Student ID: 4314752
Explain the doing-allowing distinction. What is the best version of the
principle according to which the doing-allowing distinction makes a
difference to which actions are morally permissible? Critically discuss the
best objection to that principle.
The following essay will address belief that there is some morally relevant
distinction between doing and allowing that makes the latter more morally
permissible than the former.
I will consider three ways of spelling out this moral distinction: Philippa Foot’s
theory of negative and positive duties showing that “letting die is better than
killing”, the utilitarian approach which focuses solely on maximising utility or
happiness for the greatest number of people. Finally, I aim to argue that the
best way of spelling out this Doing-Allowing moral distinction is the principle
that “deflecting a threat is better than bringing about a new threat”
as argued by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her paper “Killing, Letting Die and the
Trolley Problem”. (Thomson, 1976). I will refer to this as the “threat
principle” throughout.
I will introduce several moral dilemma examples and attempt to solve them
with each version of the principle highlight that the threat principle seems to
work best in spelling out this distinction.
, Student ID: 4314752
I do, however, believe that no singular principle can fit all scenarios
appropriately and thus there are some where the threat principle does not
provide the best moral outcome.
I will finally critically discuss the best objection to this principle.
The Doing-Allowing distinction is as follows: Doing harm is harder to justify
morally than allowing harm, and is thus seen as morally ‘worse’. Doing harm
is a more direct and often intentional way to cause suffering whereas,
although allowing harm might often have the same consequences, it is a
more indirect route to these consequences.
Philippa Foots proposed rule of negative and positive duties is as follows:
A negative duty (e.g. the duty not to kill) is more stringent than a positive
one (e.g. the duty to save a life), so if a person was presented with the
chance to save one live by taking another, they should not do it, regardless
of quantity of lives that might be saved.
Thus, she proposes killing is worse than letting die, so ‘doing harm’ is less
morally permissible than ‘allowing harm’.
The first moral dilemma I will present is the organ harvest example. A
surgeon has 5 sick patients each in need of a different organ transplant in
order to survive. The surgeon has the option to kill a healthy patient that
Explain the doing-allowing distinction. What is the best version of the
principle according to which the doing-allowing distinction makes a
difference to which actions are morally permissible? Critically discuss the
best objection to that principle.
The following essay will address belief that there is some morally relevant
distinction between doing and allowing that makes the latter more morally
permissible than the former.
I will consider three ways of spelling out this moral distinction: Philippa Foot’s
theory of negative and positive duties showing that “letting die is better than
killing”, the utilitarian approach which focuses solely on maximising utility or
happiness for the greatest number of people. Finally, I aim to argue that the
best way of spelling out this Doing-Allowing moral distinction is the principle
that “deflecting a threat is better than bringing about a new threat”
as argued by Judith Jarvis Thomson in her paper “Killing, Letting Die and the
Trolley Problem”. (Thomson, 1976). I will refer to this as the “threat
principle” throughout.
I will introduce several moral dilemma examples and attempt to solve them
with each version of the principle highlight that the threat principle seems to
work best in spelling out this distinction.
, Student ID: 4314752
I do, however, believe that no singular principle can fit all scenarios
appropriately and thus there are some where the threat principle does not
provide the best moral outcome.
I will finally critically discuss the best objection to this principle.
The Doing-Allowing distinction is as follows: Doing harm is harder to justify
morally than allowing harm, and is thus seen as morally ‘worse’. Doing harm
is a more direct and often intentional way to cause suffering whereas,
although allowing harm might often have the same consequences, it is a
more indirect route to these consequences.
Philippa Foots proposed rule of negative and positive duties is as follows:
A negative duty (e.g. the duty not to kill) is more stringent than a positive
one (e.g. the duty to save a life), so if a person was presented with the
chance to save one live by taking another, they should not do it, regardless
of quantity of lives that might be saved.
Thus, she proposes killing is worse than letting die, so ‘doing harm’ is less
morally permissible than ‘allowing harm’.
The first moral dilemma I will present is the organ harvest example. A
surgeon has 5 sick patients each in need of a different organ transplant in
order to survive. The surgeon has the option to kill a healthy patient that
