law 16
Rule 32 - Peacetime cyber espionage 16
13 Prohibition of intervention 18
Rule 66 - Intervention by State 18
14 The use of force 21
Rule 68 - Prohibition of threat or use of force 22
Rule 69 - Definition of use of force 22
Rule 70 - Definition of threat of force 24
Rule 71 - Self-defence against armed attack 25
“Policy Roundtable: Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest” 28
Introduction: Is Cyber Conflict an Intelligence Contest? 28
“Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes” 30
“Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace” 34
“Statement by ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on conference addressing cyber-enabled crimes
through the Rome Statute system” 38
“Cyber-Diplomacy: The Emergence of a Transient Field” 39
“Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security: Work of the UN First Committee 1998-2012” 42
“What’s Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation” 45
“Information Warfare in the Age of Cyber Conflict” 50
9 Cyber-enabled information warfare and influence operations: A revolution in technique?
(Gomez) 50
, 1
* Summary List *
These notes include a summary of each of the following readings:
● Erik Gartzke’s article (2013) “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down
to Earth”.
● Microsoft’s intelligence report (2022) “Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber
War”.
● Dave Harris’ textbook (2020) “Literature Review and Research Design”, chapters 6 & 7.
● John Perry Barlow’s essay (1996) “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”.
● Editors Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul’s textbook (2017) “Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations”, rules 1, 32, 66 & 68-71.
● Max Smeets & Robert Chesney’s policy roundtable (2020) “Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence
Contest”.
● Richard J. Harknett & Max Smeets’ article (2022) “Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes”.
● Joseph S. Nye’s article (2017) “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace”.
● Karim A.A. Khan KC’s statement (2024) “Statement by ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on
conference addressing cyber-enabled crimes through the Rome Statute system”.
● André Barrinha’s article (2024) “Cyber-Diplomacy: The Emergence of a Transient Field”.
● Eneken Tikk-Ringas’ policy brief (2012) “Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Work of the UN First Committee
1998-2012” (ICT4Peace Cyber Policy Process Brief).
● Walton, Calder. "What’s Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation."
Cold War History 49 (2022): 72.
● Christopher Whyte, A. Trevor Thrall & Brian M. Mazanec’s textbook (2021) “Information
Warfare in the Age of Cyber Conflict”, chapter 9 (Miguel Alberto Gomez).
, 2
“The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to
Earth”
The era of cyberwar has arrived → the most recent phase in the ongoing revolution in military
affairs.
➔ HOWEVER, the threat is now directed at the West’s sophisticated technological civilisations.
➔ The West is about to become the target rather than perpetrator.
Significant fault in the theme of impending cyber apocalypse. Cyberwar is unlikely to prove pivotal
in world affairs. It is:
● Unclear that conflict over the internet can actually function as war.
● The internet is generally an inferior substitute to terrestrial force in performing the functions
of coercion or conquest. It should NOT be considered in isolation from more traditional
forms of political violence.
○ Internet coercion’s capacity is limited by some of the same factors that make it
appear at first so intimidating. For threats to prove effective, targets must believe:
1. An attack is likely to follow from noncompliance.
2. The attack is destined to inflict unacceptable harm.
Given the inherent difficulty of credibly threatening cyberattacks without also compromising
operational effectiveness, actors will be tempted to practise cyberwar > engaging coercive threats.
➔ HOWEVER, limitations exist regarding what can be achieved over the internet:
◆ Cyberattacks are unlikely to prove particularly potent in grand strategic terms unless
they can impose substantial, durable harm on an adversary.
◆ This will likely only occur if cyberwar is accompanied by a terrestrial military force
that capitalises on any temporary incapacity achieved via the internet.
The internet poses NO revolution in military affairs, BUT instead promises simply to
extend existing international disparities in power & influence.
Panic over the Internet: The Literature on Cyberwar
CYBER PESSIMISTS = the size & scope of the cyberwar threat could be unprecedented.
● It is unique in that opponents who utilise this strategy are NOT limited by financial or
physical constraints (Lynn III).
● Need for a comprehensive US cyberwarfare defence strategy (Adams).
➔ In becoming dependent on new modern technologies, the US military has,
paradoxically, rendered itself more vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks.
● Cyberwarfare’s limited barriers to entry leave even great powers vulnerable to a constant
stream of virtual attacks (Knapp & Boulton).
● Terrorists will likely exercise offensive information warfare focusing on electronic commerce
websites > national infrastructure to wreak the most havoc (Valeri & Knights).
● Distinguish between (Arquilla & Ronfeldt):
○ Cyberwar: Conflicts among organised militaries.
○ Netwar: Internet conflict that includes non-state actors.
INCLUDES notes from (Total: 54 pages):
● See * Summary List * on page 1.
