Was The Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 Morally Justified?
Introduction
On 6th August 1945, the American Army dropped the first nuclear bomb on the Japanese
town of Hiroshima, followed three days later by a second bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
Together, these two bombs killed in excess of 200,000 people, mostly innocent civilians with
little warning of the bombings. To evaluate the morality and legitimacy of the dropping of the
atomic bombs, and to prove that the bombing was morally wrong, a number of different
factors will be discussed. Firstly, an overview of the war in the Pacific will be offered to give
military and diplomatic background on the bombings. The brutality of the war in the Pacific
will be acknowledged, as will the horrors of conventional warfare including firebombing;
however, it will be shown that with Soviet entry into the Pacific War in August 1945, the
balance of power was already shifting. This change in the balance of power meant that Japan
was defeated before Hiroshima on 6 August, and so the bombings were not necessary.
Attention will then turn to the decision within the American High Command to drop the
bomb. Classified American political, scientific and military sources will be examined to show
that there was no unified desire to use Atomic weapons against Japan, and other ways to end
the war were considered. Truman’s views, and those of his generals and advisors will be
examined to consider whether or not the use of atomic bombs was necessary to end the war.
The results of the bombing will then be explored in some detail, particularly the first strike on
Hiroshima as described in a 1946 New Yorker article by John Hersey. The bombs did not just
cause terrible injuries as a result of fire and falling buildings, but lasting and gruesome
radiation sickness. The short- and long-term damage caused by these bombs makes clear that
it was morally wrong to use them.
1
,Finally, attention will turn to the debates about the use of the atomic bombs. Contemporary
and modern views for and against the morality and legitimacy of dropping the bombs will be
evaluated, with both the traditional view, that dropping the bombs was a terrible but justified
decision, and the revisionist argument, the dropping the bombs was unnecessary and/or
immoral, set out. Overall, it will be demonstrated that Truman was morally wrong to drop the
Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and on Nagasaki. In explaining the situation in the Pacific in the
spring and summer of 1945, and the decision-making process within the White House, it will
be shown that America failed to consider other options for peace. In analysing the results of
the bombing, and the debate around the morality of their use, it will be argued that the end of
peace in the Pacific did not justify the means of atomic warfare.
War in the Pacific
America’s war with Japan began in July 1941 when, in retaliation for their invasion of China,
The United States and her allies cut off trade with Japan. This action severed vital supply
lines, including access to oil, leading the Japanese to launch their attack on Pearl Harbour on
7 December and conquer the Dutch East Indies to secure access to oil. 1 The legacy of Pearl
harbour is important: American ships were attacked with no warning in an event that shocked
the country, and had an impact on American attitudes toward Japan in 1945, with a wish to
punish Japan for Pearl Harbour.2
By early 1945 the American army had made great gains, and Japan was being pushed back
toward its home Islands. The tiny yet strategic island of Iwo Jima was taken between 19
February and 26 March 1945 in a brutal battle that resulted in the death of 6281 American
soldiers, with a further 19 000 wounded, as the Japanese garrison of 21 000 ‘fought to the
1
D. D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Praeger Press, Connecticut, London: 1996), p. 1-2.
2
D. Ford, The Pacific War, Clash of Empires in World War II (New York and London, Continuum International
Publishing Group: 2012), p. 215.
2
, death’. The battle of Okinawa began on 1st April, with an American Invasion force of 180 000
men and 172 aircraft bombarding the island from the air. The campaign saw sustained use of
Japanese kamikaze pilots – young volunteers just out of school who were willing to fly their
explosive-filled planes straight at American ships, causing loss of life as well as having a
lasting psychological impact. The American army was able to take the island, but at a huge
loss of life, with one out of three soldiers killed, injured or captured. Wainstock has estimated
that 12 613 Americans were killed and another 40 000 wounded, with over 100 000 Japanese
soldiers and civilians killed.3
The brutality of these campaigns was the foundation of the American belief that Japan would
not surrender easily, and that any attack on the Japanese home islands would be extremely
costly. The horror of war is emphasised by infantryman Paul Fussell, who had served
throughout the war in Europe and in July 1945 was waiting to be shipped back to America to
be ‘refresher trained’ before taking part in a planned invasion of Honshu. He describes how
he and his comrades ‘broke down and cried with relief and joy’ when they learned the bombs
had been dropped, and that Japan had surrendered. His account emphasises that, in debates on
war, greater attention should be given to the opinions of those who were ‘destined to be
blown to pieces on the main Japanese islands’ than those who have never fought. 4 It is hard
to argue that the Japanese style of fighting, especially the use of Kamikaze fighters, was
extremely brutal and that men like Fussell would have died had the allies invaded Japan. Yet
this in itself cannot justify the use of the Atomic bomb, nor can the invasion be seen as a
foregone conclusion.
