COMP Cases
Mergers:
Siemens/Alstom:
parties’ reationale: would enable the Merged Entity to compete effectively at global level in
the future and respond to tomorrow's mobility challenges while addressing the increasing
competitive pressure from rapidly growing (Asian) competitors, to the benefit of customers
and consumers
Adidas/Reebok
- Importance of market definition
- Different market have constraining effects on each other
(iv) Risks of coordinated effects
48. Finally, the Commission has also assessed whether the merger could give rise to
coordinated effects detrimental to consumers. Although the merger increases the market
shares’ symmetry between the two leading players, i.e. Nike and Adidas, the features of the
market, most notably the volatility of market shares due to the fashion driven, differentiated
nature of the products, as well as the presence of a large number of dynamic competitors
capable of exercising very significant competitive constraints, rule out the risks of collusion on
the market resulting from the operation.
Conclusion
49. Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing and given in particular the different positioning of
Adidas and Reebok on the market, the number of strong competitors present in all categories
and price points where Adidas and Reebok are concentrated, the fact that in some instances
shoes from a sport and leisure categories constrain the pricing of other sport categories of
athletic shoes, the Commission concludes that the transaction as notified does not raise serious
doubts as to its compatibility with the Common market.
RyanAir/AirLingus
- Market share can be useful first indicators, as long as this is not the only evidence
- Importance of the close competitor test
- Commission needs to use economic evidence
- Commission can use information from board meetings etc to evaluate the merger
- Potential competitors need to operate in the same market in order to be taken into
account
- Evaluation of switching costs/ barriers can be done by consumer surveys
- Entry barriers to competitors: (plane charter, base in Ireland, risks to entry, aggressive
response by Ryanair, more routes besides Ireland, landing slots)
, - Mere threat of entry is not enough – needs also be timely and likely
- COM needs to take economic business models of firms into account (para. 30)
- Efficiencies of the merger
o Benefit for consumer
o Merger specific
o Verifiable
- Up for the parties to show efficiencies
o COM needs to verify them
o Only if above 3 fulfilled and they outweigh anti competitive risk may a merger be
cleared
- Same for commitments
“the mere ‘threat’ of an entry, on which the applicant relies, is not sufficient… What counts is
the prospect of an entrant which offsets the anti-competitive effects specifically established in
the contested decision at that stage of the assessment.” [239]
Lufthansa
- When reviewing commitments, COM needs to take only relevant factors into account
- Court might quash a part of the COM decision
- Commission is saying it is not regulating, but in fact it does
102 Abuse of a dominant position
United Brands (HC 8)
- Definition what is a dominant position
- Bananas is a different product market than fresh fruit (today not applicable anymore)
- Prohibiting ripeners to sell bananas while green is an abuse of 102
o However, only protects competitors really
o Also partitions the market (illegal)
o Affects trade between MS
- Refusal to supply a long term customer is an abuse
o Only really protects the competitors again
o Also compare with Magill/IMS Health
Michelin
Mergers:
Siemens/Alstom:
parties’ reationale: would enable the Merged Entity to compete effectively at global level in
the future and respond to tomorrow's mobility challenges while addressing the increasing
competitive pressure from rapidly growing (Asian) competitors, to the benefit of customers
and consumers
Adidas/Reebok
- Importance of market definition
- Different market have constraining effects on each other
(iv) Risks of coordinated effects
48. Finally, the Commission has also assessed whether the merger could give rise to
coordinated effects detrimental to consumers. Although the merger increases the market
shares’ symmetry between the two leading players, i.e. Nike and Adidas, the features of the
market, most notably the volatility of market shares due to the fashion driven, differentiated
nature of the products, as well as the presence of a large number of dynamic competitors
capable of exercising very significant competitive constraints, rule out the risks of collusion on
the market resulting from the operation.
Conclusion
49. Therefore, on the basis of the foregoing and given in particular the different positioning of
Adidas and Reebok on the market, the number of strong competitors present in all categories
and price points where Adidas and Reebok are concentrated, the fact that in some instances
shoes from a sport and leisure categories constrain the pricing of other sport categories of
athletic shoes, the Commission concludes that the transaction as notified does not raise serious
doubts as to its compatibility with the Common market.
RyanAir/AirLingus
- Market share can be useful first indicators, as long as this is not the only evidence
- Importance of the close competitor test
- Commission needs to use economic evidence
- Commission can use information from board meetings etc to evaluate the merger
- Potential competitors need to operate in the same market in order to be taken into
account
- Evaluation of switching costs/ barriers can be done by consumer surveys
- Entry barriers to competitors: (plane charter, base in Ireland, risks to entry, aggressive
response by Ryanair, more routes besides Ireland, landing slots)
, - Mere threat of entry is not enough – needs also be timely and likely
- COM needs to take economic business models of firms into account (para. 30)
- Efficiencies of the merger
o Benefit for consumer
o Merger specific
o Verifiable
- Up for the parties to show efficiencies
o COM needs to verify them
o Only if above 3 fulfilled and they outweigh anti competitive risk may a merger be
cleared
- Same for commitments
“the mere ‘threat’ of an entry, on which the applicant relies, is not sufficient… What counts is
the prospect of an entrant which offsets the anti-competitive effects specifically established in
the contested decision at that stage of the assessment.” [239]
Lufthansa
- When reviewing commitments, COM needs to take only relevant factors into account
- Court might quash a part of the COM decision
- Commission is saying it is not regulating, but in fact it does
102 Abuse of a dominant position
United Brands (HC 8)
- Definition what is a dominant position
- Bananas is a different product market than fresh fruit (today not applicable anymore)
- Prohibiting ripeners to sell bananas while green is an abuse of 102
o However, only protects competitors really
o Also partitions the market (illegal)
o Affects trade between MS
- Refusal to supply a long term customer is an abuse
o Only really protects the competitors again
o Also compare with Magill/IMS Health
Michelin