Cyber Conflict in International Relations Notes on Readings
Table of Contents
* Summary List * 1
“The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth” 2
“Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War” 7
“Literature Review and Research Design” 11
Part III: Writing about literature 11
“A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” 15
“Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations” 16
1 Sovereignty 16
Rule 1 - Sovereignty (general principle) 16
5 Cyber operations not per se regulated by international law 16
Rule 32 - Peacetime cyber espionage 16
13 Prohibition of intervention 18
Rule 66 - Intervention by State 18
14 The use of force 21
Rule 68 - Prohibition of threat or use of force 22
Rule 69 - Definition of use of force 22
Rule 70 - Definition of threat of force 24
Rule 71 - Self-defence against armed attack 25
“Policy Roundtable: Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest” 28
Introduction: Is Cyber Conflict an Intelligence Contest? 28
“Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes” 30
“Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace” 34
“Statement by ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on conference addressing cyber-enabled crimes
through the Rome Statute system” 38
“Cyber-Diplomacy: The Emergence of a Transient Field” 39
“Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International
Security: Work of the UN First Committee 1998-2012” 42
“What’s Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation” 45
“Information Warfare in the Age of Cyber Conflict” 50
9 Cyber-enabled information warfare and influence operations: A revolution in technique?
(Gomez) 50
, 1
* Summary List *
These notes include a summary of each of the following readings:
● Erik Gartzke’s article (2013) “The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down
to Earth”.
● Microsoft’s intelligence report (2022) “Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber
War”.
● Dave Harris’ textbook (2020) “Literature Review and Research Design”, chapters 6 & 7.
● John Perry Barlow’s essay (1996) “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”.
● Editors Michael N. Schmitt & Liis Vihul’s textbook (2017) “Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the
International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations”, rules 1, 32, 66 & 68-71.
● Max Smeets & Robert Chesney’s policy roundtable (2020) “Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence
Contest”.
● Richard J. Harknett & Max Smeets’ article (2022) “Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes”.
● Joseph S. Nye’s article (2017) “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace”.
● Karim A.A. Khan KC’s statement (2024) “Statement by ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC on
conference addressing cyber-enabled crimes through the Rome Statute system”.
● André Barrinha’s article (2024) “Cyber-Diplomacy: The Emergence of a Transient Field”.
● Eneken Tikk-Ringas’ policy brief (2012) “Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security: Work of the UN First Committee
1998-2012” (ICT4Peace Cyber Policy Process Brief).
● Walton, Calder. "What’s Old Is New Again: Cold War Lessons for Countering Disinformation."
Cold War History 49 (2022): 72.
● Christopher Whyte, A. Trevor Thrall & Brian M. Mazanec’s textbook (2021) “Information
Warfare in the Age of Cyber Conflict”, chapter 9 (Miguel Alberto Gomez).
, 2
“The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to
Earth”
The era of cyberwar has arrived → the most recent phase in the ongoing revolution in military
affairs.
➔ HOWEVER, the threat is now directed at the West’s sophisticated technological civilisations.
➔ The West is about to become the target rather than perpetrator.
Significant fault in the theme of impending cyber apocalypse. Cyberwar is unlikely to prove pivotal
in world affairs. It is:
● Unclear that conflict over the internet can actually function as war.
● The internet is generally an inferior substitute to terrestrial force in performing the functions
of coercion or conquest. It should NOT be considered in isolation from more traditional
forms of political violence.
○ Internet coercion’s capacity is limited by some of the same factors that make it
appear at first so intimidating. For threats to prove effective, targets must believe:
1. An attack is likely to follow from noncompliance.
2. The attack is destined to inflict unacceptable harm.
Given the inherent difficulty of credibly threatening cyberattacks without also compromising
operational effectiveness, actors will be tempted to practise cyberwar > engaging coercive threats.
➔ HOWEVER, limitations exist regarding what can be achieved over the internet:
◆ Cyberattacks are unlikely to prove particularly potent in grand strategic terms unless
they can impose substantial, durable harm on an adversary.
◆ This will likely only occur if cyberwar is accompanied by a terrestrial military force
that capitalises on any temporary incapacity achieved via the internet.
The internet poses NO revolution in military affairs, BUT instead promises simply to
extend existing international disparities in power & influence.
Panic over the Internet: The Literature on Cyberwar
CYBER PESSIMISTS = the size & scope of the cyberwar threat could be unprecedented.
● It is unique in that opponents who utilise this strategy are NOT limited by financial or
physical constraints (Lynn III).
● Need for a comprehensive US cyberwarfare defence strategy (Adams).
➔ In becoming dependent on new modern technologies, the US military has,
paradoxically, rendered itself more vulnerable to crippling cyberattacks.
● Cyberwarfare’s limited barriers to entry leave even great powers vulnerable to a constant
stream of virtual attacks (Knapp & Boulton).
● Terrorists will likely exercise offensive information warfare focusing on electronic commerce
websites > national infrastructure to wreak the most havoc (Valeri & Knights).
● Distinguish between (Arquilla & Ronfeldt):
○ Cyberwar: Conflicts among organised militaries.
○ Netwar: Internet conflict that includes non-state actors.
