LJU4801
ASSIGNMENT 2 SEMESTER 1 2025
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: APRIL 2025
, LJU4801
Assignment 2 Semester 1 2025
Unique Number:
Due Date: April 2025
Legal Philosophy
1. Dworkin’s Communalist Theory and Objectivist Perspective on Judicial
Decision-Making
Dworkin’s communalist theory is rooted in the objectivist perspective, which asserts that
judicial decisions are not arbitrary but are guided by a community of legal interpreters.
This community, consisting of judges, legal scholars, and practitioners, collectively
shapes the interpretive framework within which judges operate. According to Dworkin
(1986), law is a practice of integrity where judges seek to find the best justification for
existing legal principles, ensuring consistency and coherence in legal reasoning. The
communalist approach posits that judges are constrained by the historical and moral
commitments of the legal system, preventing purely subjective decision-making.
Instead, they interpret legal texts in ways that align with the shared principles of justice
within their community, reinforcing the objectivist notion that legal reasoning is grounded
in collective understanding rather than individual discretion.
Differences Between Various Kinds of Natural Law Thinking
Natural law theories, while unified by the belief in an inherent moral order, differ in their
foundational principles. Classical natural law, as articulated by Aquinas, emphasizes a
divine or rational moral order, where human laws must conform to higher moral laws.
Modern natural law, influenced by thinkers like Finnis, shifts focus to objective principles
derived from practical reason, rather than theological foundations. Legal naturalism,
seen in Fuller’s work, posits that legal validity is dependent on adherence to procedural
ASSIGNMENT 2 SEMESTER 1 2025
UNIQUE NO.
DUE DATE: APRIL 2025
, LJU4801
Assignment 2 Semester 1 2025
Unique Number:
Due Date: April 2025
Legal Philosophy
1. Dworkin’s Communalist Theory and Objectivist Perspective on Judicial
Decision-Making
Dworkin’s communalist theory is rooted in the objectivist perspective, which asserts that
judicial decisions are not arbitrary but are guided by a community of legal interpreters.
This community, consisting of judges, legal scholars, and practitioners, collectively
shapes the interpretive framework within which judges operate. According to Dworkin
(1986), law is a practice of integrity where judges seek to find the best justification for
existing legal principles, ensuring consistency and coherence in legal reasoning. The
communalist approach posits that judges are constrained by the historical and moral
commitments of the legal system, preventing purely subjective decision-making.
Instead, they interpret legal texts in ways that align with the shared principles of justice
within their community, reinforcing the objectivist notion that legal reasoning is grounded
in collective understanding rather than individual discretion.
Differences Between Various Kinds of Natural Law Thinking
Natural law theories, while unified by the belief in an inherent moral order, differ in their
foundational principles. Classical natural law, as articulated by Aquinas, emphasizes a
divine or rational moral order, where human laws must conform to higher moral laws.
Modern natural law, influenced by thinkers like Finnis, shifts focus to objective principles
derived from practical reason, rather than theological foundations. Legal naturalism,
seen in Fuller’s work, posits that legal validity is dependent on adherence to procedural
