Semester 2 2025 – DUE 26 August 2025; 100% correct
solutions and explanations.
Personhood, Moral Responsibility, and Community in African
Philosophy: A Critical Engagement with Menkiti and Gyekye
Introduction
Ethics as a philosophical discipline is deeply concerned with the
foundations of moral life. Central to ethical reasoning are questions of
what it means to be a person, how responsibility is allocated, and how
social and communal structures influence moral decisions. Within
African philosophy, these issues have been brought into sharp focus
through the debate between Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwame Gyekye. Their
respective theories of personhood and moral responsibility offer
different accounts of how individuals and communities interact to shape
moral life. Menkiti defends a radical communitarian view in which
personhood is conferred by the community, while Gyekye articulates a
moderate communitarianism that safeguards both community and
individuality.
In parallel with these debates, normative ethical theories such as
teleological ethics, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics provide
frameworks for evaluating their claims. Teleological ethics emphasises
the outcomes of actions, deontological ethics stresses duties and rights,
while virtue ethics prioritises the cultivation of moral character. By
examining the writings of Menkiti and Gyekye in relation to these
ethical theories, this essay critically analyses their conceptions of
personhood, moral responsibility, and communal values, before
concluding with an evaluation of which ethical theories best capture
their respective positions.
Menkiti’s Radical Communitarianism