CIVIL PROCEDURE (LAW 5011)
WHITE COLLAR CRIME COMPLETE
AND SUMMARISED, BARRY
UNIVERSITY.
,I. Mens Rea
Rule of Lenity: ambiguous to a critical element - the rule of strict construction
- Plain Language first
- Legislative History
- Case Law
Due Process limitation:
Knowingly
- generally - (General Intent)
Willingly
- generally - (Specific Intent)
Knowing: The Public Welfare Doctrine
U.S. v. Int Minerals & Chem Corp
- Ignorance of Law
On appeal, where the shipment is so dangerous the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who was aware of possession of such is presumed to be aware of the regulation. Ignorance of law is
no defense unless knowledge is an element of the offense.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 834 (a) gives the Interstate Commerce Commission power to "formulate
regulations for the safe transportation" of "corrosive liquids" and 18 U. S. C. § 834 (f) states that
whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation" shall be fined or imprisoned.
Knowledge of shipment and knowledge of the regulation
To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove:
- That petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and
appreciably safer (in its avoidance of crowded thoroughfares, etc.) than the one it did follow.
- It must also be shown that petitioner knew that there was such a practicable, safer route and
yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully
neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an
alternative route.
Issue: Because Congress did not add a mens rea requirement, did they intend for the statute
not to require one.
Staples v. United States
§ 5861(d) – harsh penalty attached to such violation supports a mens rea requirement.
, Staples did not register the weapon as required by the act. Burden on D to determine whether activity
subject to the statute
Held: semi-automatic weapons are not sufficiently dangerous to put their owners on notice of
regulated nature of such ownership. For purposes of prosecuting someone for unlicensed possession
it is not sufficient that the government prove that D knew of the dangerous character of the gun he
had. Rather, the Government had to prove D knew that his semi-automatic weapon had converted to
fully-automatic firing.
Willful: Awareness of Legal Requirement
Bryan v. United States
Willfully dealing in firearms w/out a federal license.
II. Other Doctrines and Defenses
1. Specific/ General Intent
2. Good Faith Defense
3. Good Faith Reliance on Counsel Defense
4. Willful Blindness, Conscious Avoidance, or Ostrich Instructions
a. Can be used to support the element of knowledge
b. Not a substitute for the element of intent, but can be used to support to infer
c. Inferred from circumstantial evidence.
Global Tech Appliances Inc v. SEB S.A.
- Willful Blindness
A patent infringement defendant will be deemed to be willfully blind under § 271(b) if the defendant
“takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost
be said to have actually known” that the induced act constituted patent infringement.
CEO of a company may argue she did not know the criminal conduct was occurring within the
company.
Mere Recklessness or Negligence insufficient for willful blindness. Willful blindness requires a
showing that (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a
fact exists, and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.
United States v. Weitzenhoff
Government did not need to prove that D knew their acts violated either a permit or the CWA as long
as it established that defendant’s knowingly engaged in the conduct.
, Public welfare offenses are not to be construed to require proof that the defendant knew he was
violating the law in the absence of clear evidence of contrary congressional intent. A risk for failing
to ascertain the permit status is not unreasonable when the permittee is also the defendant.
III. Entity Liability
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. U.S.
Corporate criminal liability – encompass crimes with an intent element
• To effectuate a public policy, the Court determined it was proper, with respect to the Elkins
Act, that the corporation could be “held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and
purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them.”
U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers
Imputing Liability: Respondeat Superior
(1) Violations (punishable only by fines)
a. Offenses defined by statute and the conduct is performed by agent on behalf of
corporation with the scope of employment
(2) An omission of a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corps by law
(3) When the offense is authorized, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
acting on behalf of corporation within the scope of employment.
U.S. v. Hilton Hotel Corp.
• Purchasing agents participated in a boycott by threatening a supplier with loss of the hotel’s
business if the supplier refused to pay a fee to an association organized to attract conventions
to the city. This kickback type of conduct violated the Sherman Act, and was a per se
violation. Thus, no intent was required to be proven by the government.
In imputing liability to the corporation, noted that agents can be pressured to maximize profits for a
corporation and that violations of the Sherman Act result in profit to the corporation and not the
individual.
Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis
Collective Knowledge:
U.S. v. Bank of New England
What level of culpability is required for corporate liability?
- the imputation of knowledge to the corporation by use of collective knowledge.
WHITE COLLAR CRIME COMPLETE
AND SUMMARISED, BARRY
UNIVERSITY.
