‘To what extent did Nixon’s Asia policies 1969-1972 shift the direction of the Cold War?’
Between 1969 and 1972, President Richard Nixon improved diplomatic relationships with both China
and the USSR in an attempt to create greater negotiation in regards to the Vietnam War, however
although he improved the Sino-American and the Chinese-American alliances, he nevertheless was
unable to persuade both countries into encouraging the end of the Vietnam War like he had intended.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that it was Nixon’s policies in Asia which did however encourage the
beginning of detente and although he was unable to end the Vietnam War, he did therefore decrease
global tension between the Soviet Union and America.
Following the failure and poor response to Lyndon B Johnson’s policy of ‘Amercianisastion’ in
Vietnam, President Richard Nixon shaped his 1968 presidential campaign around the idea of ‘peace
with honour’ (or Vietnamisation) to enable the removal of American troops - this is evident when
considering Nixon’s pledge to not “end up like LBJ. I’m going to stop the war.” Nixon believed the
US’s withdrawal from the War would encourage his negotiation position with North Vietnam. As of
June 1969, there were an estimated 453,000 US troops in Vietnam, however by June 1972, the
estimate was 47,000. Vietnamization was not about Nixon abandoning the South, but instead it was
about removing the US’s physicality and enabling the South to fight for their War with US resources.
The ARVN was provided with M-16 Armalite rifles as well as with helicopters, planes and other
transportation methods. In 1968 there were 82,000 members of the ARVN, and by 1970, this reached
one million. Although Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization benefited his position in America and the
number of American casualties decreased rapidly, it was this policy and the neglect of the South
which would eventually lead to the fall of Saigon in 1975 establishing the Soviet’s success of
expansionism into Asia. Suggestively, it was this policy which established the growing weakness of
the US as a superpower during the Cold War.
Following the decreasing alliance of the Soviets and Chinese, both Nixon and his principal advisor,
Henry Kissinger, recognized that the improvement of Sino-American relations, would encourage the
USSR to become more negotiable as the two superpowers which they considered as a ‘threat’ became
cooperative. The beginning of the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet relationship began to occur in the
early 1960s following Mao’s belief that he should become the global face of communism instead of
Khrushchev who Mao believed did represent the traditionality of the ideology following the secret
speech and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similarly, in the late 1960s, this tension only further developed
following tensions on the Sino-Soviet border. In July 1969, Nixon relaxed travel restrictions to China
and built diplomatic relationships through France, Romania and Pakistan who all had connections to
China. The improvement of the Sino-American relationship enabled the Soviet Union to become more
cooperative which is evident when considering the ratification of SALT 1 in May 1972, however, the
relationship did not succeed as Nixon had hoped in China’s encouragement of persuading the North to
engage in peace negotiations. Suggestively, it was Nixon’s cooperation with Chairman Mao in China
which encouraged the Soviet Union to become more cooperative, and therefore decreasing the
hostility of the Cold War.
However, although Vietnamisastion and the improvement of the Sino-American alliance decreased the
threat of the Cold War, Nixon’s policies in Cambodia only increased hostility in regards to the
Vietnam War. In an attempt to weaken the use of the Ho Chi Minh trail (which was used by the North
as a passageway to receive supplies), Nixon instigated a 1969 military offence in Cambodia in an
attempt to weaken the North’s position in the war. However, following Lon Nol’s takeover in 1970
(pro-American), hostility in Cambodia increased as the Khmer Rouge grew in popularity. In response,
Between 1969 and 1972, President Richard Nixon improved diplomatic relationships with both China
and the USSR in an attempt to create greater negotiation in regards to the Vietnam War, however
although he improved the Sino-American and the Chinese-American alliances, he nevertheless was
unable to persuade both countries into encouraging the end of the Vietnam War like he had intended.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that it was Nixon’s policies in Asia which did however encourage the
beginning of detente and although he was unable to end the Vietnam War, he did therefore decrease
global tension between the Soviet Union and America.
Following the failure and poor response to Lyndon B Johnson’s policy of ‘Amercianisastion’ in
Vietnam, President Richard Nixon shaped his 1968 presidential campaign around the idea of ‘peace
with honour’ (or Vietnamisation) to enable the removal of American troops - this is evident when
considering Nixon’s pledge to not “end up like LBJ. I’m going to stop the war.” Nixon believed the
US’s withdrawal from the War would encourage his negotiation position with North Vietnam. As of
June 1969, there were an estimated 453,000 US troops in Vietnam, however by June 1972, the
estimate was 47,000. Vietnamization was not about Nixon abandoning the South, but instead it was
about removing the US’s physicality and enabling the South to fight for their War with US resources.
The ARVN was provided with M-16 Armalite rifles as well as with helicopters, planes and other
transportation methods. In 1968 there were 82,000 members of the ARVN, and by 1970, this reached
one million. Although Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization benefited his position in America and the
number of American casualties decreased rapidly, it was this policy and the neglect of the South
which would eventually lead to the fall of Saigon in 1975 establishing the Soviet’s success of
expansionism into Asia. Suggestively, it was this policy which established the growing weakness of
the US as a superpower during the Cold War.
Following the decreasing alliance of the Soviets and Chinese, both Nixon and his principal advisor,
Henry Kissinger, recognized that the improvement of Sino-American relations, would encourage the
USSR to become more negotiable as the two superpowers which they considered as a ‘threat’ became
cooperative. The beginning of the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet relationship began to occur in the
early 1960s following Mao’s belief that he should become the global face of communism instead of
Khrushchev who Mao believed did represent the traditionality of the ideology following the secret
speech and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Similarly, in the late 1960s, this tension only further developed
following tensions on the Sino-Soviet border. In July 1969, Nixon relaxed travel restrictions to China
and built diplomatic relationships through France, Romania and Pakistan who all had connections to
China. The improvement of the Sino-American relationship enabled the Soviet Union to become more
cooperative which is evident when considering the ratification of SALT 1 in May 1972, however, the
relationship did not succeed as Nixon had hoped in China’s encouragement of persuading the North to
engage in peace negotiations. Suggestively, it was Nixon’s cooperation with Chairman Mao in China
which encouraged the Soviet Union to become more cooperative, and therefore decreasing the
hostility of the Cold War.
However, although Vietnamisastion and the improvement of the Sino-American alliance decreased the
threat of the Cold War, Nixon’s policies in Cambodia only increased hostility in regards to the
Vietnam War. In an attempt to weaken the use of the Ho Chi Minh trail (which was used by the North
as a passageway to receive supplies), Nixon instigated a 1969 military offence in Cambodia in an
attempt to weaken the North’s position in the war. However, following Lon Nol’s takeover in 1970
(pro-American), hostility in Cambodia increased as the Khmer Rouge grew in popularity. In response,
