Politics 324 Question 1
Using the works of Mainwering and Perez-Liñán (2013), Plattner (2010) and Kapstein and
Converse (2008) discuss why some democracies fail and others survive.
Kapstein and Converse:
Those democracies established since 1980 have survived at higher rates than
democratic regimes founded in the two decades prior to that year. Yet it is clear that
many of today’s developing-world and post- communist democracies—including
those in such countries as Bolivia, Georgia, Venezuela, and Russia—are backsliding
and at risk of reversal, if this has not already occurred.
Experts have tended to focus on economic performance as the key to whether young
democracies live or die. Is this always the case though?
o Post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe experienced
economic distress comparable to the Great Depression but did not backslide
from democracy.
What if institutions—and in particular, political institutions—play the crucial role in
democratic consolidation? The data suggest that this is so, and further point to
institutions that place effective constraints on executive power as being of special
importance.
o When a leader, whether a president or a prime minister, faces only weak
constraints, the temptation grows to gather economic and political power into
executive hands. As power becomes more concentrated, members of other
branches of government, investors, and agents of civil society begin to doubt
whether public policies will promote the general welfare.
The leaders of young democracies may, by definition, have difficulty establishing
their legitimacy with the electorate and making promises that their constituents
consider credible. This suggests that the very youth of a democracy may cause
governance problems that could lead to premature collapse.
o Young democracies are likely to suffer from institutional weaknesses.
o Institutions take time to build and to develop credibility.
1
, Political scientists have found that the sheer amount of time that a democracy has
existed is positively related to its chances for survival.
There has shown to be a trend of democratization becoming more successful over
time. The success rates attributed to this upward trend of democratization can be
understood by three hypotheses:
1. Actions that the United States and the European Union have taken to encourage
democratization, with the EU’s role in “locking in” East European democracy
being a case in point.
2. The role of globalization and international institutions such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in promoting “good governance,” including
transparency, accountability, and citizen empowerment.
3. The relative success of many young democracies around the world in bringing
both economic growth and civil liberties to their people.
Judging democratization purely on economic gains and successes can overlook deep
inequalities within a nation.
o If large segments of the populace share only a sliver of the nation’s wealth,
they may view the political order — even if “democratic” in institutional form
— as being unresponsive or even detrimental to their interests.
o Inequality was significantly higher in democracies that eventually underwent a
reversal. Likewise, the poverty rate is on average higher in countries in which
democratization was reversed than in those where it was sustained.
o The extent to which economic development has benefited all citizens may be a
key factor in determining how democracy fares; economic growth alone may
not be enough to ensure democratic consolidation.
Low per capita income, high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and higher
ethnic fragmentation all harm the prospects that democracy will endure.
Mainwering & Pérez-Liñán:
The survival or fall of democratic regimes depends on what political leaders, parties,
militaries, social movements, and other key actors do.
o Their behaviour is shaped, but not determined, by structural forces and
cultural patterns.
2
Using the works of Mainwering and Perez-Liñán (2013), Plattner (2010) and Kapstein and
Converse (2008) discuss why some democracies fail and others survive.
Kapstein and Converse:
Those democracies established since 1980 have survived at higher rates than
democratic regimes founded in the two decades prior to that year. Yet it is clear that
many of today’s developing-world and post- communist democracies—including
those in such countries as Bolivia, Georgia, Venezuela, and Russia—are backsliding
and at risk of reversal, if this has not already occurred.
Experts have tended to focus on economic performance as the key to whether young
democracies live or die. Is this always the case though?
o Post-communist democracies of Central and Eastern Europe experienced
economic distress comparable to the Great Depression but did not backslide
from democracy.
What if institutions—and in particular, political institutions—play the crucial role in
democratic consolidation? The data suggest that this is so, and further point to
institutions that place effective constraints on executive power as being of special
importance.
o When a leader, whether a president or a prime minister, faces only weak
constraints, the temptation grows to gather economic and political power into
executive hands. As power becomes more concentrated, members of other
branches of government, investors, and agents of civil society begin to doubt
whether public policies will promote the general welfare.
The leaders of young democracies may, by definition, have difficulty establishing
their legitimacy with the electorate and making promises that their constituents
consider credible. This suggests that the very youth of a democracy may cause
governance problems that could lead to premature collapse.
o Young democracies are likely to suffer from institutional weaknesses.
o Institutions take time to build and to develop credibility.
1
, Political scientists have found that the sheer amount of time that a democracy has
existed is positively related to its chances for survival.
There has shown to be a trend of democratization becoming more successful over
time. The success rates attributed to this upward trend of democratization can be
understood by three hypotheses:
1. Actions that the United States and the European Union have taken to encourage
democratization, with the EU’s role in “locking in” East European democracy
being a case in point.
2. The role of globalization and international institutions such as the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in promoting “good governance,” including
transparency, accountability, and citizen empowerment.
3. The relative success of many young democracies around the world in bringing
both economic growth and civil liberties to their people.
Judging democratization purely on economic gains and successes can overlook deep
inequalities within a nation.
o If large segments of the populace share only a sliver of the nation’s wealth,
they may view the political order — even if “democratic” in institutional form
— as being unresponsive or even detrimental to their interests.
o Inequality was significantly higher in democracies that eventually underwent a
reversal. Likewise, the poverty rate is on average higher in countries in which
democratization was reversed than in those where it was sustained.
o The extent to which economic development has benefited all citizens may be a
key factor in determining how democracy fares; economic growth alone may
not be enough to ensure democratic consolidation.
Low per capita income, high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and higher
ethnic fragmentation all harm the prospects that democracy will endure.
Mainwering & Pérez-Liñán:
The survival or fall of democratic regimes depends on what political leaders, parties,
militaries, social movements, and other key actors do.
o Their behaviour is shaped, but not determined, by structural forces and
cultural patterns.
2
