What is the relationship between Natural Science and Social Science?
Charles Taylor maintains that we need to gain clarity about the practice of theorizing in
order to understand more about the scope and validity of our theories. Taylor argues that
we cannot think of social science as conforming to the methods and procedures of natural
science. This becomes clear when we examine the relationship between the practice of
theorizing, to the practices which theory guides.
There is a constant temptation to take natural science theory as a model for social theory –
to see theory as offering explanations of the underlying mechanisms of society, and as
providing the basis of a more effective planning of social life. But, social theory can never
really occupy this role as it is part of a different activity. However, there is an analogy
between NS theory and social theory – both are concerned with the question, ‘what is really
going on’? Taylor states that it is important to ask this question because our common-sense
understandings of what is going on are inadequate, and sometimes illusory.
The big disanalogy with natural science lies in the nature of the common-sense
understanding that the theory challenges or extends, and the role that each plays in
practices. In social sciences, there is always a pre-theoretical understanding of what is going
on among the members of a society. The objects of social theory (human beings) have
implicit understandings and self-descriptions about what goes on in certain social practices.
These are independent of theory, and are constitutive of the practices. Without them, the
practices could not continue.
According to Taylor, social theory arises when we try and formulate explicitly what we are
doing, and that social theories also consist of more than this. The stronger motive for
making and adopting social theories is the sense that our implicit understanding is
inadequate or even wrong. Theories thus also extend, criticize or challenge our self-
descriptions – and thus claim to show us the real. This kind of claim can take two forms.
Firstly, it may be that we only see what is really going on when we situate what we are doing
Charles Taylor maintains that we need to gain clarity about the practice of theorizing in
order to understand more about the scope and validity of our theories. Taylor argues that
we cannot think of social science as conforming to the methods and procedures of natural
science. This becomes clear when we examine the relationship between the practice of
theorizing, to the practices which theory guides.
There is a constant temptation to take natural science theory as a model for social theory –
to see theory as offering explanations of the underlying mechanisms of society, and as
providing the basis of a more effective planning of social life. But, social theory can never
really occupy this role as it is part of a different activity. However, there is an analogy
between NS theory and social theory – both are concerned with the question, ‘what is really
going on’? Taylor states that it is important to ask this question because our common-sense
understandings of what is going on are inadequate, and sometimes illusory.
The big disanalogy with natural science lies in the nature of the common-sense
understanding that the theory challenges or extends, and the role that each plays in
practices. In social sciences, there is always a pre-theoretical understanding of what is going
on among the members of a society. The objects of social theory (human beings) have
implicit understandings and self-descriptions about what goes on in certain social practices.
These are independent of theory, and are constitutive of the practices. Without them, the
practices could not continue.
According to Taylor, social theory arises when we try and formulate explicitly what we are
doing, and that social theories also consist of more than this. The stronger motive for
making and adopting social theories is the sense that our implicit understanding is
inadequate or even wrong. Theories thus also extend, criticize or challenge our self-
descriptions – and thus claim to show us the real. This kind of claim can take two forms.
Firstly, it may be that we only see what is really going on when we situate what we are doing
