, Introduction
The decision in Jordaan v Road Accident Fund (2022/03746) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1260 engages directly
with recurring procedural tensions in Road Accident Fund litigation, particularly the interaction
between amendments to pleadings, the doctrine of litis contestatio, and applications for interim
payments under Rule 34A of the Uniform Rules of Court read with section 17(6) of the Road
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The case arose against the backdrop of a late and substantial
escalation of the quantum claimed by the plaintiff shortly before a default-judgment hearing,
coupled with an attempt to obtain interim relief. The court was therefore required to navigate
competing considerations of procedural fairness to the RAF, efficient case management, and the
financial vulnerability of injured claimants. This discussion critically evaluates the court’s approach
to these issues, focusing on its treatment of reopened pleadings, its restrictive interpretation of the
jurisdictional requirements for interim payments, and the broader implications for future RAF
damages litigation.
Material Facts and Nature of the Damages Claimed
In Jordaan v Road Accident Fund, the plaintiff instituted action against the RAF for damages arising
from a motor vehicle accident in which she sustained bodily injuries and in which the family
breadwinner died. The RAF had conceded negligence on the part of the insured driver. In her
original particulars of claim, the plaintiff sought approximately R2.3 million for personal injury and
loss of support.
Shortly before the hearing of an application for default judgment, the plaintiff delivered a Rule 28
notice of amendment increasing the total quantum dramatically to approximately R8.86 million,
comprising claims for past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, general damages, and loss
of support (Jordaan v RAF, paras 4–5). Simultaneously, she signalled an intention to seek an interim
payment of nearly R500 000 for past loss of earnings under Rule 34A and section 17(6) of the Road
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.
This late escalation in quantum prompted the RAF to enter a notice of intention to defend on the
eve of the default judgment hearing, transforming what had appeared to be an undefended matter
into contested litigation (paras 6–8).
Litis Contestatio and the Effect of Substantial Amendments to Quantum
A central procedural issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could persist with default
judgment proceedings in light of the substantial amendment to her claim. The court approached
this through the doctrine of litis contestatio, understood in modern South African civil procedure as
the stage at which pleadings close and issues between the parties become crystallised under Rule
29 of the Uniform Rules (para 11).
Relying on authorities such as Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd and Milne NO v Shield
Insurance Co Ltd, the court emphasised that although pleadings can technically be amended at any
time before judgment, substantial amendments reopen pleadings and unsettle litis contestatio,
thereby entitling the opposing party to plead afresh (paras 13–15).
The decision in Jordaan v Road Accident Fund (2022/03746) [2023] ZAGPJHC 1260 engages directly
with recurring procedural tensions in Road Accident Fund litigation, particularly the interaction
between amendments to pleadings, the doctrine of litis contestatio, and applications for interim
payments under Rule 34A of the Uniform Rules of Court read with section 17(6) of the Road
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996. The case arose against the backdrop of a late and substantial
escalation of the quantum claimed by the plaintiff shortly before a default-judgment hearing,
coupled with an attempt to obtain interim relief. The court was therefore required to navigate
competing considerations of procedural fairness to the RAF, efficient case management, and the
financial vulnerability of injured claimants. This discussion critically evaluates the court’s approach
to these issues, focusing on its treatment of reopened pleadings, its restrictive interpretation of the
jurisdictional requirements for interim payments, and the broader implications for future RAF
damages litigation.
Material Facts and Nature of the Damages Claimed
In Jordaan v Road Accident Fund, the plaintiff instituted action against the RAF for damages arising
from a motor vehicle accident in which she sustained bodily injuries and in which the family
breadwinner died. The RAF had conceded negligence on the part of the insured driver. In her
original particulars of claim, the plaintiff sought approximately R2.3 million for personal injury and
loss of support.
Shortly before the hearing of an application for default judgment, the plaintiff delivered a Rule 28
notice of amendment increasing the total quantum dramatically to approximately R8.86 million,
comprising claims for past and future medical expenses, loss of earnings, general damages, and loss
of support (Jordaan v RAF, paras 4–5). Simultaneously, she signalled an intention to seek an interim
payment of nearly R500 000 for past loss of earnings under Rule 34A and section 17(6) of the Road
Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.
This late escalation in quantum prompted the RAF to enter a notice of intention to defend on the
eve of the default judgment hearing, transforming what had appeared to be an undefended matter
into contested litigation (paras 6–8).
Litis Contestatio and the Effect of Substantial Amendments to Quantum
A central procedural issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could persist with default
judgment proceedings in light of the substantial amendment to her claim. The court approached
this through the doctrine of litis contestatio, understood in modern South African civil procedure as
the stage at which pleadings close and issues between the parties become crystallised under Rule
29 of the Uniform Rules (para 11).
Relying on authorities such as Nkala v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd and Milne NO v Shield
Insurance Co Ltd, the court emphasised that although pleadings can technically be amended at any
time before judgment, substantial amendments reopen pleadings and unsettle litis contestatio,
thereby entitling the opposing party to plead afresh (paras 13–15).
