Diminished Responsibility Evaluation
INTRODUCTION
DR was first introduced in s2 Homicide Act 1957 and amended under s52 Coroners
and Justice Act 2009, as a result of recommendations proposed by the Law
Commission.
The purpose of this was to improve the law’s ‘clarity, fairness, and effectiveness’.
Under the 2009 law, the defendant must prove that they were suffering from:
- An abnormality of mental functioning, which arises from a recognised mental
condition,
AND THIS CONDITION MUST
- Substantially impair D’s ability to
a) understand his conduct, or
b) form a rational judgement, or
c) exercise self-control
ABNORMALITY OF MENTAL FUNCTIONING
The requirement of an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ was inserted into the new
section 2 in place of the old defence’s requirement of an ‘abnormality of mind’.
This was previously defined in Byrne as ‘a state of mind so different from that of
ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal’ and is still
used under the new defence.
The change in terminology and its inextricable link to the need for a ‘recognised
medical condition’ (as confirmed in Lindo) means the new term is preferred by
psychiatrists, as theoretically, their understanding of mental functioning should give
them the authority express expert opinion on deliberations.
In particular, the Supreme Court endorsed this in Golds when, in the course of his
judgment (in which the other members of the court concurred), Lord Hughes
asserted that medical evidence is always a practical necessity in diminished
responsibility.
This markedly reflects an improvement to the law, as it limits jury’s input in deciding
what constitutes mental impairment. They are clearly not qualified to assume this
role and may let emotions get in the way. The trial of Peter Sutcliffe reflects this, as in
this case, the jury ignored medical opinion that Sutcliffe suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia.
However, it is still unclear which parts of the Diminished Responsibility defence are
matters for the jury, especially since psychiatrists were encouraged to comment on
the ultimate issue in Brennan. The term ‘mental functioning’ moral, social and
philosophical dimensions, which leads inconsistent interpretations by psychiatrists,
juries, and the courts.
Kennefick draws the conclusion that: “psychiatrists testifying in relation to
responsibility, and juries attempting to decipher complicated psychiatric terminology,
results in ambiguity, inconsistency and thus arguably unfair treatment of the
mentally disordered offender.”
INTRODUCTION
DR was first introduced in s2 Homicide Act 1957 and amended under s52 Coroners
and Justice Act 2009, as a result of recommendations proposed by the Law
Commission.
The purpose of this was to improve the law’s ‘clarity, fairness, and effectiveness’.
Under the 2009 law, the defendant must prove that they were suffering from:
- An abnormality of mental functioning, which arises from a recognised mental
condition,
AND THIS CONDITION MUST
- Substantially impair D’s ability to
a) understand his conduct, or
b) form a rational judgement, or
c) exercise self-control
ABNORMALITY OF MENTAL FUNCTIONING
The requirement of an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ was inserted into the new
section 2 in place of the old defence’s requirement of an ‘abnormality of mind’.
This was previously defined in Byrne as ‘a state of mind so different from that of
ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal’ and is still
used under the new defence.
The change in terminology and its inextricable link to the need for a ‘recognised
medical condition’ (as confirmed in Lindo) means the new term is preferred by
psychiatrists, as theoretically, their understanding of mental functioning should give
them the authority express expert opinion on deliberations.
In particular, the Supreme Court endorsed this in Golds when, in the course of his
judgment (in which the other members of the court concurred), Lord Hughes
asserted that medical evidence is always a practical necessity in diminished
responsibility.
This markedly reflects an improvement to the law, as it limits jury’s input in deciding
what constitutes mental impairment. They are clearly not qualified to assume this
role and may let emotions get in the way. The trial of Peter Sutcliffe reflects this, as in
this case, the jury ignored medical opinion that Sutcliffe suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia.
However, it is still unclear which parts of the Diminished Responsibility defence are
matters for the jury, especially since psychiatrists were encouraged to comment on
the ultimate issue in Brennan. The term ‘mental functioning’ moral, social and
philosophical dimensions, which leads inconsistent interpretations by psychiatrists,
juries, and the courts.
Kennefick draws the conclusion that: “psychiatrists testifying in relation to
responsibility, and juries attempting to decipher complicated psychiatric terminology,
results in ambiguity, inconsistency and thus arguably unfair treatment of the
mentally disordered offender.”
