, LJU4801 ASSIGNMENT 2 SEMESTER 1 2026
DUE DATE: 7 APRIL 2026
Question 1:
Ronald Dworkin’s Objectivist Theory of Adjudication
Ronald Dworkin advances an objectivist theory of adjudication which fundamentally
challenges the idea that judges simply apply legal rules or exercise broad discretion
when deciding cases. Instead, Dworkin argues that law is an interpretive practice
consisting not only of explicit rules but also of deeper principles that reflect moral values
embedded within the legal system.1 These principles—such as fairness, justice, and
equality—are binding on judges and must be taken into account when resolving disputes,
especially in complex or “hard cases” where legal rules are unclear or conflicting.
At the core of Dworkin’s theory is the concept of “law as integrity.” This requires judges
to interpret and apply the law in a way that presents it as a coherent and unified system
of norms, rather than a fragmented set of rules.2 Judges must therefore decide cases as
though the law were created by a single rational author committed to consistency and
moral coherence. This approach ensures that similar cases are treated alike and that
legal reasoning maintains continuity with past decisions (precedent), while still being
morally justified.
Dworkin also rejects the positivist view that law and morality are separate. Instead, he
insists that moral reasoning is inherent in legal interpretation, meaning that judges
must engage with ethical considerations when determining the correct outcome of a
1
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977).
2
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986).
DUE DATE: 7 APRIL 2026
Question 1:
Ronald Dworkin’s Objectivist Theory of Adjudication
Ronald Dworkin advances an objectivist theory of adjudication which fundamentally
challenges the idea that judges simply apply legal rules or exercise broad discretion
when deciding cases. Instead, Dworkin argues that law is an interpretive practice
consisting not only of explicit rules but also of deeper principles that reflect moral values
embedded within the legal system.1 These principles—such as fairness, justice, and
equality—are binding on judges and must be taken into account when resolving disputes,
especially in complex or “hard cases” where legal rules are unclear or conflicting.
At the core of Dworkin’s theory is the concept of “law as integrity.” This requires judges
to interpret and apply the law in a way that presents it as a coherent and unified system
of norms, rather than a fragmented set of rules.2 Judges must therefore decide cases as
though the law were created by a single rational author committed to consistency and
moral coherence. This approach ensures that similar cases are treated alike and that
legal reasoning maintains continuity with past decisions (precedent), while still being
morally justified.
Dworkin also rejects the positivist view that law and morality are separate. Instead, he
insists that moral reasoning is inherent in legal interpretation, meaning that judges
must engage with ethical considerations when determining the correct outcome of a
1
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1977).
2
Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986).
