IPE
Read g The H dde Ha d f Ec cC e c
De e
Ec cc e c The threat or act b a sender go ernment or go ernments to disr pt economic
e change ith the target state nless the target acq iesces to an artic lated demand a prominent
tool of statecraft
Sanctions impose costs on both the target and sender relati e to the stat s q o b disr pting
economic e change
Price of sanctions to the US is billion ann all in lost e ports
The scholarl assessment of sanctions is that the don t ork
H fba er Schott Elliot Sanctions ha e a s ccess rate of
Pape Sanctions ha e a s ccess rate of
Game theoretic approaches Beca se of strategic interaction one sho ld obser e most of the
fail res b t miss most of the s ccesses
Imposition of sanctions represents a dead eight loss of tilit for senders and targets
disr pted economic e change
Actors ha e an incenti e to reach an agreement before imposition
If the sender prefers the stat s q o to imposing sanctions there sho ld be no coercion
attempt
If the target prefers conceding to inc rring the costs of sancitons it has an incenti e to
compl before the imposition of sanctions
The diffic lt of obser ing threats that ne er need to be e ec ted raises the possibilit that e ec
b a has affected empirical st dies of economic coercion
To test the selection effects arg ment cr cial cases to st d are those in hich coercion is
threatened b t not implemented
Dre ner arg es the most promising ein of data to test for selection bias in ol es sanctions emplo ed
in the p rs it of economic or reg lator goals beca se of the abilit to obser e threats
Dre ner s ggests selection effects are present
Models of economic coercion emphasi ing strategic interaction hold more promise as an e planation
of economic coercion
A significant n mber of coercion attempts end at the threat stage before sanctions are imposed
These cases ield larger concessions than cases here sanctions are imposed
S a eg c e ac ec cc e c
Game theoretic models of coercion that treat sender and target as rational nitar actors share a
common prediction
S ccessf l instances of economic coercion are more likel to end at the threat stage than the
imposition stage
An agreement before implementation a oids the dead eight cost of the sanctions imposition for both
target and sender efficient o tcome for rational tilit ma imi ers
Read g The H dde Ha d f Ec cC e c
De e
Ec cc e c The threat or act b a sender go ernment or go ernments to disr pt economic
e change ith the target state nless the target acq iesces to an artic lated demand a prominent
tool of statecraft
Sanctions impose costs on both the target and sender relati e to the stat s q o b disr pting
economic e change
Price of sanctions to the US is billion ann all in lost e ports
The scholarl assessment of sanctions is that the don t ork
H fba er Schott Elliot Sanctions ha e a s ccess rate of
Pape Sanctions ha e a s ccess rate of
Game theoretic approaches Beca se of strategic interaction one sho ld obser e most of the
fail res b t miss most of the s ccesses
Imposition of sanctions represents a dead eight loss of tilit for senders and targets
disr pted economic e change
Actors ha e an incenti e to reach an agreement before imposition
If the sender prefers the stat s q o to imposing sanctions there sho ld be no coercion
attempt
If the target prefers conceding to inc rring the costs of sancitons it has an incenti e to
compl before the imposition of sanctions
The diffic lt of obser ing threats that ne er need to be e ec ted raises the possibilit that e ec
b a has affected empirical st dies of economic coercion
To test the selection effects arg ment cr cial cases to st d are those in hich coercion is
threatened b t not implemented
Dre ner arg es the most promising ein of data to test for selection bias in ol es sanctions emplo ed
in the p rs it of economic or reg lator goals beca se of the abilit to obser e threats
Dre ner s ggests selection effects are present
Models of economic coercion emphasi ing strategic interaction hold more promise as an e planation
of economic coercion
A significant n mber of coercion attempts end at the threat stage before sanctions are imposed
These cases ield larger concessions than cases here sanctions are imposed
S a eg c e ac ec cc e c
Game theoretic models of coercion that treat sender and target as rational nitar actors share a
common prediction
S ccessf l instances of economic coercion are more likel to end at the threat stage than the
imposition stage
An agreement before implementation a oids the dead eight cost of the sanctions imposition for both
target and sender efficient o tcome for rational tilit ma imi ers
