Natalie
‘How far could the historian make use of Sources 1 and 2 to investigate the nature of
the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet in
the period between February and April 1917?’
Following the February Revolution of 1917, Tsar Nicholas’ abdication left Russia
without an authoritative leader. Two groups emerged, believing they has the right to
take control of Russia: members of the former Fourth Duma (later the Provisional
Government) and the Petrograd Soviet. The Duma was composed of former Tsarist
supporters, although their support had dramatically decreased during the later years
of his reign, whereas the Petrograd Soviet comprised representatives of the workers
and soldiers. The two groups embarked on a system of ‘dual power’, implying that
power and responsibility were equally divided, but this was emphatically not the
case, as supported by the sources.
On one hand, the historian could make use of Source 1 to investigate the nature of
the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet,
because it claims ‘the Provisional Government exists only as long as it is permitted to
do so by the Soviet’ suggesting that the intentions of achieving ‘dual power’
ultimately failed. For example, by March 1917, the Provisional Government had no
methods of compelling people to obey its orders: it had no authority over the
Petrograd garrison, and no disciplined police force to call upon. In contrast, the
Petrograd Soviet was supported by workers unions, the army garrison and other
Soviets nationwide, as well as loyal railway and postal workers to ensure control
over Petrograd’s links with the rest of Russia. This suggests that ‘dual power’ could
never be possible, because the Petrograd Soviet possessed significantly more
support and influence compared to the Provisional Government. Also, the source
was written by a member of the Provisional Government, informing the
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army that ‘the troops…are in [the Soviet’s]
hands’. This implies that all instructions received by the Russian army were issued by
the Petrograd Soviet, not the Provisional Government. Despite its lack of formal
political experience, the Soviet began to interest itself in foreign policy issues,
including the eventual decision for Russia to leave WW1 in November 1917. This
demonstrates that, although the Provisional Government possessed significantly
more political experience and expertise, the support for the Petrograd Soviet
allowed it to gain control of Russia’s internal and foreign affairs, which is supported
by the source.
However, the historian could not make use of Source 1 to investigate the nature of
the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet,
because it does not describe the reasons for the disparity in power between the two
groups. For example, the initial role of the Petrograd Soviet was to protect the
interests of the workers and soldiers, as well as monitor the activities of the
Provisional Government. However, the Soviet quickly adopted a more wide-ranging
role: assuming control of the Petrograd army garrison, administration of the capital’s
affairs and foreign policy issues, which provoked conflict with the Provisional
Government. This would explain the why ‘the troops, railways and post and
telegraph services are in [the Petrograd Soviet’s] hands’, as described in the source.
‘How far could the historian make use of Sources 1 and 2 to investigate the nature of
the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet in
the period between February and April 1917?’
Following the February Revolution of 1917, Tsar Nicholas’ abdication left Russia
without an authoritative leader. Two groups emerged, believing they has the right to
take control of Russia: members of the former Fourth Duma (later the Provisional
Government) and the Petrograd Soviet. The Duma was composed of former Tsarist
supporters, although their support had dramatically decreased during the later years
of his reign, whereas the Petrograd Soviet comprised representatives of the workers
and soldiers. The two groups embarked on a system of ‘dual power’, implying that
power and responsibility were equally divided, but this was emphatically not the
case, as supported by the sources.
On one hand, the historian could make use of Source 1 to investigate the nature of
the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet,
because it claims ‘the Provisional Government exists only as long as it is permitted to
do so by the Soviet’ suggesting that the intentions of achieving ‘dual power’
ultimately failed. For example, by March 1917, the Provisional Government had no
methods of compelling people to obey its orders: it had no authority over the
Petrograd garrison, and no disciplined police force to call upon. In contrast, the
Petrograd Soviet was supported by workers unions, the army garrison and other
Soviets nationwide, as well as loyal railway and postal workers to ensure control
over Petrograd’s links with the rest of Russia. This suggests that ‘dual power’ could
never be possible, because the Petrograd Soviet possessed significantly more
support and influence compared to the Provisional Government. Also, the source
was written by a member of the Provisional Government, informing the
Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army that ‘the troops…are in [the Soviet’s]
hands’. This implies that all instructions received by the Russian army were issued by
the Petrograd Soviet, not the Provisional Government. Despite its lack of formal
political experience, the Soviet began to interest itself in foreign policy issues,
including the eventual decision for Russia to leave WW1 in November 1917. This
demonstrates that, although the Provisional Government possessed significantly
more political experience and expertise, the support for the Petrograd Soviet
allowed it to gain control of Russia’s internal and foreign affairs, which is supported
by the source.
However, the historian could not make use of Source 1 to investigate the nature of
the relationship between the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet,
because it does not describe the reasons for the disparity in power between the two
groups. For example, the initial role of the Petrograd Soviet was to protect the
interests of the workers and soldiers, as well as monitor the activities of the
Provisional Government. However, the Soviet quickly adopted a more wide-ranging
role: assuming control of the Petrograd army garrison, administration of the capital’s
affairs and foreign policy issues, which provoked conflict with the Provisional
Government. This would explain the why ‘the troops, railways and post and
telegraph services are in [the Petrograd Soviet’s] hands’, as described in the source.