3
D. D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Praeger Press, Connecticut, London: 1996), pp. 3-5
4
P. Fussell, ‘Thank God for the Atomic Bomb’ The New Republic, August 1981
http://www.college.columbia.edu/core/sites/core/files/pages/Paul%20Fussel-Thank%20God%20for%20the
%20Atom%20Bomb-August%201981.pdf (accessed 29/12/2020)
3
Introduction
On 6th August 1945, the American Army dropped the first nuclear bomb on the Japanese
town of Hiroshima, followed three days later by a second bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
Together, these two bombs killed in excess of 200,000 people, mostly innocent civilians with
little warning of the bombings. To evaluate the morality and legitimacy of the dropping of the
atomic bombs, and to prove that the bombing was morally wrong, a number of different
factors will be discussed. Firstly, an overview of the war in the Pacific will be offered to give
military and diplomatic background on the bombings. The brutality of the war in the Pacific
will be acknowledged, as will the horrors of conventional warfare including firebombing;
however, it will be shown that with Soviet entry into the Pacific War in August 1945, the
balance of power was already shifting. This change in the balance of power meant that Japan
was defeated before Hiroshima on 6 August, and so the bombings were not necessary.
Attention will then turn to the decision within the American High Command to drop the
bomb. Classified American political, scientific and military sources will be examined to show
that there was no unified desire to use Atomic weapons against Japan, and other ways to end
the war were considered. Truman’s views, and those of his generals and advisors will be
examined to consider whether or not the use of atomic bombs was necessary to end the war.
The results of the bombing will then be explored in some detail, particularly the first strike on
Hiroshima as described in a 1946 New Yorker article by John Hersey. The bombs did not just
cause terrible injuries as a result of fire and falling buildings, but lasting and gruesome
radiation sickness. The short- and long-term damage caused by these bombs makes clear that
it was morally wrong to use them.
1
,Finally, attention will turn to the debates about the use of the atomic bombs. Contemporary
and modern views for and against the morality and legitimacy of dropping the bombs will be
evaluated, with both the traditional view, that dropping the bombs was a terrible but justified
decision, and the revisionist argument, the dropping the bombs was unnecessary and/or
immoral, set out. Overall, it will be demonstrated that Truman was morally wrong to drop the
Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and on Nagasaki. In explaining the situation in the Pacific in the
spring and summer of 1945, and the decision-making process within the White House, it will
be shown that America failed to consider other options for peace. In analysing the results of
the bombing, and the debate around the morality of their use, it will be argued that the end of
peace in the Pacific did not justify the means of atomic warfare.
War in the Pacific
America’s war with Japan began in July 1941 when, in retaliation for their invasion of China,
The United States and her allies cut off trade with Japan. This action severed vital supply
lines, including access to oil, leading the Japanese to launch their attack on Pearl Harbour on
7 December and conquer the Dutch East Indies to secure access to oil. 1 The legacy of Pearl
harbour is important: American ships were attacked with no warning in an event that shocked
the country, and had an impact on American attitudes toward Japan in 1945, with a wish to
punish Japan for Pearl Harbour.2
By early 1945 the American army had made great gains, and Japan was being pushed back
toward its home Islands. The tiny yet strategic island of Iwo Jima was taken between 19
February and 26 March 1945 in a brutal battle that resulted in the death of 6281 American
soldiers, with a further 19 000 wounded, as the Japanese garrison of 21 000 ‘fought to the
1
D. D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Praeger Press, Connecticut, London: 1996), p. 1-2.
2
D. Ford, The Pacific War, Clash of Empires in World War II (New York and London, Continuum International
Publishing Group: 2012), p. 215.
2
, death’. The battle of Okinawa began on 1st April, with an American Invasion force of 180 000
men and 172 aircraft bombarding the island from the air. The campaign saw sustained use of
Japanese kamikaze pilots – young volunteers just out of school who were willing to fly their
explosive-filled planes straight at American ships, causing loss of life as well as having a
lasting psychological impact. The American army was able to take the island, but at a huge
loss of life, with one out of three soldiers killed, injured or captured. Wainstock has estimated
that 12 613 Americans were killed and another 40 000 wounded, with over 100 000 Japanese
soldiers and civilians killed.3
The brutality of these campaigns was the foundation of the American belief that Japan would
not surrender easily, and that any attack on the Japanese home islands would be extremely
costly. The horror of war is emphasised by infantryman Paul Fussell, who had served
throughout the war in Europe and in July 1945 was waiting to be shipped back to America to
be ‘refresher trained’ before taking part in a planned invasion of Honshu. He describes how
he and his comrades ‘broke down and cried with relief and joy’ when they learned the bombs
had been dropped, and that Japan had surrendered. His account emphasises that, in debates on
war, greater attention should be given to the opinions of those who were ‘destined to be
blown to pieces on the main Japanese islands’ than those who have never fought. 4 It is hard
to argue that the Japanese style of fighting, especially the use of Kamikaze fighters, was
extremely brutal and that men like Fussell would have died had the allies invaded Japan. Yet
this in itself cannot justify the use of the Atomic bomb, nor can the invasion be seen as a
foregone conclusion.
3
D. D. Wainstock, The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb (Praeger Press, Connecticut, London: 1996), pp. 3-5
4
P. Fussell, ‘Thank God for the Atomic Bomb’ The New Republic, August 1981
http://www.college.columbia.edu/core/sites/core/files/pages/Paul%20Fussel-Thank%20God%20for%20the
%20Atom%20Bomb-August%201981.pdf (accessed 29/12/2020)
3