,I. Mens Rea
Rule of Lenity: ambiguous to a critical element - the rule of strict construction
- Plain Language first
- Legislative History
- Case Law
Due Process limitation:
Knowingly
- generally - (General Intent)
Willingly
- generally - (Specific Intent)
Knowing: The Public Welfare Doctrine
U.S. v. Int Minerals & Chem Corp
- Ignorance of Law
On appeal, where the shipment is so dangerous the probability of regulation is so great that anyone
who was aware of possession of such is presumed to be aware of the regulation. Ignorance of law is
no defense unless knowledge is an element of the offense.
Title 18 U. S. C. § 834 (a) gives the Interstate Commerce Commission power to "formulate
regulations for the safe transportation" of "corrosive liquids" and 18 U. S. C. § 834 (f) states that
whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation" shall be fined or imprisoned.
Knowledge of shipment and knowledge of the regulation
To sustain a conviction, the Government not only must prove:
- That petitioner could have taken another route which was both commercially practicable and
appreciably safer (in its avoidance of crowded thoroughfares, etc.) than the one it did follow.
- It must also be shown that petitioner knew that there was such a practicable, safer route and
yet deliberately took the more dangerous route through the tunnel, or that petitioner willfully
neglected to exercise its duty under the Regulation to inquire into the availability of such an
alternative route.
Issue: Because Congress did not add a mens rea requirement, did they intend for the statute
not to require one.
Staples v. United States
§ 5861(d) – harsh penalty attached to such violation supports a mens rea requirement.
, Staples did not register the weapon as required by the act. Burden on D to determine whether activity
subject to the statute
Held: semi-automatic weapons are not sufficiently dangerous to put their owners on notice of
regulated nature of such ownership. For purposes of prosecuting someone for unlicensed possession
it is not sufficient that the government prove that D knew of the dangerous character of the gun he
had. Rather, the Government had to prove D knew that his semi-automatic weapon had converted to
fully-automatic firing.
Willful: Awareness of Legal Requirement
Bryan v. United States
Willfully dealing in firearms w/out a federal license.
II. Other Doctrines and Defenses
1. Specific/ General Intent
2. Good Faith Defense
3. Good Faith Reliance on Counsel Defense
4. Willful Blindness, Conscious Avoidance, or Ostrich Instructions
a. Can be used to support the element of knowledge
b. Not a substitute for the element of intent, but can be used to support to infer
c. Inferred from circumstantial evidence.
Global Tech Appliances Inc v. SEB S.A.
- Willful Blindness
A patent infringement defendant will be deemed to be willfully blind under § 271(b) if the defendant
“takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost
be said to have actually known” that the induced act constituted patent infringement.
CEO of a company may argue she did not know the criminal conduct was occurring within the
company.
Mere Recklessness or Negligence insufficient for willful blindness. Willful blindness requires a
showing that (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a
fact exists, and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.
United States v. Weitzenhoff
Government did not need to prove that D knew their acts violated either a permit or the CWA as long
as it established that defendant’s knowingly engaged in the conduct.
, Public welfare offenses are not to be construed to require proof that the defendant knew he was
violating the law in the absence of clear evidence of contrary congressional intent. A risk for failing
to ascertain the permit status is not unreasonable when the permittee is also the defendant.
III. Entity Liability
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. U.S.
Corporate criminal liability – encompass crimes with an intent element
• To effectuate a public policy, the Court determined it was proper, with respect to the Elkins
Act, that the corporation could be “held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and
purposes of their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them.”
U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers
Imputing Liability: Respondeat Superior
(1) Violations (punishable only by fines)
a. Offenses defined by statute and the conduct is performed by agent on behalf of
corporation with the scope of employment
(2) An omission of a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corps by law
(3) When the offense is authorized, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
acting on behalf of corporation within the scope of employment.
U.S. v. Hilton Hotel Corp.
• Purchasing agents participated in a boycott by threatening a supplier with loss of the hotel’s
business if the supplier refused to pay a fee to an association organized to attract conventions
to the city. This kickback type of conduct violated the Sherman Act, and was a per se
violation. Thus, no intent was required to be proven by the government.
In imputing liability to the corporation, noted that agents can be pressured to maximize profits for a
corporation and that violations of the Sherman Act result in profit to the corporation and not the
individual.
Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis
Collective Knowledge:
U.S. v. Bank of New England
What level of culpability is required for corporate liability?
- the imputation of knowledge to the corporation by use of collective knowledge.
