‘The Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr was the main cause of the hyperin a on crisis in
Germany in 1923’. Assess the validity of this view.
The Ruhr invasion in January 1923 was certainly a major factor in the ci zens of
Germany losing all faith in the value of the mark, with workers being paid for not producing
any goods at all. Yet from the evidence provided, the Ruhr invasion seems only to be the
nal blow in the series of many events that led to “madness, nightmare, despera on, chaos”
that was the life of many german ci zens during the event of hyperin a on. (K Heiden
1944).
It can be argued that the French and Belgians were the main reason hyperin a on
struck Germany in 1923. France felt that they “Had won the war, yet was losing the peace.”
(C Fischer, the Ruhr Crisis). What Fischer is sta ng here is that France wanted to keep
Germany weak, as by keeping Germany weak France would be safe from the threat of
another a ack. Fischer also agrees that French occupa on of the Ruhr led to a loss of
economic resources which made Germany to nd it even harder to pay back repara ons.
Fischer is explaining here how by losing factories and coal mines that were found on the
Ruhr, Germany was essen ally losing an incredibly valuable area which helped them in
repara ons payment. In turn this led to Germany making less goods due to the loss of the
Ruhr yet carrying on to pay the passive resistance workers that were on strike. This resulted
in the government needing to print more money to pay the workers on strike. But the once
controlled prin ng, soon spiralled out of control - thus leading to hyperin a on showing
that it was the invasion of the Ruhr that started the chain of events which led to
hyperin a on. It all stemmed from the French occupa on of the Ruhr, and with Germany
losing such an economically valuable area, the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr can be
shown to be the main cause of hyperin a on.
Except it wasn’t. The policies of the Weimar cons tu on itself can also be credited with
the downfall of the German mark. Holfriech, in “Why the German democracy failed” states
that the German government’s economic policy was ‘Economically ra onal as well as
poli cally wise.’ But from the e ects of hyperin a on it just cannot be true. Yes, the method
of prin ng more money would allow economic growth and con nued pro ts, making the
new Weimar government seem very popular as to the point Holfreich is making, but the
sheer scale of money being printed should have been a clear warning for the Weimar
government that they needed to rethink economic strategy. Having so much money in the
German economy was bound to cause severe problems, and any economist with a
rudimentary knowledge of monetarism should have picked up on this. The mark had in ated
by 55 mes from the end of the war, to the summer of 1922, and this in a on rate showed
no signs of slowing down in a faltering economy, only to be accentuated by the invasion of
the Ruhr. The Weimar government should have been wiser - op ng to cut down on
Germany in 1923’. Assess the validity of this view.
The Ruhr invasion in January 1923 was certainly a major factor in the ci zens of
Germany losing all faith in the value of the mark, with workers being paid for not producing
any goods at all. Yet from the evidence provided, the Ruhr invasion seems only to be the
nal blow in the series of many events that led to “madness, nightmare, despera on, chaos”
that was the life of many german ci zens during the event of hyperin a on. (K Heiden
1944).
It can be argued that the French and Belgians were the main reason hyperin a on
struck Germany in 1923. France felt that they “Had won the war, yet was losing the peace.”
(C Fischer, the Ruhr Crisis). What Fischer is sta ng here is that France wanted to keep
Germany weak, as by keeping Germany weak France would be safe from the threat of
another a ack. Fischer also agrees that French occupa on of the Ruhr led to a loss of
economic resources which made Germany to nd it even harder to pay back repara ons.
Fischer is explaining here how by losing factories and coal mines that were found on the
Ruhr, Germany was essen ally losing an incredibly valuable area which helped them in
repara ons payment. In turn this led to Germany making less goods due to the loss of the
Ruhr yet carrying on to pay the passive resistance workers that were on strike. This resulted
in the government needing to print more money to pay the workers on strike. But the once
controlled prin ng, soon spiralled out of control - thus leading to hyperin a on showing
that it was the invasion of the Ruhr that started the chain of events which led to
hyperin a on. It all stemmed from the French occupa on of the Ruhr, and with Germany
losing such an economically valuable area, the Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr can be
shown to be the main cause of hyperin a on.
Except it wasn’t. The policies of the Weimar cons tu on itself can also be credited with
the downfall of the German mark. Holfriech, in “Why the German democracy failed” states
that the German government’s economic policy was ‘Economically ra onal as well as
poli cally wise.’ But from the e ects of hyperin a on it just cannot be true. Yes, the method
of prin ng more money would allow economic growth and con nued pro ts, making the
new Weimar government seem very popular as to the point Holfreich is making, but the
sheer scale of money being printed should have been a clear warning for the Weimar
government that they needed to rethink economic strategy. Having so much money in the
German economy was bound to cause severe problems, and any economist with a
rudimentary knowledge of monetarism should have picked up on this. The mark had in ated
by 55 mes from the end of the war, to the summer of 1922, and this in a on rate showed
no signs of slowing down in a faltering economy, only to be accentuated by the invasion of
the Ruhr. The Weimar government should have been wiser - op ng to cut down on
